tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post1175029231243212300..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: The State of the God Debates: Some lessons from Shook vs. CraigEric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger62125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-19531148116525000472012-03-01T15:58:07.133-06:002012-03-01T15:58:07.133-06:00Thanks Dianelos
I think we are using a different ...Thanks Dianelos<br /><br />I think we are using a different notion of consensus here, in that the one you attack is certainly not one I would defend.<br /><br />I agree, if people make the mistake you attribute to many, of equating our models of reality with reality itself, then they appear to committing a logical error that, when explained, will often be taken on board.<br /><br /><br />I am claiming something quite different about consensus. I speak here not of broad fashions, but of models that are universally accepted as the current best guess. Determinism, as you speak of it, never reached this threshhold, although various physical models that worked deterministically did. In the absence of the later-developed probablistic models, these individual models were indeed best guesses, they provided the most accurate predictions then available (which is all our models can do). Interestingly, the probablistic models now are continuing to pose problems, and we would be foolish to expect they will never themselves be supplanted, so when you say that the world turns out not be deterministic, I wonder if you too aren't overinterpreting science in this very way.<br /><br />I appreciate the point that the way to test a personal belief is to live it out. I agree entirely. This is exactly what I mean when I say that such belief systems are subjective. The evidence we use may not apply to other members of our community. And so, is it not better to say 'this is true for me' in the same way that it might be true to me that a certain style of wine is superior to others? I discover my preference by living it out, while understanding the preferences of others will play out differently, purely because of their unique lifelines.<br /><br />When we say 'the earth is round' we are maing a different type of statement, one whose lived out truth is not affected by the world view of the person making the satement. The round earth represents a best guess, as there is no better performing alternative on the table. In the God/wine case there are many alternatives available, each of which works best for some people. <br /><br />This distinction seems important to me, in that a failure to make it can lead people to misinterpret statements like 'I believe there is no God' and so buy into fights with people they essentially agree with. <br /><br />Thanks, as always, for your time.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-43068987553891717412012-03-01T14:23:12.985-06:002012-03-01T14:23:12.985-06:00Bernard,
I agree that our experience of free wil...Bernard, <br /><br />I agree that our experience of free will does not falsify determinism. For all I know in a deterministic reality intelligent beings may evolve who insist that they have free will. I sometimes wonder how an intelligent computer in our world would discuss free will. Stanislaw Lem has written some interesting stories about robots – who knew they were robots - arguing about their religious worldviews. But perhaps deterministic intelligent computers will turn out to be impossible (as is argued by some very smart people, e.g. Roger Penrose). <br /><br />On the other hand an almost universally accepted epistemic principle is the following: If X seems to be true then one should believe in X unless one has a defeater for X. So, for example, if it seems to you that there is a keyboard in front of you then you should believe that one exists in front of you, unless you have some good reason to doubt it. I think that people at the beginning of the 20th erred in embracing determinism, because their misinterpretation of physical science led them to think they had a defeater for their experience of free will, when in fact they didn’t. And the fact that philosophers since the ancient Greeks and certainly since Kant had made it clear that one should not confuse how reality seems with how reality is, makes that error at least among professional philosophers hard to justify. What’s more, most (about 85%) modern philosophers continue to hold that science describes physical reality and not just physical phenomena (a view called “scientific realism”). It seems that fashion plays a large and misleading role in philosophical thought. – Which, I dare say, goes against the grain of trusting the consensus. <br /><br />I’d like to go back to a previous question. You write: <br /><br />“<i>So, in terms of metabeliefs, the circumstances you outline acknowledge that what is in play is guesswork. Is this also how you see your belief in God, a matter of hopeful guessing, no better or worse than the hopeful guess of an atheist, or do you think there's more to it than that?</i>”<br /><br />(I dislike your use of the concept of “guesswork” because all of the quest for truth, even in the physical sciences, starts as guesswork.) <br /><br />I think that both the philosophically aware atheist and theist are convinced of their respective worldviews for similar reasons: They find that they comport well with their experience of life, they find that their worldview is the more reasonable (or intellectually defendable) one, and they find that their worldview is the most pragmatically useful one. <br /><br />The philosophically unaware atheist and theist embrace their respective worldviews because of environmental factors including peer or social pressure, or simply because of fashion. I suspect that many atheists have embraced atheism because they hold that the smartest people are atheists. Many theists on the other hand may have embraced theism because of the naked fear of being punished after death. <br /><br />The important thing to consider here is this: Religion is primary not a belief system but a way of life (or, what’s saying the same, a way of being). The belief systems are secondary, and are there to make sense of that way of life. So, when people from the outside of religion focus on religious beliefs they are putting the cart before the horse; they are approaching religion from a false angle. You often speak of “psychological preferences and needs”, “hopeful guessing”, etc. The fact is that the seriously religious people find their way of life deeply satisfying, enriching, and empowering – which becomes for them as much an empirical confirmation of their worldview as it is for the scientist to find empirical confirmation of some theory. The idea that religious beliefs are not empirically confirmed is one of the major modern myths. The difference is that the laboratory of the religious confirmation is the whole life of the individual.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-66841928218718160892012-03-01T06:26:34.951-06:002012-03-01T06:26:34.951-06:00Hi Darrell,
