tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post3219139076365825296..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: The Paradox of the Stone and the Challenge of Defining "God"Eric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-84314685171939721792010-09-02T15:34:50.863-05:002010-09-02T15:34:50.863-05:00One thing that I find difficult with definitions o...One thing that I find difficult with definitions of what we might mean by God is why we have a tendency to help ourselves to the assumption that God will in some sense be knowable. What I mean is this. We might propose a sort of logical necessity for God, where we might decide that existence itself needs explaining, why is there something and not nothing? At this point we can use God as place holder for that thing which by necessity exists (physics may in time have something to say on this I suppose). Or we might use God as our way of holding open the possibility that our brains are incapable of understanding all there is to be understood, a kind of higher realm argument.<br /><br />Neither of these conceptions though require that we are able to understand or experience anything of God. Theism, from this outsider perspective, seems to wish to grant God qualities that are within our comprehension. There is a good functional reason for doing this, such a conception offers more to us in terms of meaning, satisfaction, motivation etc. Is there a non-functional reason for doing this though? Other than saying 'because this is how I would like God to be' what drives us to the style of hubris that brings God down to our level?<br /><br />Eric, the functional take on God has strong attraction, but I get snagged at this point: are we at this point reducing the concept of God to the same level as the concept of Santa Claus? We share with our children the story of Santa Claus, so making him real for them, for potentially quite beautiful functional reasons. It is a pragmatic, and in this case brief, belief. I suspect that your brand of functionalism is getting at something more than this but I can't readily see what it is.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-8436174286640861512010-09-02T12:04:44.920-05:002010-09-02T12:04:44.920-05:00There is a short (less than 9 minutes) Twilight ...There is a short (less than 9 minutes) <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BoQ6ZC8EUQ0" rel="nofollow"> Twilight Zone</a> episode on this very theme. To save his soul, a mathematician must find a task that a daemon (essentially omnipotent and omniscient) cannot perform. An interesting and very funny alternative to the Paradox of the Stone.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-3794136138617237902010-09-02T12:03:08.860-05:002010-09-02T12:03:08.860-05:00Helpful discussion here. I'm curious, have you...Helpful discussion here. I'm curious, have you read Sarah Coakley's essay on Philippians 2 and kenosis in _Powers and Submissions_? She argues from a feminist perspective that we should interpret it is as referring to a kind of power or a particular exercise of power that God _never_ makes use of, rather than imagining that it's something that the Son has, sets aside, and picks up again later. If you've read it I'd be interested in your thoughts.Spaceman Spiffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02195067716296117149noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-46352688283881447702010-09-02T10:26:18.672-05:002010-09-02T10:26:18.672-05:00Your point about the meaning of "God exists&q...Your point about the meaning of "God exists" is one I have a great deal of sympathy with--and will be part of the discussion in class on Friday (when I move away from the question of what we mean by "God" to what we mean by "God exists," using Anthony Flew's classic challenge to the meaningfulness of claiming that God exists as a springboard for the kind of issue you raise here.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-11201599438112552812010-09-02T10:22:36.824-05:002010-09-02T10:22:36.824-05:00Dianelos,
You make several important points. The ...Dianelos,<br /><br />You make several important points. The first has to do with what has simply become a fact, for better or worse, about the "philosphy of religion" field as it has come to be understood in Western philosophy departments (or at least US philosophy departments): it emphasizes critical discussion of questions that are of particular relevance to the Western monotheistic faiths that dominate the local culture: questions about the concept of God, arguments for and against God's existence, the concept of "faith" and questions about the epistemic status of religious beliefs, the challenge to the coherence of religious belief based on the fact of religious pluralism, etc.<br /><br />This is not to say that philosophy departments in the US do not engage in and teach philosophical reflection on non-western religions. They do--but it's called Non-Western Philosophy. Most philosophy departments of any substantial size in the US have a specialist in Asian philosophy on staff who teaches courses on Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, etc. Some have specialists in African philosophy or Native American philosophy. It is telling, however, that they don't have people designated as specialists in Western or European philosophy. Those folks are called specialists in ethics, or epistemology, or metaphysics, etc. <br /><br />All of that said, I do try to approach the traditional topics in philosophy of religion in a manner that opens the discussion beyond Western theistic religions and makes substantial room for thinking about how such things as the theistic arguments or alternative notions of faith might have bearing on non-theistic religions.<br /><br />But you've got me thinking now about how great it would be to devise a team-taught "philosophy of religion" class with my colleague who specializes in Asian philosophy, one which really approaches the topic of religion with neither a Western nor an Eastern bias. Unfortunately, fiscal concerns about efficient use of faculty resources make such courses hard to realize.