tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post2285483053367497080..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: A Case Study in Ways of Seeing: Reading TextsEric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger44125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-54460826295242625282010-09-18T14:31:32.065-05:002010-09-18T14:31:32.065-05:00Darrell
As best I can see then, our disagreement ...Darrell<br /><br />As best I can see then, our disagreement hinges on a single point. <br /><br />I say there are statements that are factual, like the sun is hot, and you agree. I then make the step to say there are statements that are non-factual, like 'Tom Waits is a genius' and again you appear to agree that this is a non-factual statement, a matter of my own personal taste. <br /><br />I then say, well if there are factual and non-factual statements, then we can call these different types of statements, and here you tell me I am not allowed to distinguish between the two. That this distinction is somehow false, because Frodeman says so. Quite apart from the fact that I don't think Frodeman does say this, where is the logical misstep you think I am making? Some statements have been tested in the fire of falsifiability, and some haven't. Those that have we all agree are facts. Why can I not use some terms (and I'm flexible on the words you prefer) for this distinction?<br /><br />Finally, I shall try to point out one more time that for an agnostic there is no sense that we are saying, here is a world view that I think is true. We are claiming truth only for the personal statement 'I have no idea what it all means'. And I don't, largely because nobody's managed to convince me how such a meaning could be reliably constructed. <br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-29110712952582995882010-09-18T07:52:45.226-05:002010-09-18T07:52:45.226-05:00Hi Darrell,
Thanks for you comments. Some of the ...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />Thanks for you comments. Some of the disagreement here maybe only apparent.<br /><br /><i>[...] any scientific explanation [...] is impossible without a metaphysical narrative or hermeneutical framing.</i><br /><br />I think you bundle together (and maybe Frodeman as well) two very different things: the end result (a scientific theory) and the path taken to get there. While some paths may involve an hermeneutical framing, or whatever, the <i>resulting scientific theory</i> does not. I am not ready to say that <i>all paths to discovery</i> are as you describe – this is a very strong claim.<br /><br />As another example, mathematical discovery involve intuition in a big way. However, intuitions are totally absent from any resulting mathematical theory.<br /><br /><i>I would challenge you [...]</i><br /><br />This may illustrate a difference between actual scientific practice and what (some) philosophers of science say it is and, also, with the description of science in textbooks.<br /><br />It is no doubt true that philosophers are after “truth” in some general sense (at least, this is how it seems to me). It is also no doubt true that, as part of their individual inclinations, many scientists do the same.<br /><br />What I claim is that this is not a necessary feature of science at all. I don't think Feynman or Hawking, to name two minor figures, would put it <i>à la</i> philosopher's manner. They might insist that what counts is the predictive power of scientific theory. “Ideal Truth” in some sense might be a bonus but it seems too elusive and ill-defined.<br /><br />An interesting question for me is the following: if we cannot get to this “Ideal Truth” through science (in the general sense in which I use the term), what reasons do we have to believe that it can be achieved otherwise?JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-59324433355190345902010-09-18T01:23:37.917-05:002010-09-18T01:23:37.917-05:00JP,
“…Ok, but this story has nothing to do with t...JP,<br /><br />“…Ok, but this story has nothing to do with the scientific explanation itself. Although research will not take place without some motivation (the story) the two are different things altogether. A car will not advance without a driver (mine at least) but it won't do to confuse the two.”<br /><br />Well, Frodeman is asserting, and I agree, that any scientific explanation that goes beyond stating things like “the sun is hot” or the “earth is round” is impossible without a metaphysical narrative or hermeneutical framing.<br /><br />“You say As with all scientific endeavors, our interest is in abstracting a general or ideal truth. This is a misconception: while this may be the motivation of some scientists this is by no means necessarily the case. For instance, many will say that we can only aim at predicting the results of experiments.”<br /><br />I would challenge you to pick up any standard college level text-book that is either a philosophy of science text or a standard introduction to science text that does not at some point abstract out general or ideal truths. Please point me to one. This isn’t a conversation about what a few scientists might predict as to some experiments somewhere. This is a big-picture philosophical conversation and as such always deals with abstractions of general or ideal truths.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-20406057719009380302010-09-18T01:02:09.770-05:002010-09-18T01:02:09.770-05:008. Our non-factual knowledge, e.g ethical and aest...8. Our non-factual knowledge, e.g ethical and aesthetic judgements, educated guesses etc, have a flexibility that facts do not have. Two people facing the same situation can draw different conclusions.