Yes, is belief versus unbelief a symm...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />Yes, is belief versus unbelief a symmetrical situation? I don't think so, at least if belief means a more or less well defined belief, as theism.<br /><br />Let's say the question is “what is beyond the physical world?” I think the proper attitude is to accept our ignorance and hold our judgment, in other words a position of agnosticism. The latter is a personal choice, a psychological twist if you wish: I don't have a problem not knowing, I can live with doubt and uncertainty. Others need or choose to make a guess – that's a personal thing.<br /><br />Now, theism is just one guess among many and its popularity does not make it any more likely to be true. Unless there are solid grounds to consider it likely (and there is none that I know of), it's just a guess. A-theism in this sense is not advocating any special answer to the question above but the refusal to give theism special status on the basis of its popularity. Framing the question as a more or less 50-50 choice between theism and a-theism is a logical error.<br /><br />Of course one may disagree that there are no solid grounds for theism but this is another debate. Given this evaluation of the evidence, the above position follows naturally.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-44320351853352476552012-03-01T01:07:48.764-06:002012-03-01T01:07:48.764-06:00Hi Darrell
Oh well, thank you for staying with th...Hi Darrell<br /><br />Oh well, thank you for staying with the conversation as long as you did. Another time perhaps.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-16334382344123223222012-03-01T00:53:19.081-06:002012-03-01T00:53:19.081-06:00Hi Dianelos
Perhaps I misunderstood you. Absolute...Hi Dianelos<br /><br />Perhaps I misunderstood you. Absolutely, the best we can say of a scientific model is that it's our best predictive model. Whether it describes reality as such is a different assertion and not one I would support.<br /><br />Our apparent experience of free will didn't provide a falsifier of determinism, and nor did the behaviour of a coin. Both were explicable within that framework, and more importantly, there was no superior predictive model available until the the physics advanced. Hence, best guess is a good description.<br /><br />As you say, the key matter of contention between what the order we observe tells us about reality, and the very fact that it is a matter of contention, should warn us that both camps are at this stage guessing, weaving personal stories to fit their needs. Which is a perfectly reasonable thing to do. What is not reasonable, I don't think, is to claim one is doing more than this.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-87405931220402376912012-03-01T00:04:05.901-06:002012-03-01T00:04:05.901-06:00Bernard,
I would still like to hear how JP and B...Bernard, <br /><br />I would still like to hear how JP and Burk respond to your assertion that atheism and/or agnosticism is either a psychological twist, or genetic, and is ultimately a self-serving story; or, in other words, is no different than belief in God.<br /><br />Beyond that, I don’t see a single assertion or explanation being made by you that you haven’t already made and that hasn’t already been addressed. I think I have already pointed out the errors in your reasoning and I think Eric has as well.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-1420781757765942232012-02-29T23:56:59.836-06:002012-02-29T23:56:59.836-06:00Bernard,
The quest for truth is a difficult proj...Bernard, <br /><br />The quest for truth is a difficult project. There are clearly better and worse ways to think. That’s why we have the philosophical field of epistemology. <br /><br />One thing that almost everybody agrees with is that when we know of some error (whether committed by us or by somebody else) it’s a good idea to think why that error was committed. Indeed, that’s the beauty of mistakes: one learns from them. (Arguably the only way to learn is by making mistakes, but no matter). <br /><br />So consider the case of how almost everybody at the beginning of the 20th century believed that the physical universe was deterministic and how they were all wrong. You write that at that time determinism was the best possible guess. I disagree. People committed that error by overestimating the reach of scientific knowledge, by misunderstanding the relationship between scientific model and reality, and by suppressing the relevance of their own experience of life (namely of freedom of will). And, after all, it’s not like they didn’t know of prime-facie random events such as tossing a coin, nor were they unaware that a great number of coin tosses produces a quasi-deterministic 50/50 distribution of heads and tails. So, in my judgment people erred so gravely about determinism because they were blinded by the success of the physical sciences to the degree that they abdicated their capacity for critical thought. <br /><br />I think that the way that science dumbs people down continues. In the beginning of the 20th century philosopher Bertrand Russell rightly observed that when scientists speak of “light” they don’t mean “the thing which seeing people experience and blind people do not”. Which should be quite obvious. The various names that science uses from our everyday experience of life mean something quite different in the scientific context. Well, about a hundred years after Russell pointed out that error people almost without exception continue to commit it. So, for example, you constantly hear people say that according to general relativity “mass bends space”, as if the concept of space allows for such “bending”. Physicist David Deutsch goes so far as to claim that peoples’ sense of time is "nonsense", when of course peoples’ sense of time *defines* what “time” means. Thus science continues to move people to commit huge and