tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post9190849506999535477..comments2024-03-15T17:06:31.642-05:00Comments on The Piety That Lies Between: A Progressive Christian Perspective: Brief Question about Fighting for Change and the Ethico-Religious HopeEric Reitanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06135739290199272992noreply@blogger.comBlogger77125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-83193632135680887092010-11-24T00:28:55.105-06:002010-11-24T00:28:55.105-06:00Hi Darrell
I think moral issues often collapse in...Hi Darrell<br /><br />I think moral issues often collapse into issues of pragmatism, no matter what one's beliefs. If this were not the case, then Martin Luther King simply changing the conversation would have been enough, but the sad fact is race inequality in the US remains as vicious and intractable a problem as ever. It may be that in the long run it's the boring, unglamorous stuff that underpins change; long tortuous debates on economic policy settings, painstaking research on drug addiction treatment programmes, heroic teachers in public schools refusing to believe it has become hopeless. I sometimes wonder if the great joy we sometimes find in feeling righteous doesn't make things worse, because the implication is almost - so long as our beliefs are right, the work is done.<br /><br />I'm still struggling to believe the Christian narrative is the game breaker here. As JP has observed, it does feel like a massive oversimplification. The gentlest, most peaceful city I have ever lived in was Tokyo, and yet only fifty years before, very similar cultural settings produced awful atrocities. And let's not forget that 1930's Germany was, by in large, a Christian society. <br /><br />This question of how to build communities that meet our deepest desires (and here the only concept we need is preferences, but sophisticated, delicately constructed, satisfying preferences) is difficult and important. My best guess (and it comes from a position of massive ignorance, this is not my field) is that circumstances and attitudes are more important than beliefs. And these two factors need know no religious boundaries. This gives me great hope.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-49055975342246803672010-11-23T23:29:12.992-06:002010-11-23T23:29:12.992-06:00JP,
(Continued)
Your point about evolving and sy...JP,<br /><br />(Continued)<br /><br />Your point about evolving and systems becoming more complex I don’t believe helps you. Because we can imagine that a moral truth is different than a preference doesn’t make it so. One could say we have evolved to imagine god over and against impersonal forces but it wouldn’t mean there was a god.<br /><br />“I would add, what we would qualify anthropomorphically as “higher” capabilities like consciousness, social behaviour patterns, morality and so on.”<br /><br />But you don’t know that they are “higher.” Maybe they are lower. That is the whole point. Higher and lower become arbitrary references that ultimately mean nothing if there is no true difference between a moral truth and a preference.<br /><br />“Saying that the Christian narrative had such a dominant role in shaping our societies seems quite oversimplified.”<br /><br />I’m sure you understand the limited ability to elaborate in these responses. There are volumes and volumes out there that might make it not as simplified if you are willing to do some reading. But perhaps this is simpler: Who were the key leaders and influencers in the US Civil Rights Movement? Where they not pastors and priests? <br /><br />“Were we raised in a completely different society, at another time, on another planet, or whatever, we would perhaps find all these Western values quite nonsensical and, who knows, even morally wrong.”<br /><br />And here you come back to my point all along. Indeed, you do agree with Burk and Bernard that moral truths are no different than preferences. For all we know, if we had evolved to prefer cannibalism and the torture of children, then such would be “moral” but we might better say simply a “choice” or a “preference” and get rid of language like “evil” or “good” as it simply makes no sense in such a world-view.<br /><br />One then can see how this view could act as a solvent or acid as to a moral world-view. One should not get too worked up over different preferences after all or die trying to change something that, for a twist here or there in a meaningless evolution, might actually be the “moral” or “good” choice. And perhaps that explains why the likes of a Martin Luther King has not risen out of a naturalistic world-view.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-29851071447417775732010-11-23T23:25:53.081-06:002010-11-23T23:25:53.081-06:00JP,