<br /><br />Number eight sounds like you are trying to assert the fact/value distinction; I disagree, like Frodeman, that there is any such thing. As Frodeman notes by citing that view with which he disagrees:<br /><br />“First, the scientific method is objective. This means that the discovery of scientific truth can and must be separate from any personal, ethical/political, or metaphysical commitments. This is the basis of the celebrated fact/value distinction, which holds that the facts discovered by the scientist are quite distinct from whatever values he or she might hold. Personal or cultural values must not enter into the scientific reasoning process.”<br /><br />9. This ability to differ despite having used the same evidence and even rules of reasoning means that we can say such knowledge is true for ourselves, but should not say it is generally true, as to do so is prioritise our own world view over the views of others without having established any objective criteria for doing so.<br /><br />To say “this is what I think all these facts mean in a big-picture significant way,” which is to say in a narrative or hermeneutical fashion doesn’t mean we expect everyone to agree with us, but it is to say that we do think the narrative or world-view we are asserting is true in a universal way. And remember, the naturalist does this too. He asserts a way of thinking about the world that he believes is true for everyone. <br /><br />“This pretty much sums up for me the guts of the naturalist project that you appear to object to. I don't think there's anything in the geology article that would run counter to any of these points.”<br /><br />Frankly, I think Frodeman’s entire essay runs counter to most of these points. I would challenge you to re-read it. <br /><br />I think I have said about as much as I can say in this area at this point in this confined space. I would also point you to this link for more in this same area: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2010/09/15/3012816.htm?topic1=&topic2= Otherwise, I am happy to let Eric take the lead here.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-58214769259624876572010-09-18T00:58:13.082-05:002010-09-18T00:58:13.082-05:00Bernard,
In my view, the first three points are i...Bernard,<br /><br />In my view, the first three points are irrelevant—to this discussion anyway—although I am very happy about your nephew.<br /><br />"4. Scientists use a range of tricks to form their hypotheses. There is no set method, anything that works will be considered. Much of this work is hence coloured by tastes, experiences and inclinations."<br /><br />Number four is slightly misleading. The theory-laden nature of facts and the establishment of a hypothesis is more than just a matter of taste or inclination as theories go deeper that simply taste or inclination, all though those factors are minor players. <br /><br />"5. The process whereby a hypothesis is tested is however objective. A hypothesis becomes accepted at the point whereby its predictive capacity is verified e.g General relativity and the light bending effects of gravity."<br /><br />When something is predicted to happened, based upon other foundational “facts” or other “happenings” and it happens, this may be “objective” but only in the most cursory way. However, the theories that underlay the predictions and the entire frame of reference that led to the thinking, talking, writing, and reflecting about light or relativity were entirely metaphysical, narrative, hermeneutical ways of proceeding.<br /><br />"6. There is no other known method by which new facts can be established."<br /><br />If you mean within a metaphysical narrative or a hermeneutical fashion as out-lined by Frodeman, then number six is mostly accurate.<br /><br />"7. There are however many other ways of gaining useful knowledge about our world e.g literature deepens our understanding of the human condition by broadening our experiences and observations."<br /><br />This sounds like an attempt again to separate “facts” from other types of knowledge and they are inseparable. <br /><br />(Continued)Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-58810856667453157052010-09-17T07:01:55.120-05:002010-09-17T07:01:55.120-05:00Hi Darrell,
I am looking forward to your comment ...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />I am looking forward to your comment on Bernard's description above - with which I pretty much agree. I don't expect you will object either... Meanwhile, two quick points.<br /><br />I think one source of confusion here is that the many different aspects of this discussion are often mixed up together so that when one looks at one aspect, the other is considering something else. Sometimes, this happens in a single text. For example, Frodeman (just before reaching the conclusion) has a long paragraph on narratives where he asks “<i>whether scientific explanation itself is dependent on narrative logic</i>”. Then, he goes on to say that “<i>through telling a story, we create a context that defines and gives meaning to our research and data</i>” (followed by the glacier example). Ok, but <i>this story has nothing to do with the scientific explanation itself</i>. Although research will not take place without some motivation (the story) the two are different things altogether. A car will not advance without a driver (mine at least) but it won't do to confuse the two.<br /><br />You say <i>As with all scientific endeavors, our interest is in abstracting a general or ideal truth</i>. This is a misconception: while this may be the motivation of some scientists this is by no means necessarily the case. For instance, many will say that we can only aim at predicting the results of experiments.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-90046914465702160582010-09-17T03:15:12.689-05:002010-09-17T03:15:12.689-05:00Hi Darrell