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-82896106940280673182010-09-02T09:40:56.380-05:002010-09-02T09:40:56.380-05:00Anonymous: It is logically possible for an ordinar...Anonymous: It is logically possible for an ordinary person to create a stone so heavy that the ordinary person cannot lift it. But is it logically possible for any being (ordinary or otherwise) to create a stone so heavy that it cannot be lifted by a being who, by definition, is omnipotent and so can lift any conceivable stone? If not, then it is not logically possible for God to do so.<br /><br />In other words, one is asking about whether the act of creating a stone too heavy for X to lift is possible if X is taken to have the property of being able to lift any stone of any weight. But the property of being too heavy to be lifted by a being who can lift any stone of any weight is a logically incoherent property, akin to round-squareness.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-11032016257353112752010-09-02T04:32:36.688-05:002010-09-02T04:32:36.688-05:00Eric,
I’d like to make two more general critical ...Eric,<br /><br />I’d like to make two more general critical observations before discussing the paradox of the stone. <br /><br />In his book William Rowe defines philosophy of religion as “the critical examination of basic religious beliefs and concepts”, but then proceeds to only discuss beliefs and concepts related to God. Religion is a broader concept than theism, so I think that his book (and your course) should be called “philosophy of theism” or perhaps “philosophy of Western religion”. <br /><br />My second observation is I think especially relevant: The concept of God is often discussed as a concept that refers to one more claimed existent. So the existence of God is discussed in the same terms that the existence of apples or of electrons or of numbers or of time is discussed. I think that’s a fundamental and very misleading mistake, for theism is not the claim that beside a lot of other things one more very special being exists. Rather theism is a claim about the very structure of reality and of all that exists in it. “God exists” is not a claim about God (namely that “God” refers to something that exists), but a claim about what existence is (namely what is God-willed; alternatively one could say that theism is the claim that reality is God-structured). Both the theist and the naturalist agree that “apples exist” or “apples fall when left free in the air” are true propositions, but the metaphysical meaning they ascribe to these propositions is different. My criticism, in short, is that philosophy of religion as waged today trivializes the concept of God and is thus misleading at its very inception. The concept of God that the scholastics used (as far as I understand it) was much more appropriate. One way or the other, the concept of God as referring to how the whole of reality is, comports better with St Anselm’s definition (namely that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived), is epistemically much more powerful, fits better with the sense of “faith” you defend in your book, fits better with the beginning of John’s gospel, and so on. <br /><br />Now you define God as "the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator of the world who is transcendent, eternal, and self-existent.” This definition though lacks the primary attribute of God, namely that God is a person (or, strictly speaking, not less than a person). As we too are persons, starting the definition of God by stating the personal nature of God (and hence the personal nature of all of reality) helps one reach a basic understanding of how God is, an understanding which I think helps dispel several of the apparent paradoxes related to the other attributes of God. So, for example, the issue of personal power, i.e. about what one can or cannot do, makes sense when speaking about us, for our condition is such that we cannot do all things we wish to do. Omnipotence then is kind of a negative concept which means that God’s personal condition is not subject the that limitation ours is subject to. So God can (and does) what God wishes to do, and God can abstain (and does abstain) from doing what God wishes not to do. (As St Augustine writes in his City of God: "[God] is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills".) We see then that God, being rational, will never wish to do something absurd or pointless – which takes care of the heavy stone paradox. <br /><br />Here’s another apparent paradox: Can an omnipotent and omniscient being forget something? The answer is I think obvious. Which helps one understand how God’s victory over evil can be complete. <br /><br />Similarly with the issue of kenosis. If God wishes to divest Him/Herself of some attributes, then God can (and does) do so. Indeed I find the idea of the incarnation so beautiful, that a God who had not wished to divest Him/Herself of the various divine attributes and incarnate as a humble human being to genuinely doubt and suffer with us would be less great than that I can conceive. And that's a major reason why I am a Christian.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-71050750311536716122010-09-01T22:57:08.597-05:002010-09-01T22:57:08.597-05:00To question whether God can create a stone so heav...To question whether God can create a stone so heavy that God cannot lift is not like saying that whether God can create a round square. It is true that creating a round square is logically impossible. But the paradox of stone is not asking God to do something logically impossible because an ordinary man can easily create (make) a stone (e.g. cement used in construction) so heavy that he cannot lift it. So why an omnipotent God cannot do something an ordinary person can?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com