tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post1840957329123767433..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: Kantian Ethics, Part 3: The Second Formulation of the Categorical ImperativeEric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-50631379360927898362011-08-27T19:34:23.678-05:002011-08-27T19:34:23.678-05:00Eric
I'm sure I don't properly have my he...Eric<br /><br />I'm sure I don't properly have my head around Kant yet, but three questions seem important to me, in terms of ethics, if you should ever have the time to address them.<br /><br />I understand how one can reach the conclusion that a ethical framework based upon reason will require imperatives which are independent of the desires of the agent. So, the idea of acting only according to those laws which one would have be universal laws appears consistent.<br /><br />But, how then do we ascertain that the set of all such imperatives is not in fact an empty set? So, a relativist might say, well to me, there are no such laws I can imagine, and so, it would seem that reason delivers no such imperatives, and moral imperatives are wholly subjective. In other words, isn't it the case that the system creates imperatives only if we first believe in objective morality?<br /><br />Second, what of the case where two committed objectivists imagine contradictory imperatives. So, one might say, we must tell certain sorts of lies, because they are crucial for the functioning of civil society, while another concludes we must not lie, because honesty is crucial. How is this dispute resolved within the framework, without appealing to something other than reason? (At first blush, the sort of society one subjectively values appears to be an important part of the mix).<br /><br />Finally, I can understand why a system based upon reason demands that this reason is respected within the system; because of the requirement for consistency. I don't understand how this itself implies that one should respect not just reason, but the agent capable of reason. It seems to me the agent can be disrespected without any threat to logical consistency, in which case it is not reason that leads us to the dictum that we treat others as an end and not just a means. What is it within the system that forces the move to respecting rational agents (leaving aside the problem of defining them)?<br /><br />Thanks for these posts by the way, they're an excellent introduction to an area I wouldn't have been able to approach alone.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-90428027882641244082011-08-25T13:04:14.728-05:002011-08-25T13:04:14.728-05:00Dianelos and JP: You have identified, in fact, wha...Dianelos and JP: You have identified, in fact, what is one of my most significant objections to that Kantian project: It's failure to extend direct moral consideration to non-persons. In terms of WHY Kant thought that the scope of moral consideration was limited to persons, I think it is rooted precisely in his belief that the only thing that reason DEMANDS that we respect is reason itself. Reason not respecting reason implies a contradiction (and hence irrationality). Reason not respecting inclination produces no such contradiction--and inclinations to behave in ways that show no respect for inclination in general may be inconsistent, but there's nothing about inclination as such that calls for consistency. <br /><br />I gesture, in my original post, to a Kantian argument to take into account non-rational beings, but there is clearly much more to be said here.In general, my sense is that rational beings are not the only kinds of entities that deserve the kind of moral respect Kant extends to persons; and as such we need to look for an account of morality that calls for broader respect. <br /><br />We seem to be taken even further from this aim by pure subjectivism (in the sense of a foundation for morality which ties all values to a contingent subjective preferences, and so CALLS for respecting only what one already happens to value, and as such makes a call to do something only in those cases when there is no need for such a call because one already has an inclination to do it). But an ethic that PAYS ATTENTION to subjectivity--and not merely to rationality--strikes me as important. To be a subject puts one into a category of special moral significance, whether one is a RATIONAL subject or not.<br /><br />This alludes to another point that seems to be a recurring one in these discussions: When we talk about "subjectivity" in ethics, we don't always mean the same thing. I'm absolutely convinced that an ethic that fails to take into account subjectivity is defective. What I oppose is "ethical subjectivism," which holds that the only reason one can ever give for some person P to act in a certain way (or cultivate certain traits) is that doing so is in line with the inclinations/preferences/attitudes of P. <br /><br />Kant, I think, offers grounds for being suspicious of this view, insofar as he makes the case that REASON can offer "reasons" to do what you might not have an inclination to do or which you might not (prior to consulting reason) have an attitude of approval towards. And this seems an important point, even if Kant's theory is incomplete, and even if his theory alone does not provide a basis for thinking we can be MOTIVATED by reason alone.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-27337911273832498602011-08-25T06:31:56.731-05:002011-08-25T06:31:56.731-05:00Hi Dianelos,
I'm with you here - too much of ...Hi Dianelos,<br /><br />I'm with you here - too much of morality is concerned only with humans. It is probably related to the idea that humans are different in kind from other animals – somehow “above” nature – instead of constituting an inseparable part of it.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-83987148295451935322011-08-25T06:26:18.574-05:002011-08-25T06:26:18.574-05:00Hi Eric,
Thanks for resuming this series.