rather obvious errors of reasoning. In my judgment the culprit is not so much scientists (who wrongly believe they are experts about the meaning of science, when in fact they are merely experts in discovering mathematical patterns in physical phenomena), but rather modern philosophers whose job it is to lead people into good practices of thought, and who have so far failed to interpret science correctly (probably because they are as blinded by science’s success as the next person). <br /><br />I agree with your dislike of “guesswork” and that’s why I think a very good epistemic principle is not to make unnecessary assumptions. Without making unnecessary assumptions then, here is in my judgment the best way to think about the physical sciences: Part of our experience of life is that of physical phenomena. Physical phenomena display stable order (for example day follows night and night follows day, an apple left free in the air falls, etc). That order can be abstracted in mathematical form to great precision. That and nothing more is what the physical sciences do. That precision in turn helps us construct useful machines. – Now the next step takes us into philosophy: The fact and the nature of the mathematical order present in physical phenomena clearly tells us something about how reality is. What exactly is a matter of contention. So, for example, naturalists think that reality itself is a fundamentally mathematical construct, a mechanism. Theists on the contrary think that reality is fundamentally a thinking mind, and that the order we observe is caused by it.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-16520318616601982022012-02-29T18:39:36.484-06:002012-02-29T18:39:36.484-06:00Hi Dianelos
One thought about the human condition...Hi Dianelos<br /><br />One thought about the human condition perhaps. It seems to be in our nature to overextend our beliefs, if we are not careful to guard against it. So, you speak of the need to form beliefs in the case where the future does not yield up its information, when deciding what to study, or planing for an event on the back of a fifty fifty weather forecast perhaps. <br /><br />But might we see these necessary speculations as something quite distinct from beliefs? When the vineyard owner takes a punt, and puts the harvest off another week, they don't necessarily believe there will be no frosts. If somebody asked them, will there be frosts next week, they might honestly answer 'I don't know, although I rather hope not.'<br /><br />They are pragmatically committed to a course of action, but quite agnostic with regard to its appropriateness. This is quite different from the way I believe, say, in the existence of the keyboard in front of me, where there appears to exist sufficient evidence to do more than blindly guess. <br /><br />So, in terms of metabeliefs, the circumstances you outline acknowledge that what is in play is guesswork. Is this also how you see your belief in God, a matter of hopeful guessing, no better or worse than the hopeful guess of an atheist, or do you think there's more to it than that?<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-25937677334722591952012-02-29T14:56:29.483-06:002012-02-29T14:56:29.483-06:00Burk,
“Given our known psychological propensity ...Burk, <br /><br />“<i>Given our known psychological propensity for confirmation bias, this method of reasoning can support virtually any position or faith. The evidence adduced is typically not of a mathematical nature, but turns on satisfaction with one's life, which is notoriously subject to ideological influence and psychological relativism.</i>”<br /><br />I both agree and disagree with what you write here. <br /><br />Let me start where I disagree. There are many cases where we cannot escape embracing a belief on faith (i.e. on insufficient objective evidence), and it does not rarely happen that we recognize afterwards that that belief was wrong. Examples would be beliefs one must embrace before deciding what to study, or beliefs one must embrace before deciding whom to marry. It seems the human condition is such that some of the most important decisions in one’s life depend on beliefs one embraces on faith, or at least mostly on faith. There are examples galore. Whether to go out and do what one thinks is right, is a case in point. Even in science, when a researches picks a certain line of work in which she will invest years of her life, one must ultimately embrace some beliefs on faith. Again, it is not rarely the case that *after* embracing a belief on faith we find out that that belief was wrong. It is also not rarely the case that we find out that that belief was right. That’s the way it goes. (Indeed, my larger point here is this. We may disagree and debate as much as you wish about claims concerning the foundational nature of the reality we live in. But all our knowledge is ultimately based on the human condition, i.e. on the whole of our experience of life, and we should at least be clear about the basic facts and structure of the human condition itself.) <br /><br />Now here is where I agree with you. The human condition is not an unchangeable thing. The choices we make (which are influenced by the beliefs we have embraced) not only change our life from the outside but also from the inside as it were. The young man who decides to study engineering rather than art changes not only the objectively observable facts of his life, but also *how* that life is experienced. The quality of our experience of life, that unobservable but hugely relevant parameter about the value of our life, depends to a significant degree on our beliefs and choices (driven by these beliefs). To a remarkable degree we *become* what we believe. Which of course implies that we end up experiencing our lives in a way which confirms our beliefs. <br /><br />I think this is particularly so in the context of metaphysical beliefs (whether religious or naturalistic) where it seems that confirmation bias is strongly at work. One reason for this is probably the fact that time-tested metaphysical theories are for all practical purposes unfalsifiable either by objective or subjective evidence. Both naturalism and theism, intelligently conceived, have that property. This means that any evidence (objective or subjective) one may encounter will fit with one’s respective worldview, especially after one has firmly embraced that worldview. In other words people often change in a way that confirms their worldview. (I am here referring to the local maxima we were discussing with Eric in the context of Hegel’s epistemology.)Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-45226097393511242432012-02-29T14:04:30.724-06:002012-02-29T14:04:30.724-06:00Darrell-