I replied to this but the comment'...Hi Darrell<br /><br />I replied to this but the comment's been dropped off so I'll try again. This conversation shows promise of becoming endless, we continue to cover the same ground which suggests we are somehow talking past each other. I will try a method Dianelos uses well, which is to set out a series of statements summarising my point of view, and you can identify where in amongst it our difference is. <br /><br />1. Some things we all accept are facts. e.g the earth is round.<br /><br />2. Science is a process whereby the range of accepted facts is extended over time.<br /><br />3. The success of this extension is evidenced in the workings of technology e.g the chemotherapy that has recently saved my nephew's life.<br /><br />4. Scientists use a range of tricks to form their hypotheses. There is no set method, anything that works will be considered. Much of this work is hence coloured by tastes, experiences and inclinations.<br /><br />5. The process whereby a hypothesis is tested is however objective. A hypothesis becomes accepted at the point whereby its predictive capacity is verified e.g General relativity and the light bending effects of gravity.<br /><br />6. There is no other known method by which new facts can be established.<br /><br />7. There are however many other ways of gaining useful knowledge about our world e.g literature deepens our understanding of the human condition by broadening our experiences and observations.<br /><br />8. Our non-factual knowledge, e.g ethical and aesthetic judgements, educated guesses etc, have a flexibility that facts do not have. Two people facing the same situation can draw different conclusions.<br /><br />9. This ability to differ despite having used the same evidence and even rules of reasoning means that we can say such knowledge is true for ourselves, but should not say it is generally true, as to do so is prioritise our own world view over the views of others without having established any objective criteria for doing so.<br /><br />This pretty much sums up for me the guts of the naturalist project that you appear to object to. I don't think there's anything in the geology article that would run counter to any of these points. And so I am eager to see exactly where your difference lies.<br /><br />Thanks<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-56855952275831633342010-09-16T22:05:53.113-05:002010-09-16T22:05:53.113-05:00Bernard and JP,
One other point to my referencing...Bernard and JP,<br /><br />One other point to my referencing the Frodeman essay. The discussion we are having here on this blog is not new. We are playing out, to some extent, the debate between those two schools. Something to consider is where that debate has been going and why.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-68182020354922666382010-09-16T21:59:09.415-05:002010-09-16T21:59:09.415-05:00JP,
“I am not sure Frodeman agrees entirely with ...JP,<br /><br />“I am not sure Frodeman agrees entirely with either the analytic or the continental schools. He describes what seems to me to be the extreme positions of each and then goes on saying he wants to use the approach and concepts of the continental school, which may mean a number of things.”<br /><br />Well he doesn’t agree with the Analytical School—that is the very reason for his paper. I also don't think he is describing either school in the "extreme"; he is describing them accurately by their own admissions. He most certainly agrees (this is from the first two pages) with the Continental School or at least thinks it the more accurate way to proceed:<br /><br />“I believe that the received view of geology as outlined above (Analytical School) is mistaken. My interest as a philosopher is in challenging the assumption that geology is merely applied and imprecise physics, vainly attempting to achieve the latter’s degree of resolution and predictability. Rather, I believe that the challenges and difficulties inherent to geological reasoning have prompted geologists to develop a variety of reasoning techniques that are quite similar to some of those described and used within Continental Philosophy. My claim, then, is that geological reasoning consists of a combination of logical procedures. Some of these it shares with the experimental sciences, while others are more typical of the humanities in general and Continental Philosophy in particular.”<br /><br />“I don't think there is such a thing as THE scientific method (a fixed set of methods and techniques defining what scientist may do) and I don't think any scientist of real standing would say such a thing. This is a simplistic idea. Who came up with this?”<br /><br />Ummm, basically the Analytical School did. What he is describing, if you study the history of the philosophy of science, is fairly accurate as to how that school and the figures associated with it thought about the scientific method.<br /><br />[...] is objective [...] the discovery of scientific truth can and must be separate from any personal, ethical/political, or metaphysical commitments. <br /><br />“It is clear that the process of discovery (choosing problem, trying different approaches, understanding a situation this way or that way, thinking of experiments, and so on) is influenced by context (as I said before). But, when all this is said and done, the result of this process is objective. If not, you have to explain to me how the theory of gravitation is culture-dependent.”<br /><br />But he is not saying that the process comes up with a result that says something like gravity doesn’t exist for me. That is to entirely miss his point. He is saying that when we begin to organize our facts (gravity; the earth is round) into the entire puzzle of what we are to make of our world in a “big-picture” sense we are now into metaphysics and philosophy. We are not simply just stating the “facts.”<br /><br />Facts themselves were not theory-dependent [...]