tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post6432032447175070758..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: The April Fools Post: Some Reflections on the Funny and the UnfunnyEric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-31054914852071748422011-04-09T21:19:31.861-05:002011-04-09T21:19:31.861-05:00Hi Dustin
An interesting response, although parod...Hi Dustin<br /><br />An interesting response, although parody has a way of turning on itself sometimes.<br /><br />It may well be that my last comment was poorly phrased, and fair enough for calling me on that. Apologies to any who were offended.<br /><br />The issue of objective morality continues to interest me, however, so if you have something to contribute to that discussion, I'd be most interested.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-90785451634661289422011-04-08T19:04:24.515-05:002011-04-08T19:04:24.515-05:00Wow, Bernard, you're really right on the money...Wow, Bernard, you're really right on the money here. I too read Eric's post and thought, "You know what he really sounds like here? A NAZI." And it would terrible to sound like a Nazi, because the Nazis did things that were just awful. From a certain point of view.<br /><br />And yeah, you're right, Dianelos seems just a step away from being a raving fundamentalist. His methodology is really terrible, I much prefer, "I am a high school teacher and know some stuff about science, therefore I can pronounce confidently on all philosophical topics and insult anyone who disagrees with me without really studying the issues at all or putting in any effort or understanding what the other side thinks or why or really even knowing anything about philosophy except that I read a book by Daniel Dennett one time that confirmed what I already thought."Dustin Crummetthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09867270033494581154noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-72152476989812558302011-04-03T08:38:59.026-05:002011-04-03T08:38:59.026-05:00FYI: After sleeping on it and going back and forth...FYI: After sleeping on it and going back and forth a bit, I removed an anonymous post because, in my judgment, the author was not making any attempt to add to the discussion but was motivated by something less savory (although I may be wrong, it seemed like a veiled expression of a racist sentiment, which I don't want to provide a forum for here).<br /><br />The one thing that might be of substantive significance from the comment is the fact that there are people who are amused by jokes that are not at all "politically correct," so I restore that feature of the content since the idea of political correctness in humor (and its relation to the concept of fittingness) may be worth reflecting on.Eric Reitanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-52893054522407723342011-04-02T21:18:03.405-05:002011-04-02T21:18:03.405-05:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-67769515252409770612011-04-02T15:59:49.236-05:002011-04-02T15:59:49.236-05:00Hi Dianelos
Of course, for some of us, the lack o...Hi Dianelos<br /><br />Of course, for some of us, the lack of a metaethical framework is no problem at all. Indeed, it presents mighty opportunities to create a world that celebrates many of the values you and I would both agree upon as good and worthy. <br /><br />Again, here is a highly subjective, personal response, which you insist upon presenting as some baseline fact about the world. I know you were called on this in another thread, but it appears to provide the foundation for all of your philosophy (consciousness, free will, morality, mathematical elegance...) You start from the assumption that the way you feel about something is not only correct for you, but is the correct starting point for any philosophical investigation. <br /><br />Which makes me wonder, why not just cut to the chase and embrace fundamentalism? <br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-31418717652465114302011-04-02T15:35:31.279-05:002011-04-02T15:35:31.279-05:00[continued from above]
My point is that our wides...[continued from above]<br /><br />My point is that our widespread intuition that there must exist a fit between values and reality produces no conceptual problem for naturalism. Why then do naturalistic ethicists work hard trying to develop some realist theory of metaethics? I think the reason is that they feel that when one considers naturalism from an agnostic point of view then that intuition is so strong as to deliver a good reason for rejecting naturalism. It does look for all the world absurd to hold that there is not something intrinsically/objectively/reality-unfitting wrong with the Hutus’ actions. Thus the fact that naturalism does not know what to do with objective standards of value is not a problem for the (consequent) naturalist, but a problem for one who is evaluating naturalism. <br /><br />I understand that even though many naturalistic philosophers have tried to produce a realist theory of metaethics none has succeeded in overcoming Hume’s is/ought distinction. So it’s a good bet that it can’t be done within naturalism. Mackie agrees and has proposed his argument from queerness. I think a similar argument can be given thus: Consider any naturalistic realist metaethical theory. Without loss of generality we may assume that according to that theory the Hutus’ affective states do not fit reality and that Reitan’s do. But whence that property of Reitan’s affective states which Hutus’ affective states lack? After all, Reitan’s and Hutus’ affective states are