tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post7660602367353210967..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: Science and Religion and the Science of ReligionEric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger110125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-3538283026815888872011-02-03T23:23:28.936-06:002011-02-03T23:23:28.936-06:00Hi Bernard: As usual you raise lots of good points...Hi Bernard: As usual you raise lots of good points/questions/ideas/challenges. That's one of the best things I am getting from this conversation. Also while I think of it, I was reading stuff from Eric's archive and I discovered a comment about a novelist named...Bernard Beckett. I have to tell you I plan on using the fact that I am now pals with a novelist to my personal advantage:-) Anyway, the points you made:<br /><br />1. I DO have certain metaphysical commitments, a leaning toward some metaphysical claims, things I lean toward even though I cannot provide evidence for them and even though other people might disagree. I really hope the other people don't feel disrespected by that (I hope YOU don't). Disrespect is that last thing I want to show. I recognize my own fallibility (and people who know me would surely agree with me about that:-), and I respect people who think differently from me (I have trouble with conservative Republicans, but I am trying:-). But it seems to me that I have no choice but to consider all the things I know and make the best judgment I can.<br /><br />2. About moral intuitions, I'd put it like this: I think our moral intuition is ANALOGOUS to our vision, but with the added problem that being sinful we sometimes (often?) rationalize things so we can be immorally selfish with a clear conscience. Being analogous to eyesight, there are things we can see clearly (assuming we aren't hiding this from ourselves) and things that are more "distant" that are harder to see clearly. What's right and wrong is IMO tied up in the idea of loving one's neighbor as one's self, and loving what's good and beautiful with all we've got (this last thing is what it means to love God, I'd say. If you don't buy all the supernatural stuff, still you can love the truth and good and the like, and if God exists then he's alright with that IMO.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-70339162184951266632011-02-03T14:01:29.092-06:002011-02-03T14:01:29.092-06:00Hi Keith
I agree, when it comes to the metaphysic...Hi Keith<br /><br />I agree, when it comes to the metaphysical, part of the decision is one of personal fit, and what feels right.<br /><br />My personal predisposition is towards agnosticism o the existence on any non-testable truth, partly because I don't cope well with the idea of claiming truth for something that quite clearly I've just made up, or like the feel of; not when others like the feel of something quite opposite. The claim feels disrespectful to me. Also, I think I just have a devil of a time making sense of metaphysical statements. I still have no idea what you mean by the claim that a person's moral intuitions might be expected to match AMFs. It feels like it should make sense at the surface, but when I dig at it I can't get my hands on anything, so to speak.<br /><br />For example, are you saying God guides us towards moral understanding? If so, is He using the mechanisms of culture and evolution, or is the knowledge planted there by other means? If culture, why are different cultures guided towards such different conclusions? If evolution, does this imply that those things we have strong evolutionary predispositions to feel are in some sense guides of moral goodness? (I hope not). And if some other mechanism, does this mean that those aspects sensitive to genetic or cultural influence are not themselves core moral values at all? Because I can't even guess at what the answers to these questions might be, the AMF thesis remains somewhat mysterious to me.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-31597408844061079232011-02-02T12:05:25.191-06:002011-02-02T12:05:25.191-06:00Hi Bernard: I am always on board for more informat...Hi Bernard: I am always on board for more information as opposed to less. I agree there's lots of footholds for the scientific studt of belief formation and such and I have no problem with scientists studying things like that. I am confident that such study can help us gain important insights as you suggest. <br /><br />Where I balk, though, is when (if?) science demands that a person accept metaphysical presuppositions that conflict with his intuitions, when those presuppositions cannot be tested by science. The issue of AMF existance and whether or not a person's moral intuitions can be expected to match them is one example, how the world came to be is another. Theists typically believe that God brought the world into existence by an act of divine creative will. Science cannot test the claim, and science creates a creator-less scientific model of the evolution of the world from Big Bang to right now. But if some science minded person insists that rationality requires theists to give up the idea of God's hand being involved because "we have no need of that hypothesis", well I think their reasoning is flawed.