<br /><br />“This is one of your favorite themes. But, tell me, what does it mean to say that facts ARE theory-dependent? Saying that the fact “fire burns” is theory-dependent does not make sense at all.”<br /><br />Because in a conversation like this one or in any serious conversation, no one just says “fire burns.” The moment we begin to articulate, explain, elaborate, unpack, connect, and weave such observations into a greater whole (in other words, the moment we start speaking or writing) it all becomes theory-laden.<br /><br />I would encourage you to read the essay again, because I think he does a pretty good job of answering most of your questions or at least shedding light. I can’t in this small space add much more, without quoting his entire essay! Anyway, I hope this helped somewhat.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-33030532868634357142010-09-16T21:15:44.585-05:002010-09-16T21:15:44.585-05:00Bernard,
Well, I would assume Frodeman knows some...Bernard,<br /><br />Well, I would assume Frodeman knows something about plate tectonics too and he still wrote this essay. I think you are still assuming that somehow talk of hermeneutics means that the sun could be hot for one person, but not the other. No one, not Frodeman, or anyone else I know of is saying any such thing.<br /><br />I think he addresses your point here:<br /><br />“It is often claimed that, no matter what assumptions or goals we begin with, the scientific method will eventually bring us to the same final understanding of objective reality. Hermeneutics argues otherwise: our original goals and assumptions result in certain facts being discovered rather than others, which in turn lead to new avenues of research and sets of facts.”<br /><br />He goes on:<br /><br />“…Thus, for a truth claim to count as scientific, a scientist in Oslo must be able to reproduce results identical to those of the original experimenter in Seattle. In this sense, time and history have no place in the experimental sciences…<br /><br />“…Of course, in another sense time and history are an inescapable part of every science; a chemical reaction takes time to complete, and every chemical reaction is historical in that it has some feature, no matter how insignificant, that distinguishes it from every other reaction. But our "interest" in chemical reactions typically is not in chronicling the specific historical conditions that affect a given reaction, but rather in abstracting a general or ideal truth about a given class of chemical reactions.”<br /><br />And here is the difference I think you are missing. We could use this same example he speaks of as far as chemical reactions to plate tectonics. Observation and testing is objective (in a sense at least) and can be replicated and there is a base-line objectivity to this process, but such is never our final “interest” as he puts it. As with all scientific endeavors, our interest is in abstracting a general or ideal truth. In other words it does no good to keep noting things like we all know the stove is hot or the earth round, our interest is always in the summing up, the abstracting out of all such “facts” a general or ideal truth.<br /><br />Does this help?Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-26276276792578249822010-09-16T11:50:59.124-05:002010-09-16T11:50:59.124-05:00Bernard and JP,
I'm currently on the road. Y...Bernard and JP,<br /><br />I'm currently on the road. You both raise good points. I will try and respond soon.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-6994534518698687942010-09-15T18:57:08.153-05:002010-09-15T18:57:08.153-05:00I am not sure Frodeman agrees entirely with either...I am not sure Frodeman agrees entirely with either the analytic or the continental schools. He describes what seems to me to be the extreme positions of each and then goes on saying he wants to use the approach and concepts of the continental school, which may mean a number of things.<br /><br />Putting that aside, here's my take on some of this.<br /><br /><i>The scientific method [...]</i><br /><br />I don't think there is such a thing as THE scientific method (a fixed set of methods and techniques defining what scientist may do) and I don't think any scientist of real standing would say such a thing. This is a simplistic idea. Who came up with this?<br /><br /><i>[...] is objective [...] the discovery of scientific truth can and must be separate from any personal, ethical/political, or metaphysical commitments.</i><br /><br />It is clear that the process of discovery (choosing problem, trying different approaches, understanding a situation this way or that way, thinking of experiments, and so on) is influenced by context (as I said before). But, when all this is said and done, the <i>result</i> of this process is objective. If not, you have to explain to me how the theory of gravitation is culture-dependent.<br /><br />The text names Russell as one who held such views but I find it very hard to believe that he would not make a simple distinction between the business of discovery and the eventual demonstration of the truth of a scientific theory. Something is fishy here.<br /><br /><i>Facts themselves were not theory-dependent [...]</i><br /><br />This is one of your favorite themes. But, tell me, what does it mean to say that facts ARE theory-dependent? Saying that the fact “fire burns” is theory-dependent does not make sense at all. I think that those who say this have in mind something different from what the words actually mean. They may fail to distinguish between a fact, or an observation, and its role in supporting a theory (where it gets its meaning).<br /><br />Now, as to the continental school. I understand this is a two-paragraph summary of an extensive philosophy but... I would very much like to know what they mean by a better way than science to know reality – with valid reasons to think that this other way is really better.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-20666270084582403432010-09-15T15:08:38.540-05:002010-09-15T15:08:38.540-05:00Hi Darrell