I think you clear most of this up at the end ...JP,<br /><br />I think you clear most of this up at the end of your last post, where you finally assert what Burk and Bernard do as well and I will get to that, but first:<br /><br />“The point that has been raised is more or less this: are moral judgments simply a variety of preferences? Now, I am quite ignorant in neuroscience and wouldn't know if such an experiment has been performed – although I would expect so. It appears simple: you hook somebody to some scanner and have the subject, say, choose between different drinks and see what happens. Then, you present the subject with a moral question and look again. What is similar, what is different? This seems quite interesting.”<br /><br />Well, I have been speaking of something else. I was speaking of moral truths, not judgments. The point was that Burk and Bernard state that they (a preference and a moral truth) are really the same thing, and I believe otherwise, although at one point you did write:<br /><br />“I agree with you that there is a difference between the expression of a preference and moral judgments.”<br /><br />All a brain scan would do is show what areas “lit” up when people were making choices, whether about a preference for Coke or whether or not they should cheat on their taxes. So what? That would not tell us anything about whether cheating or not was a preference or the following of a higher moral truth.<br /><br />“But life exists nevertheless and is very well understood in terms of chemistry alone.”<br /><br />Well, that is not the case because of the very discussions on this blog! Many of Eric’s post have been that life is more than chemistry! The mind, consciousness, clearly cannot be explained by chemistry alone. You do raise a good point however, which basically is- what is the difference between a dead thing and a living thing? One could argue that according to you, none really, which is another interesting, if not morbid, product of the naturalist view.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-78540465014921320472010-11-23T18:14:03.395-06:002010-11-23T18:14:03.395-06:00Darrell,
Saying that the Christian narrative had ...Darrell,<br /><br />Saying that the Christian narrative had such a dominant role in shaping our societies seems quite oversimplified. Our history is replete with so many intricate influences, mutual dependencies and feedback loops of all sorts that I suspect we are far from being able to sort out the whole thing in a way that permits such blanket statements. The whole subject seems immensely complex. Maybe we can say more cautiously that it's Western Civilization in general that has brought us all the goodies.<br /><br />But, in any case, there is a bit of circular reasoning here, isn't it? Because, indeed, why do we find all these things good and valuable? Well, I suspect, largely because we were raised within the said civilization and have learned to value them – it's part of what a civilization does.<br /><br />Were we raised in a completely different society, at another time, on another planet, or whatever, we would perhaps find all these Western values quite nonsensical and, who knows, even morally wrong.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-9252778366213213432010-11-23T17:30:56.350-06:002010-11-23T17:30:56.350-06:00Darrell,
The bit about brain scans is about deter...Darrell,<br /><br />The bit about brain scans is about determining whether similar or different brain systems are involved in making moral judgments and expressing preferences. It has nothing to do with the values of these decisions as such. The point that has been raised is more or less this: are moral judgments simply a variety of preferences? Now, I am quite ignorant in neuroscience and wouldn't know if such an experiment has been performed – although I would expect so. It appears simple: you hook somebody to some scanner and have the subject, say, choose between different drinks and see what happens. Then, you present the subject with a moral question and look again. What is similar, what is different? This seems quite interesting.<br /><br />You have an issue with us overstepping the bounds set by evolution on the ground that if there is no such thing as morality in the amoral universe then it cannot evolve in any way. Then, what do you make of life itself? There is nothing in physics that spells “life” in any way whatsoever. Look at any molecule as long as you wish, there is nothing there that is even remotely alive. Look at any living thing at the level of chemistry and you'll see nothing fundamentally different from any chemistry going on in inanimate matter. But life exists nevertheless and is very well understood in terms of chemistry alone. I don't expect you can argue that anything more is needed to explain insects or bacterias?<br /><br />What's going on is that new structures, new mechanisms, new phenomena – call them as you wish – can appear at higher levels of organization - this being perfectly in accordance with what we know through science.<br /><br />I'm saying nothing more than that: higher levels of organization come with new – completely new – structures, structures that don't exist at lower levels. We get molecules, stars and planetary systems, weather systems, living things, nervous systems, brains, intelligence and, I would add, what we would qualify anthropomorphically as “higher” capabilities like consciousness, social behaviour patterns, morality and so on.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-75615847292173324952010-11-23T16:41:39.847-06:002010-11-23T16:41:39.847-06:00Bernard,
