tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post3351279187266181594..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: "Why is there something and not nothing?" A bit more on the questionEric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger30125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-14136262587834783792012-05-07T21:46:12.547-05:002012-05-07T21:46:12.547-05:00Hi Anonymous
Yes, recreation probably is extreme,...Hi Anonymous<br /><br />Yes, recreation probably is extreme, you're right. I enjoyed watching some of the Pigliucci clips you referenced, by the way. Thank you. His definition of progress in philosophy is interesting, and I'd certainly accept this type of progress occurs, as schools tease out the implications of one another's stances, their positions necessarily become more well developed and sophisticated. And I was too quick to dismiss the value of this.<br /><br />Nevertheless, this isn't quite the same as progress that is convergent. We're thousands of years in, and Platonists are still arguing with sceptics.<br /><br />You got me wondering, too, about some of the scientific debates people I've worked with have been involved in (dinosaur extinction, the total submersion of the New Zealand land mass) and the standards of evidence practitioners instinctively go looking for. I'd concede a model of philosophy of science that is descriptive in this sense can be tremendously helpful (under what circumstances is agreement most readily reached, when has this led to errors etc?)<br /><br />When you get onto Hume's challenge to induction, however, or brains in vats and other such ephemera, it's much harder to see how it rises above the recreational.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-38776469535053610172012-05-07T19:53:17.558-05:002012-05-07T19:53:17.558-05:00Hi Anonymous,
Perhaps “arbitrary” is misleading. ...Hi Anonymous,<br /><br />Perhaps “arbitrary” is misleading. Another way to put would be to say that, from a formalist point of view, logical rules, axioms and all the rest are <i>not about anything real at all</i>. Mathematica/logical theories are about abstract structures or forms, unconstrained by reality. Not being constrained, anything goes, really, as long at it can be defined in a completely unambiguous way.<br /><br />Once we have selected axioms and inference rules, we can apply these rules and see what follows. True, although they could be anything, rules and axioms are not really arbitrary but only in the sense that mathematicians will work on systems they find interesting or useful.<br /><br />An example of a formal rule one may or may not accept could be: if “P implies Q” is a theorem and “P” is a theorem, then “Q” is a theorem. It's mechanical, really. It means that if we have reached both “P implies Q” and “P” by applying inference rules, then we can add “Q” to the list – and go on.<br /><br />There is some connection to reality in that we can do something like this: if we can identify real objects that satisfy the axioms/rules of a formal system, we can expect that the results we get by applying formal rules in the formal system will also obtain with these objects – in which case, they will constitute a concrete model of the abstract system. For example, pebbles work well as a model of numbers and we can say that it is impossible to organize 41 pebbles in a non-trivial rectangle because 41 is prime. Drops of water, although we can count them, sort of, don't work out so well.<br /><br />Your example (all As are Bs, etc.) can be seen, I think, as a formulation of the transitivity of the relation “is a subset of”, which is in fact a theorem of set theory. It will apply to concrete objects that we organize in sets for a reason similar to the pebble example.<br /><br />Sure enough, there are mathematical “realists” out there who believe in the existence of some objective realm of mathematical objects. I have never seen a satisfying account of this idea, however, and I don't think it makes much sense. In any case, interestingly I think, whether a mathematician is a “realist” or not has no impact on actual mathematical work – you couldn't tell the difference by reading their (mathematical) papers, for example.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-37106922668359912492012-05-07T18:40:20.309-05:002012-05-07T18:40:20.309-05:00Bernard, I think we have different understandings ...Bernard, I think we have different understandings of phil of science. Of the reasonable range of stances that can be taken, I think the number is shrinking and that many stances have been shown to be grossly inconsistent and others more consistent.<br /><br />I would say it is disingenuous to say scientists gain no insight about what they are doing from studying phil of science. I think there are many examples of great scientists gaining insights and writing about them (see earlier posts). I think "recreation" is a bit extreme. <br /><br />As for your deeper questions, I have no answer and need to think more on them. :)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-25307734095351446852012-05-07T18:07:57.666-05:002012-05-07T18:07:57.666-05:00Hi Anonymous