Speaking for myself, the way I would put...Darrell-<br /><br />Speaking for myself, the way I would put it is that the choice on which you are so focused- whether there is or is not a god- is itself the psychological twitch at issue. Since we don't know and can't know, it is hardly worth spending our time "believing" one way or the other. The philosophical default is agnosticism, and to dispose of the question as irrelevant, unanswerable, and without any compelling need to answer or compelling evidence to do so.<br /><br />Proceeding from this as the objective state of the matter, one is faced with many people who nevertheless insist that this question of god is of momentous personal, political, intergalactic, cosmic etc. importance and must absolutely be answered. Have they ever read Freud? The most coherent and efficient hypotheses that come to my mind are psychological in nature, not cosmological. That is where my tendency to atheism comes from- a blend of negative (scientific) and positive (psychological) evidence. But it is by no means a leap of faith, a "deep belief", or a closed and shut case- just the best guess based on the relevant evidence. <br /><br />As Bernard says, it is a guess, and I do chose to promote it to some degree, since I believe it has some merit! I believe that we all have that right, but at the same time, one's confidence in one's argument needs to relate to the evidence behind it. If it is frankly faith-based, then there really is nothing behind it that supports it as a rational argument. At best it would be a perspective /style of living that argues for itself by example.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-36788822877452641832012-02-29T06:39:28.121-06:002012-02-29T06:39:28.121-06:00Hi Darrell,
[...] God’s existence is about object...Hi Darrell,<br /><br /><i>[...] God’s existence is about objective reality</i>.<br /><br />For what is's worth, this is what I have in mind here:<br /><br />In what sense is the proposition “the Earth is round” about objective reality? Strictly speaking the proposition is <i>not</i> directly about reality but about a representation or a model. It involves ideas, concepts and states a relationship between them.<br /><br />Now, of course, there is a connection between such propositions and objective reality in the form of “experiments” of various sorts. There are things we can do to test the proposition against reality. You can do this, do that, make some measurements, and so on – in other words establish a mapping between the “abstract” concepts in the proposition and sensory data (directly or indirectly). This is how the proposition acquires its concrete meaning and why we can say, informally, that the proposition is about reality.<br /><br />However, when we consider the proposition “God exists”, there is no such mapping. There is no way to establish a connection between the proposition and reality in an unambiguous way, as is the case with scientific propositions or statements about ordinary things. “God exists” is a proposition of a different kind. And, if we cannot “map” the words to actual data, then the proposition is not about objective reality but about something else.<br /><br />Saying that we can see or perceive God's actions in ordinary things does not work because we can just as well claim the opposite – this is entirely subjective. In the case of the shape of the Earth, we cannot at the same time measure it as round and as an elongated cylinder: this is what “objective” means.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-75626766771273666582012-02-29T00:31:05.129-06:002012-02-29T00:31:05.129-06:00Hi Darrell
Well, I am not claiming that my argume...Hi Darrell<br /><br />Well, I am not claiming that my arguments are based upon subjective leaps. In fact I am suggesting quite the opposite, that the position I am developing here relies only upon shared understandings of evidence and reasoning. Now, this is a strong claim, easily open to refutation by exposing a logical flaw or providing a counter example. That you haven't yet done this is interesting, but the invitation still stands.<br /><br />To recap, the position is this:<br /><br />Some things everybody agrees upon. We call these facts, but really mean we accept these as our best guesses. They include some physical relationships, and some logical propositions. We accept they might be wrong, but as nobody has a working alternative, we all accept them until that changes.<br /><br />Many of our beliefs require more than this. We must make assumptions which are not commonly held, or guesses about a state we have insufficient knowledge on (like the future, or another's thoughts). We sometimes refer to this set of assumptions as our world view. <br /><br />These world views can not be supported solely by shared evidence or reason. If they could be, they would be held by all those in possession of the relevant data and understanding. <br /><br />At the point where we claim a belief, based upon a world view, we are privileging our world view above those of others.<br /><br />This last step can be avoided if our metabelief is that such world views are in fact adopted for subjective reasons, essentially that our nature/experience/needs have delivered them up to us, and their fit with these needs is the only truth they represent.<br /><br />Now, my strong assertion is that the above is not itself dependent upon a particular world view. Rather it is the result of observations and lines of reasoning that we all agree upon. Of course, I might be quite wrong, and so again I invite you to show me where in this argument such an error has occurred.<br /><br />Note, the last step in the argument promotes a certain taste position (agnosticism) for those who prefer not to promote their own guesses over those of others. Nevertheless, the point itself is grounded not in this taste, but is a logical proposition, open to refutation.<br /><br />My agnosticism is absolutely world view dependent, which is why I promote it only as a personal taste.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-30549974313611977052012-02-28T23:42:51.430-06:002012-02-28T23:42:51.430-06:00JP,