"...is a little rough on the countl...Bernard,<br /><br />"...is a little rough on the countless numbers of non-believers who each in their own ways have sought to make the world a better place."<br /><br />But I wasn't speaking of non-believers in general. Naturalists and atheists make up a committed group--a group that has thought things through to a greater degree than the average non-believer. They normally can articulate deeper philosophical reasons for their position. Another factor to consider is that the average non-believer has largely been influenced by theistic belief, in the west anyway, culturally and historically, to a degree that while he might not have a good answer to why we should feed the poor, he believes we should--along with many other similar moral positions.<br /><br />There are many moral and good atheists and naturalists. There are many immoral and bad Christians. It frankly has nothing to do however with the overall point. The greater questions are which narrative, what frame of reference, and what view of who we are and our place in the cosmos is largely responsible for what moves a Martin Luther King or produces what we have come to think of as Western Civilization? While we could credit many individual non-believers in also helping with these endeavors, it certainly wasn’t the atheistic narrative that provided the motivation or moral resources.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-2197764273220427232010-11-23T14:43:57.422-06:002010-11-23T14:43:57.422-06:00Darrell
This quote:
"There is no history or...Darrell<br /><br />This quote:<br /><br />"There is no history or tradition of groups of naturalists or atheists moving and influencing entire nations and cultures to help the sick and poor over long periods of time"<br /><br />is a little rough on the countless numbers of non-believers who each in their own ways have sought to make the world a better place. If we look about the globe today, can we argue convincingly that there exists a strong correlation between the degree of theistic belief, and the achievement of social harmony? I live in New Zealand, a country with very low levels of involvement in religious rituals, and a high level of reported 'non-belief. Yet there is a strong tradition of concern for social justice issues. Scandanavian countries are often held up as similar examples, although I don't know them well enough to comment.<br /><br />The alleviation of poverty seems to me to have a massive amount to do with the way cultural and economic systems interact, post war japan is an interesting case study here perhaps, and it's certainly not a country that drew heavily upon Christian traditions in providing excellent economic support to its population. By contrast the US struggles on the poverty alleviation front despite its relatively high level of reported religious belief. This suggests the issue is much more complex than simply one of nominal motivations.<br /><br />There is also the matter of medical research, perhaps the greatest driver of advances in physical well being. I suspect that as a rule such researchers are driven by a desire to discover and contribute that transcends religious belief. I think I've read that scientists in general tend to have higher levels of reported non-theism than the general communities from which they are drawn.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-31838483264314086962010-11-23T12:35:05.151-06:002010-11-23T12:35:05.151-06:00JP,
You are talking about the fact that most peop...JP,<br /><br />You are talking about the fact that most people, like you, do see a difference, I assume because of psychology and the imagined creation of a difference whether through education, culture, or what have you. But that does not mean there is a true difference. How could a brain scan tell us if there is a true difference between a moral truth, something objective and universal, as opposed to a preference, something subjective and personal? I would love to have a scientist hold up a brain scan and show us that! A brain scan could only show us reactions to some input, it could never show us if those reactions were “good” or “bad” “normal” or anything else—and certainly not why people thought differently about morals truths and preferences. <br /><br />“…to a large degree learned instead of innate and, most importantly, we have the capacity to form our own goals.”<br /><br />Yes, but what if those goals are evil? If Evolution has provided this capactity, why should we look at it as worse than a “good” goal? In fact, these become arbitrary and meaningless choices.<br /><br />“…and none of this is programmed by evolution. We have “created” theses things all by ourself.”<br /><br />But nothing is outside biology, even our minds, as you have pointed out, right? We create only out of the bounds and resources provided by evolution—so this doesn’t really resolve the problem. You are giving something called “evolution” way too much credit here. The physical universe is amoral, uncaring, and impersonal. That we can imagine with our minds that something is “moral” or “good” only means the same thing when we say we can imagine “god” or “fairies” it doesn’t mean they are true (Burk and Bernard, I think would argue). My point, again, is that most people and cultures do see a difference between a moral truth and a preference—that they in fact are more than just imagined, evolved, created “preferences.” <br /><br />“For the same reason, and contrary to what happens in nature, we have decided to cure the ill, to help the poor…”<br /><br />But you are side-stepping the greater question, which was the point of the post—that being the fact that it has been transcendental narratives, such as Christianity that have provided the impetus to curing the ill and helping the poor, on a large organized scale anyway. There is no history or tradition of groups of naturalists or atheists moving and influencing entire nations and cultures to help the sick and poor over long periods of time.<br /><br />I don’t see where you have addressed the core problems here at all.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-13104443550449422662010-11-22T16:54:39.983-06:002010-11-22T16:54:39.983-06:00Hi Darrell,