I wouldn't argue there's no ...Hi Anonymous<br /><br />I wouldn't argue there's no progress, it's entirely correct to note that some ideas suffer from internal inconsistencies which, when discovered, tend to derail them (or force their adherents down a path of tortuous refinement and relitigation).<br /><br />Nevertheless, if we look at the list you provided earlier (instrumentalism, induction, Popper, Hempel) we don't see areas where the philosopher is able to say to the scientist, 'and here's the proper way of looking at this.' Rather, we see issues where a range of stances can be reasonably taken, and the game then becomes one of seeking out the implications of each viewpoint.<br /><br />To take what in many ways is the foundational question, do scientific models describe reality? as an our example; the range of acceptable responses to this remains breathtaking, and there are no signs that a solution is just around the corner. <br /><br />Given this state of play, it perhaps a little disingenuous to suggest scientists lose some degree of insight by not attending to this debate. What they lose, I would suggest, is rather a recreational opportunity. <br /><br />One might even argue, using your positivist example, that the progress the philosophy of science is making is towards the understanding that any attempt to provide a self sustaining platform will fail? <br /><br />Musgrave, as I understand him, argues that his take on Popper, while ultimately circular, is no more circular than any other theory that is not self-defeating. Thus, the question becomes which forms of circularity are least vicious, or most reasonable, and here reasonable appears to veer away from 'logically consistent' and towards 'widely acceptable', at which point the debate may well outrun the tools of philosophy.<br /><br />Thoughts?<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-46803849231304822602012-05-07T15:37:12.791-05:002012-05-07T15:37:12.791-05:00Hi JP, so deriving "All As are Cs from All As...Hi JP, so deriving "All As are Cs from All As are Bs and All Bs are Cs" is arbitrary? I can play by different arbitrary rules that will work just as well? Can I say All Cs are Bs from those premises? <br /><br />Bernard, here's your point with which I disagree 'And when you say philosophy of science, you actually mean a whole heap of competing philosophies, showing no real sign of coming to any conclusions.' <br /><br />I disagree because there has been progress in philosophy of science and in philosophy in general. For example, The view that logical positivism is l consistent is now rejected and we know why. Most philosphers now reject it just as most scientists now reject intelligent design. We can progress in understanding the nature of science by studying it philosophically in other ways too Pigliucci has also written/made videos on the progress in philosophy http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R96s3aXKjXc&list=UUcciwRLP-kVZ1M_z-xBvziA&index=4&feature=plpp_video<br /><br />Burk, I agree with that inference from Kuhn. I have a lot of problems with Kuhns arguments, but he at least showed us the value of studying the history of science in order to better understand the phil nature of science. <br /><br />Also, I don't think science has solved the phil problems because, in most cases, science has not even acknowledged they exist. Dawkins criticizes popular religious arguments but says next to nothing about issues in phil of science.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-54742003058422049142012-05-07T13:08:59.087-05:002012-05-07T13:08:59.087-05:00Bernard, Anonymous-
I think one reasonable point ...Bernard, Anonymous-<br /><br />I think one reasonable point to make on behalf of philosophy of science (or history/sociology of science, if those are better descriptors) is that it warns the larger society to take science with a grain of salt- showing that research programs are very value-bound, that error both unintentional and intentional are rather common, and other helpful corrective observations, even without affecting the practice of science itself. <br /><br />But commentary and warnings in the reverse direction should also be fair play.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-13845670881232727572012-05-06T21:15:58.494-05:002012-05-06T21:15:58.494-05:00Hi Anonymous,
It's interesting you mention th...Hi Anonymous,<br /><br />It's interesting you mention that <i>logic has real objectivity</i>. Perhaps it's another indication of a disconnect between philosophy and, in this case, mathematics. <br /><br />Within mathematical logic and, more generally, in any axiomatic system, inference/logical rules are, strictly speaking, entirely arbitrary. The game, is you wish, is to posit rules and axioms and see what happens. There is no assumption of objectivity whatsoever. In fact, I would say this decoupling from any objective “reality” is a central idea in modern mathematics and logic (that is in the last hundred years or so).JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-41856756350552806982012-05-06T19:43:51.774-05:002012-05-06T19:43:51.774-05:00Hi Anonymous