produced in exactly the same way, namely caused by humanity’s common sociobiological past as modified by cultural influences and one’s individual life experiences. The only possibility is that in Reitan's case these causes possess some property which the corresponding causes in the Hutus’ case lack. But here we arrive at a regression of causes which leads to a contradiction. For ultimately the causal chains that mechanistically produce Reitan’s and the Hutus’ affective states have the same root, namely the state of the universe at some point in the past, which cannot both possess and not possess that required property. <br /><br />Anyway, I wonder about this: Given that ethical realism looks hopeless within naturalism, does it make any practical sense to work on your project about objective value outside of theism? If not, why not start with theistic metaphysics and discuss how objective value can exist in a theistic reality? Wouldn’t this simplify things?Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-81462709507907857582011-04-02T15:29:17.646-05:002011-04-02T15:29:17.646-05:00Eric,
You write of the “intuition that some affe...Eric, <br /><br />You write of the “<i>intuition that some affective responses to the world, some evaluative ways of seeing it, fit the world as poorly as some factual beliefs. That is, they’re just wrong.</i>”<br /><br />And also: “<i>But that [naturalistic metaphysical systems] don’t know what to do with the idea of fitting and unfitting affective states doesn’t mean that the notion of fittingness has to be discarded.</i>”<br /><br />I think that the notion that the world is such that some affective responses to it fit and some don’t can and should be discarded by naturalists. After all, it seems to me, your example does not produce a problem for the consequent naturalist, who, I take it, will respond as follows: “<i>Naturalism explains why the Hutus acted like they did, explains why they laughed at the results, and explains why they thought it fit to laugh. It also explains why Reitan doesn’t laugh, and why Reitan thinks it unfit to laugh. It also explains why both Reitan and the Hutus have the intuition that the world is such that some affective responses fit and others don’t. So there is no problem whatsoever for naturalism, as it accounts for all facts of the case</i>”<br /><br />(Incidentally, above I substituted “physicalism” with “naturalism”, for I think that in our context the distinction is irrelevant, and naturalism is a more flexible view. With Adams I understand by “metaphysical physicalism” the idea that all facts can be described using physical terms and explained by physical laws. By “metaphysical naturalism” I understand the idea that all facts can be described using mechanistic terms (including perhaps non physical ones, such as universals, or some conscious substances) and explained by mechanistic laws.) <br /><br />[continued bellow]Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-5976705447310699402011-04-01T19:50:31.043-05:002011-04-01T19:50:31.043-05:00Hi Eric
Sometimes the word subjective appears to ...Hi Eric<br /><br />Sometimes the word subjective appears to shift meaning ever so slightly. The broad fittingness envelop may well be defined biologically. I've just returned from watching chimps at the local zoo and my sense of what makes for fitting behaviour is slightly different from theirs, it seems. <br /><br />Hence, your gruesome example may move us very close to the edge of our biological limits. It may well be that even the perpetrators could, in times of reflection, removed from the distorting influences of violence and war, have a sense of disquiet. I don't know. Certainly, post World War Two, there was genuine remorse for many of the atrocities. And which of us hasn't, one step removed from the immediate influence, looked back on an event and reset our moral compass?<br /><br />But, you seem to have something else in mind here. A sort of absolute right and wrong that transcends our biological imperatives. I still can make no sense of this. Does that mean the grizzly bear that eats young cubs in order to bring a potential partner back to fertility is acting immorally? That seems an odd view to me.<br /><br />Perhaps you mean there is a set of rules that only apply to humans. Or only adult humans, who are sober, and fit into 'normal' patterns of mental function, or are middle class and safe from the pressures of war, or are, you know, of blond hair and blue eyes... This gets very tricky very quickly. You will note my scepticism regarding your ability to bring this one home, but I am fascinated to see how you go about dealing to the elephant.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-26458742692432663542011-04-01T19:18:33.611-05:002011-04-01T19:18:33.611-05:00Hi, Eric-
I think you are groping towards a subje...Hi, Eric-<br /><br />I think you are groping towards a subjectivity / relativity that dare not say its name. <br /><br />How popular does something have to be in order to be objective? How many people have to laugh for a joke to be objectively funny? You seem, via "fitness" to be trying to dredge up virtue ethics, which isn't so bad as long as it is recognized to have a subjective basis. <br /><br />But if one tries to wave one's wand and say that virtue X is objective because everyone in their right mind says it is good.. it just doesn't work. The criterion has not changed. However easy the case.. torture, holocausts, etc., our degree of revulsion doesn't change the category of the judgement.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.com