I think there is a significant differ...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />I think there is a significant difference between, say, expressing a preference for apple pie against chocolate cake and being against torture. I also said that <i>I wouldn't know whether the mechanisms involved [,,,] are separate, identical, or made in a patchwork manner from simpler subsystems</i>.<br /><br />So, it may be a difference of degree or a more fundamental one. I suspect science has something to say about this – maybe in the form of brain scans taken under both conditions (moral vs preference decision). They could show if similar or separate parts of the brain are stimulated in each case. If somebody knows, this would be useful information.<br /><br />As for the contradiction you see in my statement, I think it is due to a misunderstanding.<br /><br />I take it we are the product of biological evolution. For reasons of its own, so to speak, evolution has endowed us with a wide array of capabilities, including superior intelligence and a very high degree of flexibility in our behaviour. Our behaviour patterns are to a large degree learned instead of innate and, most importantly, we have the capacity to <i>form our own goals</i>.<br /><br />We use this capacity all the time. We eat elaborate meals not primarily to nourish us but because we enjoy them. We also enjoy involving ourselves in elaborate play and games to a degree that has nothing to do with the learning of survival skills. We have philosophical discussions on blogs. And so on, the list is endless – and none of this is programmed by evolution. We have “created” theses things all by ourself.<br /><br />For the same reason, and contrary to what happens in nature, we have decided to cure the ill, to help the poor, to create social institutions that help achieve some degree of social justice. If we followed the lessons of nature, I suppose we would have to refuse taking care of sick children because only the strong must survive – and so on. This is how you get social darwinism and all the nonsense.<br /><br />This is what I mean when I write that our ethics should not be guided by evolutionary principles. And, I think, this is also what Dawkins was saying in the text you quote.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-91184965362580116342010-11-22T14:32:36.712-06:002010-11-22T14:32:36.712-06:00Burk and JP,
This statement seems contradictory t...Burk and JP,<br /><br />This statement seems contradictory to me:<br /><br />“I am not saying that evolutionary theory should guide our morality or ethics. What I wrote was that I take morality to be an entirely natural phenomenon, evolved like any other.”<br /><br />And,<br /><br />“I agree with you that there is a difference between the expression of a preference and moral judgments… I would guess that there is some connection between the two, the evolution of morality having no doubt occurred later than that of preferences and evolution acting in the patchwork manner that we know.”<br /><br />This seems to go against you and Bernard’s suggestions that, at bottom, there is no real difference between a moral truth and a preference, other than the imagined or made up one we attribute to culture and psychology.<br /><br />Or, perhaps I misunderstand each of you.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-16518165598470427742010-11-22T12:00:21.528-06:002010-11-22T12:00:21.528-06:00Darrell-
You'll have to be a bit more specifi...Darrell-<br /><br />You'll have to be a bit more specific about any discrepancies. I think JP, Bernard and I are pretty much on the same page, all trying rather desperately to put some meat on Dianelos's bone of the "final call" and the sovereign agent untethered from any reason or rhyme.<br /><br />So far, it seems that Dianelos is simply trying to save the theistic free will argument through magic.. by asserting that what seems random and without discernible cause is actually the sovereign free will we are all looking for, capable of moving mountains and ruling human affairs, without leaving traces prone to analysis. Bold, yes. Reasonable and humble in its interpretation, not so much.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-20120892966273385772010-11-22T11:17:09.450-06:002010-11-22T11:17:09.450-06:00Dianelos
You ask:
"What is it that makes a ...Dianelos<br /><br />You ask:<br /><br />"What is it that makes a class of behaviors moral, and moreover some morally good and others morally evil? It can’t be their physical origin or physical nature, for all behaviors and, indeed, all events have some physical origin and nature."<br /><br />I don't quite see how the second statement follows. Isn't that like saying 'what gives an item heat? It can't be its physical nature because all items have some physical origin or nature.' <br /><br />I would argue morality is a function of the physical world, and specifically the evolved nature of the physical brain. Take a computer running a chess playing programme. For such a programme we can identify a category of choices which we could label good choices, in that they are consistent with the desired outcome of maximising the likelihood of victory. Not morally good yet, but good in terms of goals, and entirely physical in their nature.<br /><br />Morally good then might be seen as a category of human choices consistent with an outcome which is, by some established narrative, considered desirable. And how is this narrative established? Via evolution in the first instance, and subsequently modified by culture. So, empathy, the foundation of human morality I think, appears to have a strong evolutionary component. So too co-operation and loyalty. <br /><br />Different cultures, religions and times then appear to churn through these narrative instincts in different ways. So, is easy access to abortion services or euthanasia a moral good? Rather depends on the where and when in history you live doesn't it?<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-15956494701981340592010-11-22T10:47:34.761-06:002010-11-22T10:47:34.761-06:00JP,