If I may step in, something I'm ...Hi Anonymous<br /><br />If I may step in, something I'm curious about. I personally enjoy reading and thinking about the philosophy of science. I find recreational utility in it I suppose, the fun of twisting and turning arguments and seeing where they lead.<br /><br />Perhaps like you, I know a good many science graduates who would tend to say, 'yeah, but who cares?' Now, I might talk at this point about realism, pragmatism or induction, and the polite amongst them might listen attentively, but often, at the end, their response boils down to something like this:<br />'So, when you say our models may not reflect reality, you mean it in the sense that your model of there being a hand at the end of your arm might not reflect reality?' Um... yeah.<br />'And when you caution that we can't establish logically the validity of induction, you're not saying, when a child steps out in front of a bus, I shouldn't behave as if induction holds?' Well, no, certainly not.<br /> 'And there's nothing in your philosophy to tell me how to better go about developing my predictive models?' Not really, no.<br /> 'And when you say philosophy of science, you actually mean a whole heap of competing philosophies, showing no real sign of coming to any conclusions.' You could put it like that.<br /> 'Okay, well, um, thanks for chatting. You enjoy your philosophy, won't you, I'm sort of busy with this.'<br /><br />And, unless I'm missing something in the philosophy of science, they seem to have a point.<br /><br />Unless, of course, the scientist wants to go the extra mile and propose, in the Dawkins manner, that their scientific discoveries have resolved the philosophical conundrums. At that point I think they do have to play by the pointy headed rules, or risk accusation of a self serving double standard.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-85936161147910148042012-05-06T14:15:57.791-05:002012-05-06T14:15:57.791-05:00Burk, I agree with your analysis of the evil comme...Burk, I agree with your analysis of the evil comment. I wish they had expanded the discussion on that a bit more. <br /><br />As for "what's the point?" As mentioned in the previous post, the point is to better understand the nature of what I am doing qua scientist. Personally, in studying phil of science, I'm more aware of the nonscientific assumptions I make when doing science. I'm also more aware of how science affects my overall worldview (what should I infer from recent science). But I'm not sure I understood your grammar point. I think logic and grammar are distinct in that logic has real objectivity to itAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-17468787622841023292012-05-06T12:34:14.169-05:002012-05-06T12:34:14.169-05:00Thanks for the video and comments. I agree mostly....Thanks for the video and comments. I agree mostly. But one has to ask.. if all this meta doesn't actually affect or bear on the practice of science, what is the point? It is like grammar.. if the grammarians have essentially given up and retreated to a descriptive approach from their previous prescriptive approach, then it is an academic exercise, in every sense. Also the idea of "slavery" to defunct philosophers seems a tad overdone, even though when pressed, the practitioner may well quote whatever philosophy passed over the lectern when she was in college, for what that is worth, which is not terribly much.<br /><br />Lastly, on Hitler, your video discussants get some chuckles out of agreeing that it is a "fact" that he was evil. At risk of derailing the thread completely, I fundamentally disagree. It is a fact that most people agree that Hitler was evil, not that he <i>was</i> evil. The former is a factual observation of our social shared feelings. The latter is a conflation of fact/value, as Putnam pooh poohs. "Evil" is totally predicated on our feelings about net harms and benefits, or some similar calculus. In some perspectives, humanity is all evil all the time, due to our killing of so many sentient beings. There are so many different frames by which to view values like this that I think it is and should be impossible to separate our subjective approaches from the concept of value. <br /><br />The fact that occasionally we all (post-war generations) are able to agree on a value assignment (and effectively suppress a dissenting minority) is wonderful on many fronts, but it does not magically create an <i>objective</i> value out of a subjective one.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-54278055923503891092012-05-06T10:26:05.813-05:002012-05-06T10:26:05.813-05:00I would agree that philosophical investigation tha...I would agree that philosophical investigation that seeks to pin down the transcendent and give us knowledge of it is futile. <br /><br />What I want to suggest is, first, that certain questions can serve as philosophical pointers to the transcendent--in the sense that if we regard the questions as having answers, they have answers only if there is that which transcends the world of experience. <br /><br />And I think there is a kind of *negative* philosophy that can then kick in when it comes to the transcendent. What I mean is that positive speculation about the transcendent can by constrained by philosophical criticism.<br /><br />Human speculations about the transcendent is inevitably framed in terms of concepts that have emerged in our engagement with the experienced world, and hence in terms of concepts that may not apply univocally to that which transcends experience. We're in the domain of analogy and metaphor. But even in such a domain, it becomes possible to note that certain claims about the transcendent suffer from a kind of inner incoherence or have implications with respect to the empirical world that are a poor fit with what we know. Such critical comments are what I mean by negative philosophy.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-78842837004451884252012-05-06T10:13:39.710-05:002012-05-06T10:13:39.710-05:00SecularDad,