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-71822876776137896322011-02-02T07:32:06.668-06:002011-02-02T07:32:06.668-06:00Hi JP: To make sure I get what you are saying, tel...Hi JP: To make sure I get what you are saying, tell me if this is right. <br /><br />You claimed as a principle the following: <b>if two people have competing intuitions and there is no reason to suppose that either person's intuitions are better, both people should refrain from trusting their respective intuitions and wait for proof </b>. You now seem to be saying this principle only applies to certain KINDS of intuitions, specifically ones about supposed transcendent reality. If that's what you are saying, then I don't see why other intuitions (like ones about epistemological principles) SHOULD be exempt, and it seems to me the principle defeats itself if we apply it more broadly.<br /><br />BTW we don't have to be using the word proof to mean mathematical proof, not if we aren't talking about mathematical ideas. The ABC example you cited was about mathematical intuition so I assume that in THAT example math proof is what you were getting at.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-35341137822067843222011-02-02T06:59:59.298-06:002011-02-02T06:59:59.298-06:00Hi Keith,
Concerning your second point, what is i...Hi Keith,<br /><br />Concerning your second point, what is in question here is the validity of a specific brand of intuitions, specifically intuitions about the transcendent (including AMF). In line with the general spirit of Eric's post, I think it's proper to investigate these intuitions with all the tools at our disposal. Now, whether this is a scientific question or not may depend of what, precisely, we mean by “science” (I tend to take a rather wide view). But this is a technical point. What I think we can do (among other things) is to approach the question in a scientific spirit and see what we can find out this way.<br /><br />The general question is “what can we do to assess the reliability of these intuitions?” And I think we can do much, from looking up what we know about the psychology of intuition to the track record of past intuitions of similar kind to the (no doubt very difficult) study of the manner in which the brain obtains information from this realm (for example, the imprinting of AMFs). And so on. There is no shortage of ideas here.<br /><br />What I was trying to do with the example involving our alphabetical friends is to suggest that, in such a symmetrical situation, this fact should be equally recognized by everybody. To do differently requires giving a strong reason to prefer one side to the other – in other words, to break the symmetry.<br /><br />We're at the level of informal discussion here, trying to find common ground if we may and at least explain more clearly where we stand and why. You're asking for proofs but, strictly speaking, nothing like that can be proven, by logic or otherwise. It would be great to be able to achieve mathematical clarity but I fear we must satisfy ourselves with more modest goals - until the truth-o-matic device comes along, that is, but we may have to wait a while for that.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-89462886795339789482011-02-02T00:36:58.292-06:002011-02-02T00:36:58.292-06:00Hi Keith
Not exactly, no. I'm arguing that by...Hi Keith<br /><br />Not exactly, no. I'm arguing that by scientific consideration can advance considerably our understanding of the question (perhaps just by helping us to define our intuitions more clearly). <br /><br />I've tried to offer an example or two to show how this might be achieved.<br /><br />My point is this: no intuition stands alone from reason or experience. The more we expose our intuition to reason and experience, the better our intuition becomes. At the point where we say 'I believe X just because I do' we are, I think, putting a full stop on this process of enquiry. <br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-13766037715297708772011-02-01T12:51:41.427-06:002011-02-01T12:51:41.427-06:00Hi JP: I've been busy too so it's all good...Hi JP: I've been busy too so it's all good. I have a couple of comments on your comments.<br /><br />1. I think we might not be as far apart on the definition of intuition as you think. I claimed that <b>intuition = that feeling you have when you believe something </b>. You point out that you might well have a strong intuition that such and such math conjecture is true but you'd suspend judgment until a proof was presented. Definitely. But it seems to me that when you have a strong intuition about such conjectures you are saying something about what you THINK is the likelihood of the something being true. When you have an intuition that X is true, it seems to me you are at least saying that which respect to belief you are leaning in X's direction. To say you BELIEVE X might demand a stronger sense of certainty, but the difference between belief and the weaker intuition regarding X is a matter of degree, it seems to me.