I'm confused. As I look over the range o...JP,<br /><br />I'm confused. As I look over the range of your statements and thoughts for this post, they seem contradictory. You have lost me I'm afraid. You also seem to disagree with Burk and Bernard at points. Maybe the three of you teasing those points out might help us understand better.<br /><br />Also, I wonder if you might quickly just go back through your responses and see if you think I'm just misreading or if there might be some truth to my confusion.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-33045135269053186482010-11-21T19:10:03.758-06:002010-11-21T19:10:03.758-06:00Hi JP,
You write: “I take morality to be an enti...Hi JP, <br /><br />You write: “<i>I take morality to be an entirely natural phenomenon, evolved like any other.</i>”<br /><br />Morality is not a phenomenon. Behavior, including moral behavior, is a phenomenon. Thus moral behavior, as per the physical closure of the universe, is a natural phenomenon. I mean what else could it be? I don’t think that anybody is claiming that moral behavior is an unnatural phenomenon in some sense. <br /><br />The question, which I think Richard Dawkins does understand well, is rather this: What is it that makes a class of behaviors moral, and moreover some morally good and others morally evil? It can’t be their physical origin or physical nature, for all behaviors and, indeed, all events have some physical origin and nature. It is here that morality appears to be unreachable by scientific thought. From naturalism’s point of view the source or ground of morality is a sheer mystery. I think Dawkins understands this, and that’s why he has said something like: “Wherever morality comes from, it does not come from the Bible”. I for one agree with him in this.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-78093235420226040682010-11-21T16:22:34.375-06:002010-11-21T16:22:34.375-06:00Darrell,
What then to make of Richard Dawkins’ ta...Darrell,<br /><br /><i>What then to make of Richard Dawkins’ take on this [...]</i><br /><br />It's interesting that you raise this point because there is much confusion about this.<br /><br />I am not saying that evolutionary theory should guide our morality or ethics. What I wrote was that I take morality to be an entirely natural phenomenon, evolved like any other. I wouldn't know whether the mechanisms involved in making moral judgments and expressing preferences are separate, identical, or made in a patchwork manner from simpler subsystems. This is a question for biology.<br /><br />As for Dawkins, what he is saying is that we should not build our morality by reference to what happens in nature and I certainly agree. Biology can certainly help explain why we hold certain values and not others. However, using evolutionary theory to justify doctrines like social darwinism is totally unjustified.<br /><br />I have seen this confusion many times, people saying “if you believe in evolution, then you must have such and such values”. I don't know where that comes from and it does not make any sense at all.JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-42523202125335744742010-11-21T12:14:19.540-06:002010-11-21T12:14:19.540-06:00Darrell-
Well-put, but Dawkins, or at least these...Darrell-<br /><br />Well-put, but Dawkins, or at least these quotes, is a bit behind the times. Lots of more recent work shows that evolution leads directly to our social natures, including morals and individual vs group conflicts that make up our natures. One only has to observe love within the family to know that evolution leads to strongly positive and moral natures, within the most elemental and universal social system. I recently blogged on Peter Kropotkin, who was a visionary in this perspective, seeing our natures as not just irremediably bad and fallen, but good as well as bad- as we observe in practice, and as issuing from the processes of evolution (the naturalistic mechanism).<br /><br />So our natures are not mysterious from an evolutionary perspective. Are our natures alone enough to guide modern morals? Surely they require some amount of cultivation: culture. That is a feedback system between our natures and our reason and experience- the latter of which are growing all the time. Where once the power of myth was the only going method of cultivating respect for social institutions, divine kingship, and the all the rest of it, now I think we can have some faith in our collective reason to figure out how best to organize and cultivate ourselves, fox news excepted, naturally.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-26381333368289538742010-11-20T20:16:30.028-06:002010-11-20T20:16:30.028-06:00JP,