From what I've read on this topic...SecularDad,<br /><br />From what I've read on this topic, current lessons from quantum physics entail that, on the assumption that the limits of our empirical reach are also the limits of reality, PSR is false. By the very same token, however, these lessons entail that, on the assumption of PSR, the limits of our empirical reach are not the limits of reality.<br /><br />But I'm not deeply read on the subject.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-2447230809141080732012-05-05T19:27:34.065-05:002012-05-05T19:27:34.065-05:00Hi All,
Well, I mean no disrespect to practicing...Hi All, <br /><br />Well, I mean no disrespect to practicing scientists.<br /><br />But it is a mistake to think that because one practices an activity one can give a theory of it. (Putnam)<br /><br />So, I don't think it is silly to say most philosophers of science better understand the nature/scope of science than most scientists. In my experience, when I ask most majors/graduates in science what they think of Hume's problem of induction, realism/instrumentalism debate, uniformity of Nature, Hempel & the strengths/weaknesses of his explanations for scientific explanations, Popper's falsifiability and strengths/weaknesses of his ideas on deduction and nature of sci theory, and the phil assumptions of science ... they look at me blindly because they have not engaged in "metathinking" about their field. And that's ok. They are busy doing lab work, surveying the universe, discovering new meds, treating illnesses, and so on.<br /> <br />Of course, there are great scientists who engage in philosophy of science (Einstein, Plank, Schrodinger, Feynman, etc). They don't just want the sci facts, but want to know how those impact their worldview(philosophy) They engage in philosophy to better understand what they are doing.<br /><br />Of course, I'm not saying studying phil of science will make you a better scientist. It might actually make you worse at science just as a swimmer might be too conscientious/mechanical after studying the physics of swimming. <br /><br />Here's an interesting point: When I ask many scientists philosophical questions about what science is, these scientists end up mouthing naive positions that have been clarified, rebutted, or deepened by philosophers of science. Putnam says they give answers that were in vogue 50 years ago. <br /><br />Finally, it's not science that is controversial, it's the logical inferences you make from science that are controversial.<br /><br />In minute 5 of part 3, Putnamn explains phil of science and its value. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNPZDLEba44&feature=relmfu <br /><br />Don't pick on Putnam, he has Einstein hair.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-30881113139422403422012-05-05T13:12:47.215-05:002012-05-05T13:12:47.215-05:00Hi Burk, Anonymous,
Concerning logic, Burk is per...Hi Burk, Anonymous,<br /><br />Concerning logic, Burk is perfectly right. To say that “mathematical logic has outgrown its origins is an understatement” is itself a major understatement. There is no common measure between what mathematical logic has achieved and anything coming out of philosophy in this area. Modal logic, for example, which seems to be the rage in some philosophical quarters, looks like child's play compared to the daily fare of (math) logicians.<br /><br />Although I am a mathematician by formation (but not actively doing math), mathematical logic is not my specialty. But I have studied it and can tell you this is a fantastically sophisticated discipline. What has been achieved in the last century is absolutely amazing, in logic per se but also in the foundation of mathematics and other areas. <br /><br />Burk, you mention Godel and Turing but other names come to mind, from Hilbert (who was one of those who started the whole thing) to perhaps Paul Cohen whose work in the 60s led to the determination that the continuum hypothesis was undecidable.<br /><br />This is not to downplay philosophy but philosophers don't help their cause with this too often seen attitude of looking down at other disciplines as just “branches” of philosophy or at scientists as if they didn't “really” understood what they're doing. This is just plain silly.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-43607229177789869992012-05-05T11:24:17.513-05:002012-05-05T11:24:17.513-05:00Anonymous-
Thank you for the book suggestion.. I ...Anonymous-<br /><br />Thank you for the book suggestion.. I will put it on my list. I should ask who were the greatest logicians of recent times? Off the top of my head, I would say Gödel and Turing, both of whom identified as mathematicians rather than philosophers. It is one more field that has quite definitively outgrown its roots in the precincts of philosophy, though at least there, philosophers have something useful and interesting to point to in their own work as well as that of others.<br /><br />This whole debate as to who is the parent of whom can be turned around to say that the children have outgrown the parent. Theology stuggles to keep its toehold in philosophy, for even a modicum of scholarly respectibility, clutching to the skirts, as it were; while natural science fields have long left the nursury behind. True, we shouldn't be so disrepectful of the parent, but if it is in its dotage, some comment seems appropriate.<br /><br />I have been called a positivist, and that is probably true on some grounds.. at least on the utility of empiricism for investigations of reality. For our subjective and artistic pursuits, however (morals, ethics, depth psychology, etc.), I wouldn't dream of being a positivist, though. Unfortunately, the fields do overlap, since our subjective selves happen in reality and in real brains, so it becomes a very complex relationship there.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-6650445021002640642012-05-04T21:56:40.327-05:002012-05-04T21:56:40.327-05:00Eric,