<br /><br />2. On the substance of your objection. A and B, both eaually competent math dudes, have opposing intuitions about X. Neither A nor B has a reason to believe their own intuitions are better than the other, so the fact that the other intuitions exist means both A and B OUGHT to distrust their own intuitions about X. This raises a few questions for me, I am asking this one question right now: can you prove this epistemic principle is right? I ask this because without a proof it seems to me you are USING an intuition about epistemology justify your principle. Not that there's anything wrong with that (in fact i think there's no getting around intuition) but applying your principle woul dseem to me to require ignoring the principle until it were proved.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-46378914171055413542011-02-01T07:23:56.824-06:002011-02-01T07:23:56.824-06:00Hi Bernard:
To make sure I understand you. I am c...Hi Bernard:<br /><br />To make sure I understand you. I am claiming that a person's moral intuition can reflect the truth about an AMF. You seem to me to be saying that this question (whether or not a person's intuition can accomplish this) can be studied by science. What that it?keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-61822187109715061472011-01-31T06:56:19.040-06:002011-01-31T06:56:19.040-06:00Hi Keith,
Sorry to be so late in coming back to y...Hi Keith,<br /><br />Sorry to be so late in coming back to you – I've been rather busy.<br /><br />You write that <i>intuition [is] nothing more than that feeling that comes when you believe something to be true</i>. We may have a different understanding of the term. I can certainly imagine a strong intuition accompanied by non-belief. Using your math examples, I might have a strong intuition that a particular conjecture is true but, at the same time, suspend my judgment until a proof or counter-example comes along. In this case, we have a strong intuition without the triggering of the “truth” belief.<br /><br />Let me go back to my example with A & B having opposite intuitions. We may suppose, to make things more precise, that both are equally competent mathematicians and have completely opposing intuitions concerning the truth of a particular conjecture. An outside observer C (without a previous opinion) looking at the situation could not reasonably choose one side or the other <i>if the only significant difference is the intuition</i>. My claim is that what goes for C should also apply to A and B. <br /><br />More than that. Suppose that X comes long with a string intuition of his own concerning another subject altogether. Now, C, observing the fact, must wonder whether there is a Y with an opposing intuition – perhaps there is one and he is simply unknown to C; or maybe not, but C does not know. Given his experience with A and B, I think it would be reasonable for C to suspend his judgment about X's hunch and wait for more information.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-54439741622087107342011-01-30T22:00:06.631-06:002011-01-30T22:00:06.631-06:00Hi Keith
I should be clear that I am much more in...Hi Keith<br /><br />I should be clear that I am much more interested in whether we can gain knowledge of AMFs. The issue of whether there are AMFs is beyond me, in the same way that whether there is free will is beyond me. I don't clearly enough understand what people mean by the term. I do at least understand that they mean something that is non-physical and non-testable, and in this respect you are absolutely right I think, here we have a non-scientific question.<br /><br />But, I think you are also claiming that there is some process of intuition by which we can be led to understand something of this moral truth. You seem to believe that some of your moral hunches are true, or at least likely to be true. I think you would claim that if there are AMFs, our repugnance of genocide fits them.<br /><br />This second part of your thesis seems to be open to scientific investigation. My claim is that any intuition about a physical process can be enhanced by studying that process more closely. Your hunch is that somehow God causes your brain to be in certain states, corresponding to at least partial understandings of these AMFs. <br /><br />As one example, our moral hunches about the rights of women, appear to be extremely culturally malleable. We can see that by surveying the last century, or indeed the world today. <br /><br />This anthropological observation then raises interesting questions. If God leads us in our moral hunches, when were we being misled, throughout most of human history, or just recently? Why would God want to mislead us in this way? Or, alternatively, does this give us reason to say that the treatment of women (let's be specific here, the definition of rape for example) is not this kind of moral fact? Can AMFs only apply to those values that are not culturally flexible?<br /><br />Studying culture, and I think also genetic influences on moral reasoning, can at the very least refine our definition of AMFs. If we find strong genetic influences, and these influences also exist in fellow primates, would this lead us to conclude that primates have this kind of knowledge of AMFs? for example. <br /><br />I think science and religion can work very closely together here, just so long as neither attempts to deny the other its natural territory.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-50367560100602624912011-01-30T20:06:49.247-06:002011-01-30T20:06:49.247-06:00Hi Bernard:
Here's how I see the issue: I see...Hi Bernard:<br /><br />Here's how I see the issue: I see the question of whether or not AMFs exist is a metaphysical question, not one that is scientifically testable at all, and recognizing such doesn't count as sidestepping. Now one COULD study which parts of the brain are activated when people think about moral things, and one could study what effects damage to those parts of the brain have on the beliefs about morality people report. And one could probably do sociological studies on how culture affects the things people report as right or wrong. But none of this has to do with whether or not the moral beliefs actually correspond to a non-physical moral reality.<br /><br />Now I personally believe in such a reality. And if we assume there there is no plausible physical or social explanation as to how a person's moral beliefs would correspond to that reality, then it would follow logically any such correspondence would be due to some transcendent thing. I believe it has to do with God somehow. I know that's not scientifically testable; Like I said, metaphysics.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-18673706232647264982011-01-30T14:41:00.206-06:002011-01-30T14:41:00.206-06:00Keith
Indeed, so here's a thought. If all our...Keith<br /><br />Indeed, so here's a thought. If all our intuitions are indeed grounded in experience, and if all our interpretations of experience are indeed dependent upon intuition, then there may be much to be said for always being open to testing one against the other. <br /><br />The gaining of new knowledge might be that process by which the two are better made to fit together. I think of the young child, for example, with their programmed intuitions about the physical world, and the way experience affirms some, and modifies others.<br /><br />A problem might occur then, whenever either aspect is given such such prominence that it in effects exempts itself from the checking process. I'm thinking of the scientist who asserts the infallibility of a particular experimental result, without being prepared to check the assumptions that underpin the model, or the theist who claims there is more to moral knowledge than our evolved predispositions, without being prepared to examine the cultural and biological influences on this intuition.<br /><br />For me, saying that there exists transcendental knowledge, without being prepared to propose a mechanism by which this knowledge is made available to the brain, feels like an attempt to sidestep the need to check our intuition against the available data. There is a difference between arguing that leaps of faith are inevitable, and arguing that all leaps of faith are therefore reasonable.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-38804715546687247582011-01-29T22:02:59.445-06:002011-01-29T22:02:59.445-06:00Hi Bernard: Except for my quibble (I claim that in...Hi Bernard: Except for my quibble (I claim that intuition is at the bottom of every epistemic event including the interpretation of scientific evidence) I agree we should get as much information as we can.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-89737246916847870072011-01-29T18:54:29.968-06:002011-01-29T18:54:29.968-06:00Hi Keith
My last post was lost. In brief, that we...Hi Keith<br /><br />My last post was lost. In brief, that we must trust our intuition is not the issue for me, I agree with you on this. But, if we are able to enhance our intuition, by way of exposing it to pertinent evidence, shouldn't we try to do that?<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-70524882023648770042011-01-29T00:28:47.528-06:002011-01-29T00:28:47.528-06:00Hi Keith