“I am going one step further and suggest that...JP,<br /><br />“I am going one step further and suggest that statements about God's existence are only about particular world views and not about any objective reality. In other words, that it is meaningless to ask whether the statement “God exists” is true or false in any absolute or objective sense: the statement has only meaning within the context of a specific world view.”<br /><br />I don’t see how this is one step forward. You are asserting the atheist’s or naturalist’s point of view. The Christian is saying that God’s existence is about objective reality in the sense of being real, outside our minds and wills, although he is not saying God is like a UFO or Big Foot.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-38103139252815040152012-02-28T23:41:33.984-06:002012-02-28T23:41:33.984-06:00Bernard,
“Perhaps I can ask you a question? When ...Bernard,<br /><br />“Perhaps I can ask you a question? When you make a faith leap what do you think drives you one way or the other (once the evidence and reason has been laid out, and we are forced to move beyond it?) In my case, it's the absolute opposite of the position you accuse me of. In fact, I think there is nothing at all objective about my faith positions. I think they are psychological twitches, genetic tendencies and self-serving stories. I used these terms not to denigrate you, but to illuminate my own position.”<br /><br />So let me understand: You believe your agnosticism could just be a psychological twist, or genetic, and is a self-serving story? If so, then why would you trust it or even suggest it to be a good option to anyone? That doesn’t make any sense to me at all. If I felt my belief in God was any of those things, I would just be quiet about it and let it go. I certainly wouldn’t care one way or the other if others thought differently and I certainly wouldn’t waste my time on a blog discussing it. It would be like arguing over whether red wine was better than white.<br /><br />Also, I would love to hear what Burk and JP thinks about the fact that you seem to be saying their atheism or agnosticism is only a twitch, or genetics, and it just a self-serving story. In other words, their position, you seem to be saying, is not based upon evidence or objectivity (and I agree with you) but is simply their own personal preference—only true for them (where I would disagree—and I think Burk and JP may join me there). <br /><br />“As an agnostic, often I simply don't leap at all; I don't find it all necessary, for instance, to have an opinion on God's existence.”<br /><br />Every choice of this nature is a leap, whether belief, doubt, or unbelief. And again, the only reason one can say “I don’t know” is because he has positive beliefs in other directions which allow him to doubt certain assertions, such as “God exists.” Again you are trying to privilege your position but it will simply not do. You certainly do not have to have an opinion of whether or not God exists, but I would hazard to guess that your doubt comes from other faith positions you already hold like empiricism or naturalism. I just don’t see how you get off this hook. Again, it is convenient to label everyone else as being committed one way or the other, while you stand back and hold judgment. But all one need do is ask why he withholds judgment and we will hear all sorts of positive assertions (empiricism, naturalism, scientism, etc.) which are all philosophical positions held by faith.<br /><br />“How about you? What do you think guides your leaps of faith? Is there an answer the theist can give to this that doesn't compromise humility? This is what interests me.”<br /><br />I really don’t like the phrase “leap of faith.” Again, I am not using the word “faith” to mean without evidence or in spite of the evidence. I think what can guide our faith positions is humility—knowing that that we could be wrong. The issue you are addressing is more a sensibility, a personality issue, a social dysfunction as far as making being right a superiority issue.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-80939483397289227892012-02-28T14:14:57.889-06:002012-02-28T14:14:57.889-06:00Hi Dianelos
Thanks for that.
This is an issue, I...Hi Dianelos<br /><br />Thanks for that.<br /><br />This is an issue, I think, about metabeliefs. What attitude do we take towards the stances we adopt?<br /><br />We seem to agree that in the end we are in the business of making guesses about how the world might be, based on our imperfect data. In this sense, the notion of commonly held beliefs becomes crucial, as we can say of a belief that everybody holds (the earth is round) that it represents a best current guess. We make this claim on the grounds that no alternative currently has any traction.<br /><br />It is true a best guess may turn out to be wrong, in fact the progress of science relies upon this very observation, and here your example of deterministic mechanisms is most apt. But, prior to quantum mechanics, a deterministic guess was indeed the best available guess, and still stands as a very useful approximating device in most circumstances (as does Newtonian physics). It was this fidelity with common experience that made it such a good guess in the first place.<br /><br />I am arguing that when such commonality does not exist (so reasonable people, similarly informed, can make different guesses), we no longer have grounds for speaking of best guesses. Here your guess really is as good as mine, we are in essence both constructing stories to fit our needs. <br /><br />Now, to believe such a personal guess is to disbelieve the alternative, despite us having no grounds for thinking one is any better than the other (apart from the subjective grounds that this guess suits me personally, so a statement of taste). Or alternatively, if we think we do have grounds we are being, to my mind, unspeakably arrogant. I have no taste for such hubris, and so think about such 'beliefs' as just idiosyncratic guesses.<br /><br />People who make statements like 'I believe there is a God' are doing something quite different from owning a personal guess. All power to them, each to their own, but I wonder why they are so reluctant to admit the self promoting attitude upon which this stance must rest.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-46835333127098752122012-02-28T09:40:44.676-06:002012-02-28T09:40:44.676-06:00Hi, Dianelos-