I think the question “Why is there somethi...Eric, <br /><br />I think the question “Why is there something and not nothing?” is a false question. Here is my reasoning: <br /><br />Any proper question has an answer which represents knowledge. All knowledge we have is grounded on our experience of life (by which I mean all experience and not just objective/empirical experience) – simply because there is nothing else on which to ground knowledge. Thus all knowledge is ultimately knowledge *about* experience. (Observe that even knowledge about the non-existence of things is ultimately knowledge about experience; thus to say that there is no greatest prime is to say that one can falsify any claim about some number being the greatest possible prime; to say that no unicorns exist is to say that one will never experience a proper unicorn; etc) Thus all proper questions are ultimately questions about experience. But the question “Why is there something and not nothing?” cannot be construed as a question about experience. Therefore that question is nonsensical. <br /><br />I suppose the strongest claim above is that all knowledge is ultimately knowledge *about* experience. But if one sees that all knowledge is ultimately grounded on experience alone, then one is forced to accept that any impression one may have about knowledge referring to something beyond experience is incoherent. Since all we have to ground knowledge is experience, knowledge can never refer to something beyond experience.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-61300885483745757002012-05-04T20:52:56.445-05:002012-05-04T20:52:56.445-05:00I think your misconceptions about philosophy can b...I think your misconceptions about philosophy can be partially corrected by the simplest of readings. There is some truth to the runner analogy. Have you read the introduction to the philosophy of Science by Okasha? http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Science-Very-Short-Introduction/dp/0192802836/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1336182411&sr=8-1<br />Also, Logic is a branch of philosophy. Are you dismissing the study of logic as adolescent? <br />Surely, a person like you could see the value of some fields of philosophy, it not all? Just as one might be skeptical of sociology, but not physics? Do logic and math, which are presupposed by science, give us access to some reality?<br />The gist of our disagreement is you are a positivist, and I ain't. Is that right?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-86467657278414284172012-05-04T20:29:07.449-05:002012-05-04T20:29:07.449-05:00Anonymous-
I appreciate agnosticism.. sorry to ma...Anonymous-<br /><br />I appreciate agnosticism.. sorry to make assumptions. But I think "being" is an extremely loaded, leading term. If such a thing exists, it is far more likely to resemble an electron, i.e. be inanimate, than what the customary definition is.. "Anything that partakes in being is also called a 'being', though often this use is limited to entities that have subjectivity (as in the expression "human being")."<br /><br />PSR simply maintains that everything has a reason, which I am sure is dear to the hearts of philosophers. It does not give any insight into what that reason might be, whether an infinity of some kind or other construction. Indeed, it is as empty as the void outside of reality (but still something!) that we are speculating about. There is no necessity for the "existence of a being that contains within itself the reason for its existence", which is logically as incoherent as the violation of PSR. You are posing a riddle and making as though it is some kind of answer. I may make great zen, but isn't necessary by any stretch.<br /><br />On the whole philosophy question ... I think the idea that philosophers somehow know the deepest mechanisms and secrets of science in some superior fashion, as a physiologist/biologist would know a runner's mechanism, is a false analogy. That kind of insight simply isn't there, and moreover, the volume and depth of knowledge resides entirely on the scientist's side. At best one gets the kind of vague, sociological commentary that Kuhn offered- which was certainly helpful and interesting, but hardly earthshaking. What does reside on the philosopher's side is a certain familiarity with various unanswerable and esoteric questions that few others have the stamina/stomach to persist in after adolescence. Indeed, if they knew so much about modes of inquiry, they would have attended to their own field, and its manifest failings, such as postmodernism, and the many other isms that have come and gone.