I agree with what you say here. I also l...Hi Keith<br /><br />I agree with what you say here. I also like the idea of exploring the implications of this stance a little.<br /><br />We agree we can have false beliefs, and that evidence can sometimes push us from a false belief to one that is at least better. This is the scientific project, in essence. Thus, if we are interested in moving towards ever more accurate pictures of our world, we should be interested in opening our intuitions up to daylight whenever possible.<br /><br />So, if I see a chap about to step off the top of a tall building, and he tells me he has an unshakable belief he is superman, so all will be well, it would be a kind gesture I think to invite him down to the top of my garden shed, where he can test his intuition more safely. Experience, properly reflected upon, enhances intuition.<br /><br />Further, I propose,we can break our intuitions into categories. Those that can be in principle falsified, so they make testable predictions (as in superman's case), and those that can not, they describe but do not predict (So if I had a belief aliens play marbles in my garden but can not be observed). <br /><br />For testable intuitions, if you find another person has a very strong intuition that works against your own, it is at the very least a generous act to attempt to find a test by which you can decide between them.<br /><br />For intuitions that are non-falsifiable, I like the idea that we label these as narratives, rather than facts. A fact is our best non-falsified model (the world is round), a narrative is an internally generated and personal view on the world (It is wrong to eat meat). We all rely on both.<br /><br />Our difference may be that I claim there are many facts regarding the formation of moral knowledge, and if we turn our attention to how our moral intuitions are formed (the role of genes, physical/chemical environment, culture, developmental experience etc) we can test various claims and so refine them. To pull back from this process and say 'no, I just know such knowledge can get in, I'm not interested in looking for ways to test this', is for me anti-scientific, which remains my main point in this discussion.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-81023961436500484972011-01-28T16:02:08.098-06:002011-01-28T16:02:08.098-06:00HI Bernard:
In my last (short) post I endorsed yo...HI Bernard:<br /><br />In my last (short) post I endorsed your summation of my position: to say that "I believe in AMFs" means "I have a strong intuition that AMFs exist". But you said more and I want to comment on it.<br /><br />1. An AMF (absolute moral fact, as JP called it) means this (or at least this is what I mean when I say that). Let A be any particular potential act or event or situation or something. I take it for granted that there might well exist at least one person who finds himself saying "A is unjust!". This person is saying more than "I really don't like A"--he's saying "and neither SHOULD anyone else". To say that AMFs exist is to say that there exist things that are really like what that person says. It's to sayt there really ARE things that are unjust, that people ought not like, that people ought not do. <br /><br />2. By intuition I might mean nothing more than that feeling that comes when you believe something to be true. If the feeling is strong you find yourself very convinced, if it is weaker you find yourself less convinced. Now I claim that there is nothing you KNOW to be true that doesn't come with your belief that it is true. I also claim it is impossible for you to DISBELIEVE something when you have that feeling of belief. Therefore, from the inside there is no way to separate the things you know to be true from the false things you mistakenly believe are true. Supposedly science is supposed to help remedy this alleged problem, But I claim <b> science cannot accomplish this task! </b>. Science can do a whole lot, I'd say, but it cannot do the impossible. It CAN show you something so that after being shown you no longer believe what you previously believed. And it can show you something so that something you previously had no belief about you now DO believe. But it is not possible for you to decide to remain agnostic about something you believe to be true, not even if it hasn't been verified by science. If "there is no alternative" is a valid pragmatic approach to truth seeking, then I'd say trusting your intuition is pragmatically valid.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-2563924342913620322011-01-27T17:30:28.090-06:002011-01-27T17:30:28.090-06:00Hi Bernard: Assuming that those other people you w...Hi Bernard: Assuming that those other people you were talking about don't have the same intuition as I do about AMFs, then I'd say you summed things up nicely.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-52033033468046738562011-01-27T14:10:07.265-06:002011-01-27T14:10:07.265-06:00Hi Keith
I may be getting you wrong here. I think...Hi Keith<br /><br />I may be getting you wrong here. I think you are saying there is no reason for others to rely upon your intuition, it's just your way of making sense of the world. If so, I agree entirely. We all create personal narratives to interpret the world we encounter.<br /><br />Next, if I have you right, you say you have a personal intuition that there exists AMFs. Against this, I have no such personal intuition. Now, if you endorse my strategy of not relying upon your intuition here, does your statement:<br /><br />'I believe there are AMFs'<br /><br />equate to <br /><br />'I have a strong intuition that there are AMFs, although there is no good reason for others to share this point of view.'<br /><br />I'm not sure if this is what you mean or not.