One th...Hi Eric,<br /><br />Thanks for resuming this series.<br /><br />One thing I find problematic is the very concept of Reason used by Kant, this mysterious entity making choices not <i>determined [...] by the laws of physics as they play out in the complex organic systems we call our brains</i>. This seems to require the existence of some immaterial “soul”, independent of the physical brain, the locus of rational thought. How well does Kant's theory work without this assumption?<br /><br />Moreover, this idea of a disembodied reason does not seem to relate at all with what we now know about the brain and the complex interplay of its various parts.<br /><br />What we now know would suggest, I think, that a purely “rational” person, without any desire, passion, inclination and so on, would simply stand there, doing nothing until he'd fall down from exhaustion and eventually die. In other words, something else, non-rational, is needed to trigger the rational engine into action.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-85035398607846970872011-08-25T04:03:39.801-05:002011-08-25T04:03:39.801-05:00Hi Eric
As always, an interesting post that makes...Hi Eric<br /><br />As always, an interesting post that makes the very complex fell almost within grasp. It does still feel to me that as you describe it, the Kantian approach is helping itself to s degree of subjectivity.<br /><br />Why should any moral rule apply only to those capable of reason, and furthermore, how could we define such a capacity in the first place? This seems tricky to me. Clearly many animals are capable of forming patterns of expectation from their natural experiences, in fact without such capacity few creatures would survive (perhaps, in some broad sense, none would). Similarly, computers can undertake the sort of reasoning that seems to be referenced here, applying algorithms to extend experiences (inputs) to hypothetical situations, universalising if you will. <br /><br />More problematically perhaps, different humans have different levels of capacity for reason, perhaps because of age, experience, health etc. <br /><br />So, in amongst all this, there seems to be an assumption in play that there is more to reason than just an evolved behavioural tendency to link, compare and anticipate, that we are free and rational in some higher sense. If we take this subjective assumption out, does Kant's system still work? And if not, isn't Burk quite right to say it is at heart subjective?<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-77979182419361607082011-08-24T18:09:45.107-05:002011-08-24T18:09:45.107-05:00Eric,
I haven’t by far digested your post, but I ...Eric,<br /><br />I haven’t by far digested your post, but I don’t understand why Kant should limit this formulation of the CI to humanity (or rational beings which I suppose includes God). After all even stones are objects of moral concern, and should therefore be dealt with in the CI.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-46254380545999011192011-08-24T15:45:09.033-05:002011-08-24T15:45:09.033-05:00But I think the problem is that Ron's new orde...But I think the problem is that Ron's new orders are still value-laden, despite not coming explicitly from Debbie. Reason alone produces nothing of moral value here. Only if it is combined with subjectively-derived values does it result in anything.<br /><br />In this case, the implicit goal/value is that Ron wants the organization to function effectively, for the sake of fulfilling whatever goals it may have in general, ... thus reason indicates that some degree of obedience is required. What Debbie wants is irrelevant, if Ron himself has taken over the goal-setting behavior, which he has.<br /><br />Likewise, Kant really can't stake his system on reason alone, but on a series of implicit values like.. I value my own autonomy and ability to fulfill my life goals, thus reason indicates that some similar regard needs to be extended to others, lest my own life descend into a Hobbesian hell.<br /><br />This is quite apart, as you say, from our devotion to reason per se. Reason by itself, however dutifully worshipped, doesn't tell us what we want. We might all want to commit suicide right now, for all that reason cares.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-67095003694495219882011-08-24T14:22:24.783-05:002011-08-24T14:22:24.783-05:00With regard to the following: "As mentioned p...With regard to the following: "As mentioned previously, (and as you partially mention as well), this doesn't even begin to address Hume's point, which was the reason is not prior at all, but is a slave to passion, which I believe is true."