I agree with the second point there (t...Hi Darrell<br /><br />I agree with the second point there (the talk of a single scientific method is a gross oversimplification) but disagree with the first, for the reasons I've been through. The method of discovery is often highly subjective, but the method by which theories become verified and so entrenched remains uniquely objective. This is as true for geology as any other science, and I gave the establishment of plate techtonics as an example. Do you disagree?<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-19440136100635060822010-09-15T01:35:30.404-05:002010-09-15T01:35:30.404-05:00Bernard and JP,
I will also assume since you saw ...Bernard and JP,<br /><br />I will also assume since you saw little contradiction or problems with Frodeman's essay that you agree with his taking the continental side when he writes:<br /><br /><br />“The claims of Continental Philosophy—the other main school of contemporary philosophy—concerning science can also be summarized in two points: (1) whereas science offers us a powerful tool for the discovery of truth, science is not the only, or even necessarily the best way that humans come to know reality, and (2) the existence of ‘‘the’’ scientific method (understood as<br />above) is a myth. Science has neither the priority in the discovery of truth, nor the unity and cohesiveness of one identifiable method, nor the distance from ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical commitments that Analytic philosophy claims it has.”Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-83716194398827029072010-09-15T01:24:14.380-05:002010-09-15T01:24:14.380-05:00Bernard and JP,
I’m glad you found little to disa...Bernard and JP,<br /><br />I’m glad you found little to disagree with as to Frodeman’s essay. So, when he sums up the school of thought (Analytical) he disagrees with here:<br /><br />“First, the scientific method is objective. This means that the discovery of scientific truth can and must be separate from any personal, ethical/political, or metaphysical commitments. This is the basis of the celebrated fact/value distinction, which holds that the facts discovered by the scientist are quite distinct from whatever values he or she might hold. Personal or cultural values must not enter into the scientific reasoning process.”<br /><br />“Second, the scientific method is empirical. Science is built upon a rigorous distinction between observations (which again were understood, at least ideally, as being factual and unequivocal) and theory. Facts themselves were not theory-dependent; observation was thought to be a matter of ‘‘taking a good look.’’ The distinction between statements that describe and statements that evaluate was viewed as unproblematic.”<br /> <br />…then we all agree that the view of science he is describing here (and in the entire essay) is not helpful and certainly not the best way to think about science or what it does. I'm glad to hear it.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-69595419433026825422010-09-14T07:02:52.810-05:002010-09-14T07:02:52.810-05:00[...]
There is also all this talk about “differen...[...]<br /><br />There is also all this talk about “different ways of knowing”. Now, this is a tricky and very interesting one and I suspect much of the disagreements arise from different definitions of the word “knowledge”. If we use it very freely and want to talk of “moral knowledge” and include such things as “the fish knows how to swim”, this is one thing. But I would rather formulate the issue as “how do we acquire reliable knowledge about reality?” I would not talk of “moral knowledge” because I take it to be subjective but, even it we suppose that morality comes in an absolute variety, how can we know, reliably, what is right or wrong?<br /><br />We know that an evidence-based approach (generally speaking, a “scientific” approach) can provide reliable knowledge. Do we know of any other method that has been shown to be reliable? This would be very useful and I am all for it. But I don't know of any such thing.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-7831827741941116502010-09-14T07:00:55.401-05:002010-09-14T07:00:55.401-05:00Hi Darrell,
Thanks for the link to Frodeman's...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />Thanks for the link to Frodeman's text on geology. You imply that I (and others) are “contradicted” by the text – I am puzzled by this. On the whole the article does not strike me as controversial. You will have to point out which part I am expected to disagree with.<br /><br />You mention the Analytic school of thought. But here I think we need to distinguish what scientists do and believe from what a particular school of philosophy says about it. For instance, the paper, in the discussion on the Analytic school paints a rather restricted view of science. On page 961, it says: <i>Science was thought to consist of an single, identifiable set of logical procedures applicable to all fields of study.</i> I wonder if any scientist worthy of the name ever thought so. Philosophers look at science <i>a posteriori</i> and describe how it seems to work. This may tend to produce a static description of science that minimizes its highly dynamic nature. In a way this is similar to music theoreticians of old who came up with a complete theory of fugal compositions just before Bach came on the scene and broke every rule in the book. Great scientists, like great composers, will do whatever it takes – even if it requires developing entirely new methods.<br /><br />There are a few points it would be interesting to discuss. For example, there is an extensive discussion in the text (page 964) about how context determines what research will be pursued and which theories will be developed. Again you would be hard pressed to find a scientist who disagrees with this. But then the author seems to imply that the resulting theories will be less objective. I wonder – is this a confusion between completeness and objectivity or a do I misunderstand what is meant by “objectivity”?<br /><br />[...]JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-48151186230852770562010-09-14T02:50:11.940-05:002010-09-14T02:50:11.940-05:00Darrell