<br /><br />The idea that I would offer is that philosophy represents the infancy of knowledge and of other fields- a groping around in the dark, formerly in fields that had some hope of attaining knowledge, (the natural philosophies), but now mostly in various completely unanswerable questions, and in some cases (theism), fields that are falsely constructed from the ground up, being psychological issues, not philosophical ones at all.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-60190912479970909432012-05-04T19:53:57.627-05:002012-05-04T19:53:57.627-05:00Perhaps somebody can explain to me why we think &#...Perhaps somebody can explain to me why we think 'why' questions are always applicable. I can certainly see we have an instinct to think in terms of cause and effect, and I can see how such an instinct can be very helpful in terms of learning and anticipating. But there are also times when the instinct is unhelpful (this week's lottery numbers are my phone number! A conspiracy. Somebody's sending me a message. Help!) And under some interpretations of quantum physics, the best we can say of outcomes is that they are probabilistic, so there is a sense in which PSR doesn't hold in our physical world. To take an instinct that is often unhelpful day to day, and may be at odds with fundamental physical models, and then want to apply it to an hypothesised extra-physical world... that's an instinct I don't much understand. Maybe somebody can help.<br /><br />Are we being careful enough, I wonder, when we speak of a world beyond the reach of science? Unless we can specifically pin down what it is that puts it beyond the reach of physical investigation, it becomes impossible to judge whether claims to intuitive knowledge of it make any sense. What, for instance, makes us think intuition isn't available to scientific investigation? <br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-83127505381995991352012-05-04T19:45:12.502-05:002012-05-04T19:45:12.502-05:00Burk,
1)I am agnostic, not a theist. Your white b...Burk, <br />1)I am agnostic, not a theist. Your white beard rant is just that... an ad hominem rant.<br />2) I havent posited something to explain something, I've reasoned that something that is contingent must imply something that is necessary if PSR is true. I reasoned there must be an engine car if the series of cars are moving and have the principle of movement outside themselves.<br />3)PSR does not imply some sort of infinity. It implies the existence of a being that contains within itself the reason for its existence. <br />4)It's not sophistry, it's the application of objective logic. Where you disagree is with PSR, not with the structure of the argument.<br />5)I disagree with your last paragraph, but philosophy vs. science is interesting. Here's something with which you will probably disagree too. Science is a branch of philosophy. One branch of Philosophy is logic, and science is a type of logical reasoning that moves from observing to hypothesizing to experimenting and back (ergo, a branch of logic). Here's something even more disagreeable: Just as a great runner need not understand the physics of running, so a great scientist need not understand the phil assumptions and scope of science. Take the brillinat scientist who claims he discovered how something comes from nothing... until pressed on the ambiguity of nothing. These big questions do have meaning, not all meaning is scientificAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-4128373245852472602012-05-04T13:28:20.312-05:002012-05-04T13:28:20.312-05:00Anonymous-
"The problem with turtles all the...Anonymous-<br /><br /><i>"The problem with turtles all the way day is that neither a contingent being nor a series of contingent beings explains itself sufficiently. It's like train cars without an engine car. Nor is the series more than a sum of its parts, so there must be a necessary being."</i><br /><br />This is a fine place to start. Why even use the word "being"? This gives the whole game away as to what you are trying to accomplish, which is to cast your projected psychological totem into an anthropomorphized creator-of-the-universe role, doubtless with white beard.<br /><br />Assuming for the moment that the word "being" is taken in a purely philosophical sense of that which exists, vs not exists, you have neatly solved the problem of why there is something by positing something. End of story. I don't see what that resolves in any way. We can see that there is something- that is the question, not the answer. <br /><br />I agree that the turtles all the way down formulation is unsatisfying, even mystical. But that is what PSR really implies- some form of infinity that we probably can not grasp at all.<br /><br />So yes, the whole issue does seem meaningless, or at least far less meaningful than theists make it out to be. Conducting convenient bits of sophistry about necessary vs contingent whatevers means far less than you seem to credit, since it isn't an <i>answer</i>, but merely various restatements of the question.<br /><br />This sort of gets to the heart again of the science vs philosophy debate. Philosophers love to, if I may put it bluntly, bullshit. This origin-of-everything issue is a classic case. It takes a great deal of fortitude to engage these arguments seriously, delve into them at hairsplitting depth, etc., when they are the most rampant form of speculation ever to go entirely unrewarded by actual knowledge. It also carries the rather dire risk of thinking that you have come up with brilliant ideas that form some kind of "system" or rationale, but have zero relation to the reality you are putatively trying to explain/investigate.