Thanks for taking up Bernard's ...Hi, Dianelos-<br /><br />Thanks for taking up Bernard's questions, which were well-put. If I could comment ... <br /><br /><i>"If all goes well, the faith process is as follows: One embraces a belief on faith, which leads one to make certain choices in one’s life, which leads to evidence which justifies that belief. Of course if things do not go well the evidence one finds defeats the original belief. <br /><br />Now please compare the above two processes. If all goes well then both lead to justified, indeed empirically justified, beliefs. If not all goes well then both lead one to find out one’s error."</i><br /><br />Given our known psychological propensity for confirmation bias, this method of reasoning can support virtually any position or faith. The evidence adduced is typically not of a mathematical nature, but turns on satisfaction with one's life, which is notoriously subject to ideological influence and psychological relativism. <br /><br />So I would suggest that the project of having faith first and then supporting it with "evidence" is fatally flawed from a philosophical standpoint, even when it is quite psychological congenial and empirically all too common-place.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-51854867380766605272012-02-28T01:44:02.852-06:002012-02-28T01:44:02.852-06:00Bernard,
I understand you want (or it is more to ...Bernard,<br /><br />I understand you want (or it is more to your taste) to avoid privileging your own intuitions over others. You don’t wish to downgrade other people. You only like to embrace beliefs for which there is consensus (and further perhaps, for which there is scientific consensus). In this context I’d like to offer the following thoughts. <br /><br />1. People do err. To believe in X knowing that others believe in not-X entails that one thinks that one is right and that others are wrong. (Let’s here overlook the fact that different people understand X differently, for example I don’t believe in the God virtually all atheists don’t believe in.) But I don’t think that holding that one is right and others are wrong entails downgrading others. Doing mistakes is part of the learning process, and in any case all non-dogmatic people are aware that they may be mistaken too. The other day I was reading one of the letters of Michelangelo, in which he described how his caster had made a mistake that had ruined one of his sculptures, and how he would have to work very hard to fix his caster’s mistake. But he was also very forgiving of him observing that “whoever makes, makes mistakes.” I thought that was a very good quote. <br /><br />2. Consensus says little. At the beginning of the 20th century “all” educated people (theists, atheists, and agnostics alike) believed that the physical universe is deterministic, and they believed that on overwhelming and centuries old scientific evidence. As it turns out they were mistaken. <br /><br />3. The human condition is such that one must make choices. In our context some choose (for some reason – even taste) to believe in a mechanical reality, some choose (for some reason - even taste) to believe in a religious reality, and some choose (for some reason – even taste) to withhold belief. But even the latter make a choice and will have to live with the consequences, exactly as is the case with the former “believers”. Ultimately our choices define who we are and how we experience life. <br /><br />4. Contrary to the widespread impression, believing something on faith need not be less intellectually sound than believing something on evidence. Let me try to explain what I mean:<br /><br />If all goes well, believing on evidence is the following process: <i>One has some evidence which justifies a belief, which leads one to embrace that belief, which leads one to make certain choices in one’s life.</i> I am saying “if all goes well” for it happens that the choices one makes may lead one to find contrary evidence (i.e. defeaters) for that belief. <br /><br />If all goes well, the faith process is as follows: <i>One embraces a belief on faith, which leads one to make certain choices in one’s life, which leads to evidence which justifies that belief.</i> Of course if things do not go well the evidence one finds defeats the original belief. <br /><br />Now please compare the above two processes. If all goes well then both lead to justified, indeed empirically justified, beliefs. If not all goes well then both lead one to find out one’s error. In short, I am arguing that evidence-based and faith-based learning processes can be similarly effective. In real life I suspect we learn by using both processes at the same time, i.e. by using both evidence and faith while building our beliefs. <br /><br />But there also differences. In general a belief supported by evidence is more likely true than a belief unsupported by evidence (and it is thus less likely that future evidence will falsify that belief). On the other hand, a fact about the human condition is that there are many contexts where there isn’t (or even where there can’t be) prior evidence, but where one must nevertheless believe something. (Or where to withhold belief may be a costly or risky choice.) <br /><br />In conclusion my argument is this: The human condition is such that 1) thinking hard about beliefs, 2) trusting in one’s cognitive faculties, 3) keeping an open mind, and last but not least 4) living one’s beliefs - is the best winning strategy as far as knowledge goes.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-34879900270868016692012-02-26T10:06:15.196-06:002012-02-26T10:06:15.196-06:00Hi Darrell,
In fact, I am suggesting something mo...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />In fact, I am suggesting something more radical: that <i>there isn't a fact of the matter concerning the existence of God</i>.<br /><br />You have often mentioned how world views determine how we evaluate evidence and the conclusions to which we are led.<br /><br />I am going one step further and suggest that statements about God's existence are <i>only</i> about particular world views and not about any objective reality. In other words, that it is meaningless to ask whether the statement “God exists” is true or false in any absolute or objective sense: the statement has only meaning within the context of a specific world view.<br /><br />This may seem extreme but it appears to fit well within the world-view dependent model of how we interpret facts. I'm not sure where this leads but I think this approach is worth a look. Any thought?JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-7071201598395100172012-02-25T17:38:54.914-06:002012-02-25T17:38:54.914-06:00Hi Darrell
An interesting response.