My take on the philosophy of science is s...Darrell<br /><br />My take on the philosophy of science is strongly influenced by Karl Popper. I don't agree with all his stuff but I am particularly interested in the emphasis he puts on falsifiability, and the subsequent divisions between Popper and Kuhn on this and related matters.<br /><br />Briefly, I think the so-called contradiction between continental and analytical approaches is a false dichotomy. I don't know anybody who believes there is no narrative building in the business of doing science. Scientists guess, daydream, hope, interpret, assume, compete... the whole nine yards. Of course they do. They are human beings engaged in a quintessentially human activity. And so, as Kuhn would have it, they work within a paradigm that is not of itself a forced move. <br /><br />But, as Popper claimed, there lies at the heart of scientific progress a key defining feature. Human foibles may produce the work, but it is this business of the testable prediction that ultimately sorts the good from the bad and over time widens our set of accepted facts. So yes, Copernicus offered a new perspective, but it was Galileo's observations that encouraged the leap across to general acceptance. General relativity impressed us with its elegance, but it was the testing of its predictions (most famously the bending of light by the sun's mass) that brought across even the most hardened sceptic. Darwin had perhaps the greatest perspective shifting idea of all, but spent many long years testing some of its implications (how long will a seed remain viable in salt water for example?) Others, quite rightly, needed to see evidence of the mechanisms implied (e.g a mechanism for inheritance) before being swayed. Check out the story of Fresnel's entry into the French Academy's theory of light competition for perhaps the most delightful tale of predictive grunt.<br /><br />So, while it is absolutely correct that geology requires its own heuristics in order to get the work done, look at the history of continental drift and the discoveries required before it could be fully accepted and you will see, I contend, the continental (sorry) and analytical strands weaving together.<br /><br />Now, it is a step too far to claim their are no conventions in play in the testing of predictions, inductive reasoning is everybody's favourite, and as Dianelos has pointed out, at some point we tend to jettison explanations that appear so unlikely they feel like special pleading. But even then, note that a stubborn soul who persevered and eventually found a way of testing the unlikely explanation would be attended to. Indeed the history of science has its fair share of such visionaries.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-43701716126541596502010-09-14T02:28:07.722-05:002010-09-14T02:28:07.722-05:00Hi Darrell
When I speak of this being a good way ...Hi Darrell<br /><br />When I speak of this being a good way of seeing the naturalist project, I'm not assuming others should see it that way too. It's just an interesting idea to play around with. That's what ideas are to me, possibilities, which does link directly to the idea that our narratives vary considerably, whereas our grasp of facts don't tend to.<br /><br />I think the point you make here:<br /><br />'but they are what each of us really believe to be the case or an accurate “telling” of what we really think about the world and the “truth” of the world.'<br /><br />captures very well the difference between our views.<br />I don't have any sense of what an accurate telling of the world would look like. I happily admit I have no idea, but sort of enjoy the process of playing around with options. For this reason, you'll not find me accusing others of foolishness for seeing things differently.<br /><br />Occasionally, on a good day, I'll hit upon an observation or idea that seems worth pursuing. I think the observation that we all agree on the facts of the world might, with a little careful thought, tell us something too about the nature of the method by which we uncover such facts. I also think that the observation that we all build such different narratives about our facts might be able tell us something useful about the nature of these narratives. <br /><br />Personally speaking, seeing other people take facts in such different directions than I would encourages me not to trust my own world view much at all. So I like to probe, wonder, and yes, argue, mostly to see if other people's points of view have bits I'd like to borrow. people who do things differently and assert, as you seem to, that a world view can uncover some deep truth about the world, puzzle me, and so I'm trying to better understand that. I think you see me as far more definite about things than I am, and my communication style may be to blame.<br /><br />Let me address the issue of the analytical approach to the philosophy separately.