“However, as you might expect, I don't at...JP,<br /><br />“However, as you might expect, I don't attribute this it to the existence of some “objective” moral truths but to some underlying differences between the biological mechanisms involved. I would guess that there is some connection between the two, the evolution of morality having no doubt occurred…”<br /><br />What then to make of Richard Dawkins’ take on this, who might know a bit more about evolution and biology than some of us. Here are some quotes:<br /> <br />“I am not advocating a morality based on evolution. I am saying how things have evolved. I am not saying how we humans morally ought to behave.… My own feeling is that a human society based simply on the gene’s law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live. . . . Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature.” (The Selfish Gene)<br /><br />“No decent person wants to live in a society that operates according to Darwinian laws. I am a passionate Darwinist, when it involves explaining the development of life. However, I am a passionate anti-Darwinist when it involves the kind of society in which we want to live. A Darwinian State would be a Fascist state.” (Interview)<br /><br />This seems like a significant disagreement. Also, how is it that “morality” evolving from preferences changes anything? I thought that was the very point of contention. What Burk and Bernard are saying is that, because of evolution, we may use words like “moral” but to be more accurate, we might as well say “preference.” A human makes a choice; he acts or refuses to act. The universe does not care what choice is made. Since any difference between a moral and a preference is, they would argue, completely imagined—they are on the same plane then—the “moral” cannot be higher or different than a preference, even if it is mistakenly perceived that way by the greater culture.<br /><br />Finally, how could an amoral, neutral, impersonal dead thing like a “mechanism” (whatever that might be?) cause, produce, or provide for what we think of as a moral sensibility? This sounds like alchemy, or a theory like the spontaneous generation of life.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-49413561792560361502010-11-19T20:20:07.445-06:002010-11-19T20:20:07.445-06:00Burk,
“If I could offer an answer- propaganda.”
...Burk,<br /><br />“If I could offer an answer- propaganda.”<br /><br />Yes, of course, and I could say that to posit that preferences and moral truths are really the same thing is atheistic propaganda.<br /><br />So, really, your argument is that most cultures, in most times, including our own, were and are, wrong. All were followers of propaganda, while the few enlightened knew better. Perhaps you are correct- but I doubt it.<br /><br />“And the nature of morals was often enough not couched as objective, but sometimes in the form of "because I said so".”<br /><br />Well, it was considered objective because it was thought God was saying it. But anyway, we have the same factor involved when one says “because evolution says so.” Right? Or, because “the scientific evidence and facts say so.” Although in these instances it really does take the form of “because I said so,” as what one really is saying is, “because I must interpret evolution and the facts to say such and such…” <br /><br />Interesting.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-79976899665373894722010-11-19T19:24:42.747-06:002010-11-19T19:24:42.747-06:00Darrell
I think I've already made it clear th...Darrell<br /><br />I think I've already made it clear that I don't believe in any absolute objective measures of right and wrong, I think what is deemed right or wrong is a negotiated social understanding.<br /><br />In the context within which I work, education, this has important pragmatic implications. Clearly, in order for a community of 2000 adolescents to function, there are sets of social behaviours that are required, and it is of pressing concern how best to get a level of adherence to such norms.<br /><br />For those who come from the perspective of morality as preference (as I do) the trick is to create an environment where compliance is its own reward. Kids want to play along with these rules because the upside for them, in terms of the active and positive engagement that results, is so clear.<br /><br />There is a prediction associated with this, and that is behavioural problems are most likely to emerge when certain groups of kids are shut out from the rewards on offer, be they social engagement, academic success, or whatever. And this does seem to be what happens. The kid with reading difficulties, or a sense the teacher doesn't much value them, or who has problems communicating with their peers, they're the ones that are hard to get to play along.<br /><br />The alternative thesis often leads to the claim that kids today just aren't given the right moral guidance in the home. But watch how the said youth transforms under the influence of, say, their basketball coach, and this belief becomes harder to sustain. The salient variable is that here is an activity they value, so much so that the reward of compliance shifts their moral preference away from rebellion.<br /><br />The behaviour of adolescents is of course far more complex than this brief treatment suggests, and deeply ingrained narratives about what is right and wrong are clearly still important, as JP notes, but the preference model is, in the case of education, (and I would suggest more broadly law and order) is a very powerful one.<br /><br />BernardBernard Beckettnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-12197561055370616082010-11-19T18:23:37.318-06:002010-11-19T18:23:37.318-06:00Darrell, Bernard-