You're r...Hi Darrell<br /><br />An interesting response.<br /><br />You're right, we often go over the evidence/reason material; I'm not sure why as we are in absolute agreement on it, as per your comments to JP.<br /><br />The much more interesting issue is, what are we to make of our faith positions, when we find it necessary to make such leaps (and on the existence of God, agnostics find no such need, it's the position's defining characteristic)?<br /><br />Perhaps I can ask you a question? When you make a faith leap what do you think drives you one way or the other (once the evidence and reason has been laid out, and we are forced to move beyond it?) In my case, it's the absolute opposite of the position you accuse me of. In fact, I think there is nothing at all objective about my faith positions. I think they are psychological twitches, genetic tendencies and self-serving stories. I used these terms not to denigrate you, but to illuminate my own position.<br /><br />As an agnostic, often I simply don't leap at all; I don't find it all necessary, for instance, to have an opinion on God's existence. I don't know, end of story. I don't even know what the word God might mean. But, when I do find the need to construct a story, I do exactly that and then own the construction as subjective.<br /><br />How about you? What do you think guides your leaps of faith? Is there an answer the theist can give to this that doesn't compromise humility? This is what interests me.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-25393636664662008312012-02-25T11:33:18.095-06:002012-02-25T11:33:18.095-06:00JP,
If you are saying that we all live by faith, ...JP,<br /><br />If you are saying that we all live by faith, then I think that is certainly true. If we believe in God, we do so by faith. If we don’t believe in God, we do so by faith. I think the same is true of agnosticism. It is a view that comes by faith. I would rather use the word “faith” instead of intuition. I should add that I am using “faith” in the philosophical sense, which does not mean in spite of or without any evidence. What I mean is that we all have the same evidence, the universe, history, and our individual and shared experiences. When we gather all this up, reflect, and try and draw conclusions (whether the atheist, theist, or agnostic) we do so by faith.<br /><br />In that way it is a personal decision, but it is hardly a personal preference such as preferring vanilla to chocolate. Since it goes to deeply held issues regarding existence, the meaning of life, purpose, and morality we can certainly believe our position is true and that others are mistaken. Clearly, you think theists are mistaken. So what? Disagreement hardly equates to superiority. Acting superior because one thinks he is right, is more an unfortunate sensibility or personality problem than anything intrinsic to the matter of perhaps being right about something.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-77266560195941273962012-02-25T11:31:08.924-06:002012-02-25T11:31:08.924-06:00Bernard,
Well, we addressed the “evidence/reason”...Bernard,<br /><br />Well, we addressed the “evidence/reason” issue. Theists believe commonly held lines of evidence and reason and still come to different conclusions. Eric has gone over this many times. <br /><br />But let’s not quibble about inconvenient facts—you are indeed correct. While you objectively gaze down and only weigh the evidence, everyone else is “making stuff up,” have "psychological twitches", or are simply spouting “self-serving” stories. Clearly I can see how that makes agnosticism the more humble position and one that certainly doesn’t downgrade theism in the least…Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-74374980971820793682012-02-24T17:52:54.501-06:002012-02-24T17:52:54.501-06:00Hi Darrell
It may just be I'm unclear with my...Hi Darrell<br /><br />It may just be I'm unclear with my definitions here, as your refutations don't appear to contradict the points I thought I'd made. Perhaps I can clarify:<br /><br />On the first point, by compelling, I mean that the direction of the compulsion is universal. Yes, people feel compelled in their religious beliefs, but it is exactly as you note, they are pulled to one side or the other. So on this foundational observation we are in agreement.<br /><br />On the second point you address, you agree intuition is involved, but point out it's not only intuition. And of course, on this I agree. Thoughtful people carefully weight evidence, review lines of reasoning and then jump. The fact that some jump one way and some another, however, tells us that intuition determines the jump direction (were this not so, all similarly informed people would jump the same way, as they do, say, on the existence of cells, shape of the earth or cause of pregnancy). So I don't think we are in disagreement here either.<br /><br />Where we may disagree is on the third point. You say to interpret the evidence differently is to do nothing more than that. My claim is a person who chooses interpretation A is by definition rejecting interpretation B as less worthy. If this is not so, then why not choose B instead? And this is the crux. There are ways around this that do not compromise humility. <br /><br />One is to say, well I just chose A, so what? I don't know if I'm right or wrong, I had to guess something, so I guessed this. It was random. Another is to say, well I chose it because it suits me, it fits my needs, but it may not fit the needs of others. In other words, my choice is subjective.<br /><br />However, to say 'I really think there is/isn't a God, this isn't a random psychological twitch of mine, nor is it a self serving story, it's what I believe to be true', is to leave such humility well behind. My central claim is that fallibilism doesn't get us past this problem.<br /><br />Finally, agnostics don't necessarily have an intuition that there's probably no God. Some may have an intuition there probably is, and others an intuition that probability is an unhelpful term here. The thing about agnostics is we don't trust our intuitions unless backed up by commonly held lines of evidence and/reason. When we're just making stuff up, we acknowledge it's what we're doing.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-40122306205321092132012-02-24T17:48:37.144-06:002012-02-24T17:48:37.144-06:00Hi Darrell,