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-38456604718903550102010-09-14T00:07:01.957-05:002010-09-14T00:07:01.957-05:00to start to understand the narratives that we crea...to start to understand the narratives that we create, a very good series is _the masks of god_ by joseph campbell;<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 1: Primitive Mythology http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Primitive-Mythology/dp/0140194436<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 2: Oriental Mythology http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Oriental-Mythology/dp/0140194428<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 3: Occidental Mythology http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Occidental-Mythology/dp/014019441X<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 4: Creative Mythology http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Creative-Mythology/dp/0140194401 <br /><br />cheers! webulite.comwebulite.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06214558335964572038noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-66875707822206846112010-09-13T23:45:57.946-05:002010-09-13T23:45:57.946-05:00Bernard,
“As always, this comes down to language ...Bernard,<br /><br />“As always, this comes down to language doesn't it? What appears to be empirically true is that different people have different narratives. So a statement to this effect is not in itself narrative dependent, we can go out and test it.”<br /><br />But that was not the point of what you were saying. Of course we all agree it is empirically true that people have different narratives. Your statement seemed directed otherwise than to just point out that people view things differently.<br /><br />Allow me to quote you again:<br /><br />"I think this is a good way of seeing the naturalist/agnostic project, not as an attempt to deny the importance of story, but as an ambition to remember always that that's just what they are, make do constructions."<br /><br />You are stating that the “ambition” should be to “see” these different narratives in a certain way, as “constructions.” That is quite different than simply noting that people have different narratives. They indeed are constructions, but they are constructed out of the facts and evidence, our experience of the world, history, and many other factors, but they are what each of us really believe to be the case or an accurate “telling” of what we really think about the world and the “truth” of the world. Whether it is the naturalist “story” or the Christian one, each believes it to be an accurate and truthful telling of what is true about our selves and the physical world.<br /><br />By asserting what our “ambition” should be and by asserting how we should “see” these narratives, you are indeed asserting a narrative yourself. This constant attempt on the part of naturalists to exempt themselves and to privilege their own narrative is exactly the problem I am trying to point out. It simply will not do.<br /><br />As to the essay on geology, I’m happy you liked it but can you address the matter of it contradicting and sort of exposing the very arguments you have been making in these conversations? I would say that you, JP, and Burk have definitely been coming at these issues from the Analytical school of thought, which he basically takes to task as certainly not the best way to approach, not only his area of expertise, but any area of knowledge. Do you disagree he does that? He seems to be agreeing with Eric in many ways, do you see that?<br /><br />By the way, I have posted on my own blog some of my thoughts about the essay and I have also quoted some key parts of the essay.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-63908695153508832682010-09-12T03:37:58.209-05:002010-09-12T03:37:58.209-05:00Darrell
Thanks for the geology link by the way. A...Darrell<br /><br />Thanks for the geology link by the way. A great article, I really enjoyed it. It will not surprise you that my take on it is a little different from yours, but I love the philosophy of science and this brought together many of my favourite themes.<br /><br />I remember when I first read Kuhn, feeling almost disappointed that what he was saying seemed far less incendiary than I had been led to believe. I think this may be because I came to him via Popper, so the idea that science was capable of uncovering some deeper truth was already off the table. <br /><br />In New Zealand there is a fascinating debate going on between a geologist I know and the geneticists I once worked with, and it in part highlights the different ways geologists and biologists go about their work. The question is whether, since breaking away from Gondwanaland, the NZ continent has been completely submerged. The geologist is raising the heretical possibility that it was, meaning all our flora and fauna are recent arrivals, and the biologists are claiming in return that gene sequences are showing too much divergence to support recent splits.<br /><br />What I love about science though is that this issue will in time be resolved. The evidence is going to pile up one way or the other and the other side will back down (or eventually die, as one wag, I forget who, once described it).<br /><br />The most provocative statement in that article for me is the Kuhnian claim that sometimes a scientific claim can't be resolved without appealing first to competing narratives, the example being having to choose between logical consistency and predictive power. My argument against this, very briefly, is that when such resolution is impossible, we are perfectly capable of leaving the issue marked as unresolved, whilst working on finding the theory that might break the impasse. This, it seems to me, is exactly the case with Quantum Physics at the moment.<br /><br />A last thought. My training is in economics, a field where strict scientific methods can not be employed. Nevertheless the knowledge gained is crucial to our well being. (It was once described wonderfully as 'the science of muddling through'). So, I would never argue that non-scientific knowledge is useless. It has incredible pragmatic value. Try using science to choose a partner for life. I am however interested in chasing down what type of knowledge theistic knowledge is, and what people mean by some of its claims. <br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-83119636646837545622010-09-12T02:24:00.670-05:002010-09-12T02:24:00.670-05:00Hi Darrell