<br /><br />I still think there is a more interesting strategy available, which is to remain agnostic until we can first, define more clearly what we mean by AMFs, and secondly, explain more clearly what we mean by intuition. I would propose, for instance, that our intuition is itself a biological/cultural artefact, and there are a number of predictions this claim makes that we could test, so teasing out the way intuition functions. (Which is happening in a number of fields).So, rather than just trusting one's intuition, why not consider instead trying to discover what intuition actually is?<br /><br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-84312997656409960892011-01-27T12:31:35.983-06:002011-01-27T12:31:35.983-06:00Hi JP: I like your hunch-o-meter, although I'd...Hi JP: I like your hunch-o-meter, although I'd like it better if the meter would allow me to tell what's at the center of the mixed chocolates, so I could more easily avoid the ones with yucky stuff inside:-). <br />Let me see if I am understand your point. You seem to supposing that A and B have conflicting intuitions. C has no reason to think either intuition is more reliable, so he concludes they are equally like to be wrong (or right). But (you seem to argue) the same thing applies to A and B--neither of THEM has a reason to think his own intuition is more reliable, so neither of them should place much trust in their own intuitions.<br /><br />Is that about it?keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-30538154153480316992011-01-27T12:21:32.881-06:002011-01-27T12:21:32.881-06:00Hi Bernard: About my proposed epistemplogy (consul...Hi Bernard: About my proposed epistemplogy (consult keith and he'll tell you what his hunches are), I'd rather that principle be applied to what TV shows are spared from the network chopping block than to more metaphysical matters:-)<br /><br />But really I am not suggesting that other people depend on my intuition--y'all have your own to contend with, I'd say. All I'm saying is that I have a strong sense that stuff like justice exists, and that justice as a concept depends on the existence of objective moral facts or values, things that a properly functioning conscience would lead a person to see as right or wrong. I am not claiming that my conscience always functions properly, so I am not insisting that MY evaluations are right, but I have no choice but assume an evaluation is right unless I havwe a good reason to assume otherwise. You have said that "no choice" is a good pragmatic reason for proceding. I agree with that. As far as i can see, this is a different notion from the scientifically investigatable hypothesis about whether people can detect dishonesty in the faces of other people. Detecting dishonesty doesn't have anything to do with whether or not it's generally morally wrong to lie.keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-77805971257510658262011-01-27T11:22:28.552-06:002011-01-27T11:22:28.552-06:00Hi JP
As I understand it, if we have a non-falsif...Hi JP<br /><br />As I understand it, if we have a non-falsified alternative to Newton, then it accounts for all the data Newtonian mechanics accounts for, so if it's not predictive, then the Newtonian prediction, when tested, will falsify this alternative.<br /><br />I fear the evolutionary approach to induction gets us stuck. At best it can show there was uniformity in the world in the past. This is how we developed as inductive reasoners. But if everything changes tomorrow, evolution will have led us astray. <br /><br />We can say we have an animal instinct for induction, and that if we don't use induction, we can not live (so there is a pragmatic justification) but we can't say we have a reason to expect this to be how the world is really is.<br /><br />So as per my data points example, Popper's theory that science leads us to the truth does not imply science is the best bet for the future. That leap appears to require an animal instinct.<br /><br />The theist leap then seems to be, well if we admit this animal instinct, why not others? <br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-4150710548675315422011-01-27T06:35:03.612-06:002011-01-27T06:35:03.612-06:00Hi Bernard,
All things being equal, a non-falsifi...Hi Bernard,<br /><br />All things being equal, a non-falsified theory is better than the alternative. But, I think, this depends on the circumstances. Newton's theory has been falsified (if I understand the term correctly) but can still be better than a non-falsified one that makes only a few predictions – or none at all.<br /><br />I'm not sure your example works. As far as the third data point is concerned, under your hypotheses, theories A and B are equally likely to predict the correct value (1/3 probability in both cases). Overall, of course, theory B will fare better (whatever the unknown point is) but it's no better as a predictor. Moreover if we introduce a time factor, saying that at time T1 theory B has got the two points right, what about a later time T2? Without some assumed regularity it might well be that the data points will change and that, then, A will win. Induction in some form seems always to creep in but I must confess I find this very confusing and I have to think more about induction-less science <i>à la Popper</i>.