"Well, I think there is an...Darrell, Bernard-<br /><br /><i>"Well, I think there is an obvious reason, which is that most, if not every, culture throughout recorded history has noted a difference between a moral truth, something objective and universal, and a preference, something subjective and individual. Why is that? Why the distinction? No one offers the distinction to be because of short-term and long-term thinking."</i><br /><br />If I could offer an answer- propaganda. If the dominant preference is made into not only the best judgement we have at the moment, but the god's honest truth forever and for all, then it will have more social power to compel compliance, which after all is the point of writing things like the ten commandments, Levitical laws, and the like. I am not saying that this makes them substantively wrong or bad, but simply that you are buying into excessive propagandistic claims about what are, in the end, human judgements like any other.<br /><br />And the nature of morals was often enough not couched as objective, but sometimes in the form of "because I said so". This is essentially how god deals with the Jews- they are to have special laws and status, just because. And then they regarded eating pork and much else as unclean and immoral. Ditto for Muhammed, who dictates so much of Muslim behavior and mores for frankly idiosyncratic reasons.Burkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11158223475895530397noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-63305258735675310102010-11-19T18:19:33.409-06:002010-11-19T18:19:33.409-06:00Hi Darrell,
I agree with you that there is a diff...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />I agree with you that there is a difference between the expression of a preference and moral judgments. However, as you might expect, I don't attribute this it to the existence of some “objective” moral truths but to some underlying differences between the biological mechanisms involved. I would guess that there is some connection between the two, the evolution of morality having no doubt occurred later than that of preferences and evolution acting in the patchwork manner that we know. This is a question for biology perhaps.<br /><br />I also agree with you that we may be led to make moral judgments that go against majority opinion. If, as I think may be the case, moral values may be imprinted on us in our youth and difficult to change thereafter, a difference in upbringing or cultural origin may lead to the situation you describe.<br /><br />I also agree, but up to a point, that “being moral” may involve personal costs of some kind. But I suspect that acting on such moral judgments come with a satisfaction of its own. If the evolution of morality was related to the need to ensure an harmonious social life, it is to be expected that such situations will occur but, also, that a mechanism to make us act despite the costs will co-evolve.<br /><br />jpJPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-24928016710895386622010-11-19T17:47:11.067-06:002010-11-19T17:47:11.067-06:00Bernard,
“I think Burk's point is a good one ...Bernard,<br /><br />“I think Burk's point is a good one here. If preferences are broadly described as tendencies towards action (where this action includes thinking a particular thought, or uttering a particular sentence) then there's no obvious reason why we couldn't categorise such preferences…”<br /><br />Well, I think there is an obvious reason, which is that most, if not every, culture throughout recorded history has noted a difference between a moral truth, something objective and universal, and a preference, something subjective and individual. Why is that? Why the distinction? No one offers the distinction to be because of short-term and long-term thinking.<br /><br />“Because I think of the term 'morally good' as a useful narrative category, a way of reminding myself of lessons learnt in the past for instance (so, through experience I understand the satisfaction available to me from forgoing unconsidered consumption on favour of providing assistance to others)”<br /><br />I think this a little unrealistic and it assumes too much. First, what if the lessons I have learned from the past are that I can steal and get away with it? Second, you assume there should be a feeling of “satisfaction” when helping others, why? Don’t greedy people feel a sense of satisfaction when hoarding? You also miss the point that morality, like love, or grace, or any such significant quality is not about how it can be “useful” to us. This is simply the Western obsession with self-help and the idea that unless something benefits us, of what point or use is it. What if being moral means not being satisfied sometimes? What if everything is not about pragmatic value? I don’t think Naturalism has an adequate answer to that question.<br /><br />I would pose my question again: Do we believe there are some actions or omissions that are wrong, regardless of whether a majority of people or the law stated otherwise. Why or why not? And, if it (some choice) is only a preference and not something we think others should also follow, why would we care whether or not they did? I like Mexican food, but I’m not offended if others do not. People like Martin Luther King, and others who have literally given their lives for a cause, normally do not do so because they disagreed with the preferences of others. The gulf between the two (a moral truth and a preference) is too wide and too deep.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-85812932491083033162010-11-18T20:46:49.655-06:002010-11-18T20:46:49.655-06:00Hi JP,