[...] differing ways to interpret the...Hi Darrell,<br /><br /><i>[...] differing ways to interpret the evidence</i>.<br /><br />What I understand is this: interpret the evidence one way, you get theism; another way and you get atheism, or agnosticism, and so on.<br /><br />But then, in effect, what you're saying is that there is no fact of the matter concerning the existence of God and other such matters. Because unless there is an objective way to evaluate these interpretations, it is meaningless to say that one is “better” or “truer” than another. It all becomes a matter of personal preference.<br /><br />I could perhaps agree with that.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-27283995351115990852012-02-24T11:42:13.294-06:002012-02-24T11:42:13.294-06:00Bernard,
“You appear to be arguing that agnostici...Bernard,<br /><br />“You appear to be arguing that agnosticism must be grounded in beliefs in order to get off the ground. This is true, and so I distinguish between commonly held beliefs (where no downgrading occurs because we're all on the same page, some examples of inductive reasoning for example) and controversial beliefs, where contradictory views are widely held and we have no licence to assert our own view as superior…”<br /><br />First of all, theism is not a controversial belief. Atheism and agnosticism are. The great majority of people world-wide are theists or believers in something transcendent. And are you forgetting that most atheists (and I would suggest most agnostics as well) clearly write and speak as if their “belief” (no God) is superior to theism? I think we can respect each other’s differences of opinions in these areas without it becoming a matter of superiority. Ironically, this attitude is “belief” based! For instance, the Christian view puts quite a premium on humility and the fact we are flawed and prone to see things the way we want to see things. After all, the first admission a Christian makes is that he/she was wrong about many things. Other views, such as Nietzsche’s atheism, do not put a premium on humility. So, interestingly enough, the very attitude you are proposing is more than a “taste” it is a sensibility that arises from “beliefs!” <br /><br />“I begin with an observation open to refutation. That no current set of evidence and reasoning compels us to one side or other of the theism debate.”<br /><br />But as Eric has pointed out many times, the question of God’s existence is based upon how one is willing to interpret the evidence and what counts as evidence, not on whether any exists. That the vast majority of people from time immemorial have been theists or believers in something transcendent clearly has and does compel people one way or the other. <br /><br />“Next,a claim from reasoning. If the argument can not be communally resolved, belief on either side will involve an appeal to intuition.”<br /><br />This is not true. What both sides appeal to are differing ways to interpret the evidence of the world they live in and their experience of that world. Does this involve intuition? Or course, but intuition is involved in every investigation including scientific ones. But intuition is only part of it and there is more to appeal to than intuition.<br /><br />“A further logical claim. To back one's intuition is to reject the intuition of those who have reached the contradictory conclusion.”<br /><br />I disagree. To interpret the evidence differently is to nothing more than that—to interpret it differently. Besides, your charge, if it were true, would logically apply to the intuition that agnostics have that there is probably no God, so, again, I don’t see how you escape your own judgment here. You just noted in your first point that there is no evidence or reasoning to compel you to one side or the other. Thus, your agnosticism is partly based upon intuition. So?Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-63788630931785784982012-02-23T21:37:14.868-06:002012-02-23T21:37:14.868-06:00Hi Darrell
Thanks for staying with this thread, I...Hi Darrell<br /><br />Thanks for staying with this thread, I very much enjoy investigating it and your questions are helpful.<br /><br />Yes, if I was saying my thoughts are tastes, and yours are beliefs, that would be self serving. Actually, I am saying we all have the choice to describe our views in terms of taste (that is, claim they are grounded in subjective values) or in terms of beliefs. My claim then is that the taste solution, (which I have a taste for) avoids the downgrading trap.<br /><br />You appear to be arguing that agnosticism must be grounded in beliefs in order to get off the ground. This is true, and so I distinguish between commonly held beliefs (where no downgrading occurs because we're all on the same page, some examples of inductive reasoning for example) and controversial beliefs, where contradictory views are widely held and we have no licence to assert our own view as superior. I think you can get to agnosticism along this route this way:<br /><br />I begin with an observation open to refutation. That no current set of evidence and reasoning compels us to one side or other of the theism debate.<br /><br />Next,a claim from reasoning. If the argument can not be communally resolved, belief on either side will involve an appeal to intuition.<br /><br />A further logical claim. To back one's intuition is to reject the intuition of those who have reached the contradictory conclusion.<br /><br />Finally, the claim that re-expressing one's beliefs in terms of tastes avoids the downgrading problem, for those who find this, well, distasteful.<br /><br />So, that's it, the whole arguemnt. Four steps, each open to refutation, either through exposure of logical flaws (which are likely, given my limited talents in the area) or provision of counter example.<br /><br />In other words I'm claiming this view is implied by commonly accepted lines of evidence and reasoning. You seem to be saying that hidden somewhere in here is a hidden appeal to personal intuition. I don't see it, but am happy for you to point it out ot me.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.com