<br /><br />Again, maybe we have to look for a justification of induction in our biology. This may be philosophically hopeless but, nevertheless, it seems to me that the real justification of induction lies in this direction.<br /><br />Simply put, isn't the simple fact that we (most animals with a nervous system) have a working memory an indication that reality displays the kind of predictability sufficient to justify induction? Without this, memories are useless and, presumably, would not have evolved in the first place.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-55391093159285806052011-01-27T06:29:48.409-06:002011-01-27T06:29:48.409-06:00Hi Keith,
Thanks for your answer. But why stop he...Hi Keith,<br /><br />Thanks for your answer. But why stop here?<br /><br />Consider the following case: A and B both have very strong, but opposite, intuitions about some proposition P. C comes along, rather undecided about P, and looks at the situation. Other than their difference concerning P, A & B seems equally reasonable and generally reliable. Moreover, using the newly invented hunch-o-meter (TM), C determines that A and B are equally strongly convinced by their intuition, right at the top of the scale.<br /><br />Besides the obvious fact that at most one of A or B is right, C can't conclude nothing at all about P, having no way to decide between the conflicting intuitions. But now, if this argument is sound, it should also apply to A and B and lead them to scale down their belief to a cautious “I think so but I'm not so sure anymore”. On what ground could they dismiss C's argument?JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-74033988262708478742011-01-27T00:46:14.002-06:002011-01-27T00:46:14.002-06:00Hi Keith
Good question. It depends. Science seems...Hi Keith<br /><br />Good question. It depends. Science seems to do exactly what you say, reserving judgement until the data comes in. Competition between theories provides the motivation to imagine, develop and carry out new tests and so discover new data. And that in the end is what science is about, pushing out the knowledge frontier. (String theory, or quantum interpretations are examples, but science is in fact full of disagreement at the frontier).<br /><br />Sometimes explanations emerge, however, that are by their nature curiosity stoppers. Essentially a theory that can be twisted to fit any data set, and makes no unique predictions of its own. Because these are unfalsifiable, they contribute nothing to scientific progress, and we can say they are unsupported by science. The creationist theory I outlined is an example, or the belief that fairies whisper our dreams to us, or that aliens once came to earth and played marbles but nobody saw them. I'm not sure we reject these, so much as treat them with disinterest.<br /><br />Also, we might have beliefs that appear plausible, but nobody can agree upon what exactly they mean, and again this leads to them being untestable and science is forced to simply ignore them, leaving the philosophers to work out whether or not they can be in principle falsified. Free will might be an example, (and I'm not yet sure what AMFs actually are, but this might just be me).<br /><br />The theory that biology and culture shape our sense of right and wrong can be broken into many smaller parts that can be tested, so extending the knowledge frontier. Indeed it's happening as we speak. <br /><br />The alternative theory, that Keith's intuition provides a guide to AMFs, seems to require at the very least a unique definition of AMFs - everything you say about them seems to apply equally to moral relativity. And it probably needs a way of showing that this intuition is different from our purely biological intuitive capacity - our ability to sense dishonesty by reading facial signs in ways we can't articulate (but can test), for example.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-24712886897234510292011-01-26T19:29:26.690-06:002011-01-26T19:29:26.690-06:00Hi Bernard: The difference between a falsified the...Hi Bernard: The difference between a falsified theory and a non-falsified theory is that the falsified theory CANNOT be true. That seems like a pretty good reason to choose between the two. And since applying the scientific method allows us to eliminate more and more false theories, that seems like a pretty good reason to employ the scientific method. But the point you made doesn't explain what we should do when comparing two theories when neither have been falsified. If there is no reason to think unfalsified-1 is more likely to be true than unfalsified-2, then why should we choose one over the other? And if a given theory cannot be scientifically falsified, why should we reject that theory since it is not less likely to be true than one that CAN be scientifically falsified?keith johnsonnoreply@blogger.com