You write: “In a somewhat abstract manner ...Hi JP,<br /><br />You write: “<i>In a somewhat abstract manner I am interested in the question of what caused Christianity to change with time.</i>” and also “<i>What I don't quite get is how change can originate from within religion itself and, I must add, I never saw a satisfying answer to this question.</i>”<br /><br />According to all religions the nature of reality is intrinsically and fundamentally moral; there is a force or attraction or pointer (put it as you will) towards goodness in the very fabric of reality. Further, according to all religions, the meaning and sense of our life is to orient our own nature according to that fundamental moral nature of reality. Thus the answer I'd suggest is this: Religions, by being expressively aware of this moral dimension of reality, have been more effective in perceiving its direction and affecting accordingly the societies in which they exist.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-29312320195005823022010-11-18T11:10:09.625-06:002010-11-18T11:10:09.625-06:00JP,
“I think you misinterpreted my question. I wa...JP,<br /><br />“I think you misinterpreted my question. I was not trying to deny any accomplishment. My remark was to the effect that the claim that Christianity has led to this or that is imprecise and can be interpreted in many ways. In any case, however it is interpreted, saying that Christianity is responsible for all the good things we enjoy is as silly as the claim some make that, on the contrary, it caused all our problems.”<br /><br />We could interpret everything in many ways, right? My point however was that the best interpretation of what caused many of the most prized social advances in history was the influence of a single narrative, a way at looking at the world, called Christianity. What is imprecise about at least two facts: One, that slavery is ended in England by, mostly, the efforts of one man, William Wilberforce, whose religious faith is what drove him on; or, two, that the key and most influential leaders of the Civil Rights Movement here in the US were pastors and priests? I could go on and on. What is imprecise? If you have other causes, please share them. <br /><br />Further, my point wasn’t that Christianity was responsible for every good thing, but that it is certainly partly, if not fully, responsible for many of the very good things we simply take for granted in the West. This was in keeping with the context of the post where several were implying they didn’t see any connection or that somehow this all would have happened with or without Christianity. The historical record says otherwise. Conversely, can anyone show from history where a culture or civilization operating, from the beginning, from naturalistic or atheistic principles produced something similar to Western Civilzation? <br /><br />The rest of your questions about how does religion change from within do not, in my mind, really fit with the context of this post and should really be a topic for a different discussion—unless I am missing how it fits with what Eric’s post was originally regarding and the subsequent responses. Please help me if I'm missing how it fits.Darrellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14078435438689569728noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6215077578479252542.post-2425675727151917212010-11-18T06:44:36.887-06:002010-11-18T06:44:36.887-06:00Hi Darrell,
I think you misinterpreted my questio...Hi Darrell,<br /><br />I think you misinterpreted my question. I was not trying to deny any accomplishment. My remark was to the effect that the claim that Christianity has led to this or that is imprecise and can be interpreted in many ways. In any case, however it is interpreted, saying that Christianity is responsible for all the good things we enjoy is as silly as the claim some make that, on the contrary, it caused all our problems.<br /><br />In a somewhat abstract manner I am interested in the question of what caused Christianity to change with time. More specifically, if we consider (say) Western Europe of the past as a more or less homogeneous Christian territory we can ask how changes in moral values came about. I don't think one can deny that it did happen.<br /><br />Now, I can understand in a general way how social changes (which may be the consequence of a number of factors, including outside influences and growth of knowledge) may force an evolution of moral rules. From there, through a complex interplay of influences and feedback loops, religion may adapt to the new reality and become a (very efficient) vector for disseminating the changes.<br /><br />What I don't quite get is how change can originate from within religion itself and, I must add, I never saw a satisfying answer to this question. Of course, when religion and the general population are not “in sync”, they will tend to converge, I suppose, through mutual influences. But, if we assume a starting point in which there is harmony between the two, in which religion, so to speak, integrates seamlessly with social life then I don't really see how change can come from within religion. Something from outside must trigger change, doesn't it?<br /><br />I don't think I am denigrating religion by asking this and I am, by necessity, oversimplifying. But don't you think it's a legitimate question?JPhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12609837930361362269noreply@blogger.com