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-4289528542871988602012-05-04T12:51:21.856-05:002012-05-04T12:51:21.856-05:00Braun, so your point is it is meaningless to even ...Braun, so your point is it is meaningless to even ask what is the sufficient reason for the existence of the universe? Since everything reasonable begins after the big bang?<br />I, on the other hand, believe the question of what happened before the big bang (or what it depends on ) is a meaningful question. It's not like asking what's north of the north pole. To use an analogy I read in Reitan's book, it's like asking what is pulling these train cars. <br />As for your second paragraph, I think you misunderstand what PSR proves. It proves that, if there is a sufficient reason, then there must be a necessary being. It does not prove I understand the nature of the necessary being. <br /> <br />I don't have to see or understand the nature of x to know it must exist. For example, I know light exists, but I don't understand its wave/particle duality. I know my great grandfather existed, but I cannot see him. These are two different types of analogies, but the point is I can suspect a necessary being exists without being able to understand the nature of said being. <br />Also, The problem with turtles all the way day is that neither a contingent being nor a series of contingent beings explains itself sufficiently. It's like train cars without an engine car. Nor is the series more than a sum of its parts, so there must be a necessary being.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-78386614915417817872012-05-04T10:25:17.005-05:002012-05-04T10:25:17.005-05:00Anonymous-
Interesting questions indeed. Firstly,...Anonymous-<br /><br />Interesting questions indeed. Firstly, I really don't know what to make of PSR at this level of speculation. Time itself beings with the big bang, as far as I understand, and PSR sort of depends on the arrow of time, to my naive thought, at least. The zoo of phenomena at this level is far beyond my ability to comprehend or form beliefs about, in the absence of some more solid knowledge.<br /><br />More importantly, if one hews to PSR, one should do so consistently. This method of saying that I get to evade PSR by defining for my convenience a self-consisting, self-creating whatever "being" that doesn't have to obey PSR, and which I happen to speak to through my navel, while you, my opponent, have to obey PSR and thus have to recognize the "Cause" of all which I propose outside of PSR ... well, that just doesn't make any sense. It's going to be turtles all the way down.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-43551348768458963442012-05-04T07:57:11.271-05:002012-05-04T07:57:11.271-05:00Jarod, good points. But I see no contradiction in ...Jarod, good points. But I see no contradiction in saying supernatural realities could affect me in nonscientific ways. The point is I would not intuit them through science, but through intuition...The supernatural has no bearing on my "scientific" worldview, but not my entire worldview<br />Take the Matrix Analogy again... Isn't the computer created reality affected by the reality that created it?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-69360449829862390082012-05-03T23:54:16.829-05:002012-05-03T23:54:16.829-05:00Assuming the existence of the transcendent only ma...Assuming the existence of the transcendent only makes philosophical sense if it means there are rules beyond those that govern our scientific reality. If the rules of a superceding reality are limited to those that affect us (and therefore can be investigated scientifically), then there is nothing "more" and therefore nothing transcendent.<br /><br />But this means that when we speculate about the transcendent, our speculation is meaningful only if it is about a wholly different reality. One with rules that don't apply to us or any aspect of our reality (because if they did, they wouldn't be transcendent). But if that's the case, there is nothing -but- internal consistency to our speculations. Consistency with our own empirical reality is absurd, as is the notion of pragmatic implications of the transcendent. What -makes- the transcendent transcendent doesn't touch -us- at all.<br /><br />What we are really doing, when we are doing something with pragmatic sense, is speculating about a world which -ours- supercedes. For example, suppose I ask the question, "If we behave in X manner, what effect will that have on the denizens of Hades, one of which may or may not one day be ourselves? Will souls be shifted to more fiery pockets of the underworld, or will they be shaken in a box of sticky pennies?" If we assume my behavior may effect some quality of Hades, that's not Hades rule-governing my reality, it's my reality rule-governing Hades.<br /><br />(And, likewise, it would make no pragmatic sense for any denizen of Hades to speculate about the rules of -our- world that -don't- affect it.)<br /><br />So while there may be a transcendent reality, its transcendent aspects are precisely those which have no bearing on our lives. And those aspects which do have bearing, we -can- investigate scientifically by examining how we are affected.Jarodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10657747266291733478noreply@blogger.com