As always, this comes down to language...Hi Darrell<br /><br />As always, this comes down to language doesn't it? What appears to be empirically true is that different people have different narratives. So a statement to this effect is not in itself narrative dependent, we can go out and test it.<br /><br />We will all agree on how a gun works, but I am claiming we will disagree on the various circumstances in which it might be okay to own, point or shoot one. So, whether or not we're comfortable using a word like truth for both these ideas (I'd rather avoid the word truth in both cases) there does appear to be a different sort of existence being referenced.<br /><br />Now, the only thing I am trying to point out is that when someone says 'I believe there is a God' some people are going to misinterpret that statement if it is meant only to describe a world view, equivalent to 'I believe we shouldn't shoot animals' and not a fact of existence, equivalent to 'I believe the sun exists.' Many people hearing the God statement will assume it's of the second type, and so a whole round of misunderstanding will begin, where they will challenge you over evidence, accuse you of simple minded beliefs you don't hold, I'm sure you know the whole routine.<br /><br />If we are careful with our language in this area, and maybe I need a better word than story because it seems to invite similar misunderstanding, then we can finally get on to the fun stuff, which is why we choose the particular constructions we have plumped for.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-16950534714676354372010-09-11T19:59:54.154-05:002010-09-11T19:59:54.154-05:00Dear Darrell,
[quote]
I hate to beat a dead horse...Dear Darrell,<br /><br />[quote]<br />I hate to beat a dead horse, but I will point this out again: The assertion, such, that we need to remember these stories are constructions is, in itself, part of a construction, a story, a narrative of what one thinks is really "true" and thus the thing (moral of the story so to speak) we need to remember and hold on to.<br />[/quote]<br /><br /><br />I would recommend an excellent work by Joseph Campbell http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Campbell called _The Masks of God_ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Campbell#The_Masks_of_God which is an extremely popular and well written series on which explains a great deal on how we created that narrative.<br /><br />It's in 4 volumes (very short easily held and read paperbacks)<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 1: Primitive Mythology <br />http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Primitive-Mythology/dp/0140194436<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 2: Oriental Mythology <br />http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Oriental-Mythology/dp/0140194428<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 3: Occidental Mythology<br />http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Occidental-Mythology/dp/014019441X<br /><br />The Masks of God, Vol. 4: Creative Mythology<br />http://www.amazon.com/Masks-God-Vol-Creative-Mythology/dp/0140194401<br /><br />I would highly recommend them as probably in the top ten books I have ever read. And explain how mankind created their mythologies.<br /><br />This is also a topic I am interested in, if anyone wants to contact me for additional conversations.<br /><br />Cheers! webulite.comwebulite.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06214558335964572038noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-35549301155321815462010-09-11T16:57:08.129-05:002010-09-11T16:57:08.129-05:00Bernard and Eric,
"I think this is a good wa...Bernard and Eric,<br /><br />"I think this is a good way of seeing the naturalist/agnostic project, not as an attempt to deny the importance of story, but as an ambition to remember always that that's just what they are, make do constructions."<br /><br />I hate to beat a dead horse, but I will point this out again: The assertion, such, that we need to remember these stories are constructions is, in itself, part of a construction, a story, a narrative of what one thinks is really "true" and thus the thing (moral of the story so to speak) we need to remember and hold on to.<br /><br />As such, it misses the greater point, which is, that it is the narrative or story that is really true. It is what makes a fact or series of events meaningful or significant. Again, going to the gun example, what is “true” is not my knowing how a gun works and being able to take it a part, clean it, and reassemble it--the bare facts so to speak. What is true is my knowing all that but also knowing not to shoot it toward a house full of people. That is what is “true” and that type of knowing involves a narrative about the importance of life. <br /><br />Eric, I wonder if it would be helpful to interact with this paper by a geologist: http://www.phil.unt.edu/people/faculty/bios/Frodeman/Frodeman-GeoReasoning.pdf Even if we don't want to use this, I would encourage Bernard and JP to read it closely--it goes to much of what I have been trying to say. <br /><br />It goes to many of the areas in this discussion and amazingly, does it in an area (geology) that one might think could hardly be talked about as a narrative.<br /><br />As a side note, I think it ironic that some here have been keen on some of Anthony Flew's arguments, when he has since renounced his atheism.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.com