<br /><br />There is a distinction that needs to be made here. Hume was not merely claiming that, in the absence of any desire to be reasonable, THAT reason demands certain behavior would be a matter of indifference to us. Hume was making the stronger claim that reason, apart from inclinations or desires, doesn't impose any behavioral demands.<br /><br />Hume's idea was this: Reason can only tell us how to get what we want: if you want X, do Y. It doesn't generate any behavioral demands ("do Y's") all by itself. Kant responds that, on the contrary, reason DOES generate behavioral demands all by itself. And this might be true EVEN IF there remains a question about why we should do what reason demands apart from a desire to be reasonable.<br /><br />To see the distinction here, consider the following analogy. Suppose there are two leaders in your organization, Debbie and Ron. Imagine that Harry says the following: "Ron never issues any policy requirements that are action-guiding apart from Debbie's goal-setting. He only tells us how to achieve the goals that Debbie sets. She says, 'Double our donations from last quarter!' Then Ron says, 'If you want to double last quarter's donations, send out twice as many donation requests!"<br /><br />But then suppose Kim observes Ron start issuing orders that are completely independent of Debbie's goal-setting (such things as "No swearing during meetings!") Suppose Kim points this out to Harry. "See?" she might say. "Ron gives orders that aren't contingent on Debbie's goal-setting."<br /><br />Would it make sense, at that point, for Harry to say, "Ah, but why should any of us listen to Ron's orders if Debbie doesn't set increased levels of obedience to Ron as a organizational goal? Ron's orders STILL depend for their force on Debbie's goal-setting!"<br /><br />If Harry said this, he would no longer be defending his original claim that Ron only tells people in the organization how to achieve Debbie's goals and never gives any stand-alone orders. THAT original claim has been refuted by Kim--and if Harry denies this, he's obfuscating. What Harry might do, at this point, is concede Kim's point and admit that Ron does issue independent orders. But he could then ask why he should obey Ron's orders since his allegiance is to Debbie.<br /><br />Put more simply, Kant HAS done something significant in response to Hume (assuming his arguments succeed). Specifically, he has demonstrated that if you do give your allegiance to reason, there are "orders" reason will give that will have action-guiding force apart from what your desires happen to be. Reason doesn't NEED "the passions" in order to generate behavioral requirements in the way that Hume believed.<br /><br />And this point is significant EVEN if we can still ask why, apart from a DESIRE to listen to reason, we should pay any attention to the laws that reason lays down all on its own, without piggy-backing on the goals set by desire.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-3202372897883931302011-08-22T18:51:27.249-05:002011-08-22T18:51:27.249-05:00One could construct Kant's point as a recognit...One could construct Kant's point as a recognition of subjectivist morals. He treats reason as the assumption, with his model of equality under the law and other moral action as the necessary consequence of being a reasonable human. As mentioned previously, (and as you partially mention as well), this doesn't even begin to address Hume's point, which was the reason is not prior at all, but is a slave to passion, which I believe is true.<br /><br />Anyhow, Kant makes the subjective desires of the agent paramount, since they are what make such an agent self-willed and not a mechanism of the law or of someone else's will, let alone a mechanism of some higher power or rule-giver. It is then reasonable (given Kant's assumptions) for each agent to recognize the independence and subjectiveness of each other agent, and thus allow each one space to develop her or his personal desires / goals rather than running roughshod over them without due cause.<br /><br />It is a partial of truce on the battlefield of will-to-power. A point is that the key property of the agent is not her rationality, which only allows her to recognize Kant's imperative and other ambient rules, (if she wishes to partake in the truce), but her subjective desires, which both tempt her to violate the autonomy of others, and form her most precious resource for being and becoming. Computers are rational agents, but we don't care about them, categorically or otherwise, other than as means (yet).Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.com