One of the most important grounds for challenging religious belief, especially theism, has involved invoking “evidentialism,” that is, the doctrine that one ought never to believe any claim, C, on insufficient evidence. Taken together with the premise that there isn’t sufficient evidence in support of the claim that God exists (a premise denied by not a few theists—but that’s another matter), evidentialism entails that belief in God is illegitimate.
Probably the clearest and most uncompromising articulation of this doctrine was offered by William Kingdon Clifford in the 19th Century. In his essay “The Ethics of Belief,” Clifford argued that all of our beliefs have the potential to affect what we do in ways that, should our beliefs prove false, can be very harmful. As such, belief is not a private affair but a public one, and we have a solemn responsibility to extend belief only to “truths which have been established by long experience and waiting toil, and which have stood in the fierce light of free and fearless questioning.” Clifford thus concludes that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”
Formulated in such strident and sweeping terms, evidentialism does not appear to be a tenable doctrine. Among other things it would mean that it’s wrong for children to take anything on trust from teachers or parents—and this seems a recipe for the impossibility of children ever arriving at a state in which they could actually engage in the sort of investigative activity that Clifford demands.
Furthermore, this kind of sweeping evidentialism falls prey to the following problem: In order to operate in accord with the evidentialist principle, we need to know what counts as evidence. But how do we arrive at the correct belief concerning what counts as evidence? What evidence do we use?
This is a variant on the problem of the criterion—basically, the problem of ascertaining in a non-circular way what criteria we should use for deciding what to believe. The problem can be summarized as follows: for any proposed criteria for deciding what to believe, one might ask, “Why should I believe that these criteria are the ones I should use?” If we answer this question by invoking the criteria in question, then we have begged the question. If we answer this question by appeal to different criteria, we can then ask the same question about them.
The difficulty that this poses for evidentialism can be emphasized with an example. Assume that “C” is the following proposition: “My senses are reliable.” A sweeping evidentialism would insist that we not believe this on insufficient evidence. But what is to count as sufficient evidence? How could we test the reliability of our senses without appeal to the very senses we are not supposed to trust until their reliability has been established?
This, of course, is the path to a radical skepticism which precludes having any beliefs at all. But, of course, it is impossible to actually live a human life—to make choices, to act on those choices, to form and maintain relationships, to work, etc.,—without having any beliefs. While Clifford rightly notes that our beliefs imply certain actions, it is equally true that our actions presuppose beliefs. Whenever we act, we act as if something is the case. Radical skepticism is therefore pragmatically impossible for anyone who actually gets on with the business of living (as Hume famously noted).
And in this business of living, isn’t it the case that we trust our senses unless and until we have good reason not to—unless they generate inconsistencies of various sorts? More broadly, doesn’t the business of living routinely require that we trust a range of propositions unless and until there is evidence that calls that trust into question? To put this point a bit more formally, the business of living requires that, with respect to some propositions, our “default” position should be belief (that is, we should operate as if the proposition is true unless we are confronted with reasons not to). Evidentialism, by contrast, insists that the default position for every claim C is disbelief or agnosticism. Put bluntly, then, one cannot be a faithful evidentialist of this sweeping sort and still lead a human life.
But a defender of evidentialism could seek to salvage the doctrine by making some distinctions. For example, there is a difference between what we might call “actual belief”—where you are convinced that something is the case, that you've got the truth—and “presumptive belief”—where you are merely operating as if something is the case. The criminal justice system in the US (and elsewhere) operates on the presumption of innocence. That is, if there is insufficient evidence to establishing guilt, the accused is treated as innocent. But everyone has heard stories of juries that quietly harbor the view that the accused is “guilty as hell” while delivering an acquittal. The jurors don’t “actually” believe that the accused is innocent in such cases, but they operate in accord with the presumption of innocence (at least in their role as jurors--they might in their private lives take steps to make sure that their children are kept away from the accused).
A modified evidentialist could hold that what living a human life requires is not that we actually believe that our senses are reliable, but that we presumptively do so. We operate as if our senses are reliable unless and until we encounter sufficient reason not to. And so the modified evidentialist could say that one ought never to actually believe any claim C on insufficient evidence, but that one should be free to presumptively believe a range of things, within certain limits, so long as there is no evidence against these things.
Several issues arise, however, in relation to this modified principle. First, there is the question of the limits within which presumptive belief (if not actual belief) is taken to be legitimate. Here there will be room, I think, for considerable dispute—especially in connections with “meaning bestowing beliefs about the transcendent” (religious beliefs). The evidentialist challenge to theism, then, will have to take a position in this disputed territory, making a case for the view that the class of propositions for which presumptive belief is appropriate excludes belief in God. But if this is what the evidentialist wants to argue, there are a number of important opposing arguments. Since I will be covering a number of these arguments later in my philosophy of religion class (when discussion pragmatic arguments for religious belief), I won't take up this version of evidentialism in detail at this time.
But there is another way of construing the evidentialist challenge to theism that I do want to explore a bit further here. Perhaps the evidentialist challenge to theism is merely targeting “actual” belief, while accepting the legitimacy of presumptive belief. In this case different concerns arise. First of all, as a challenge to theism it is radically attenuated insofar as it leaves space for the epistemic legitimacy of people organizing their lives around a presumptive belief in God.
But second, there is the question of the extent to which our actual beliefs are in our control. When it comes to the reliability of my senses, for example, I don’t just presumptively believe their deliverances. I really believe them. Of course, I could say something along the following lines: “Although living a human life requires that I presumptively believe the deliverances of my senses, I affirm that I have no compelling reason to actually believe them.” But saying this doesn’t make it the case that my belief here is merely presumptive. It remains an actual belief. Converting it into a merely presumptive belief seems beyond my power.
What is not beyond my power is lifting up, alongside this actual belief in the reliability of my senses, the judgment that such actual belief exceeds what is warranted by the evidence and as well as what is demanded by the pragmatic requirements of living (which only requires presumptive belief). Pairing this judgment with my actual belief might produce a kind of "functional equivalent" of mere presumptive belief.
But in that case, we would still need to ask, “On what basis should I believe this judgment about my actual belief in the reliability of my senses?” Is this belief about my belief itself an actual one or is it a presumptive one? And if it is a presumptive one, does that mean we are to act as if our belief is merely presumptive even though it is actual? This will be possible only if there is a discernible pragmatic difference between actually believing C and presumptively believing C. In other words, the behavior you exhibit when you behave as if C is true is different from the behavior you exhibit when by actually believe C is true. But in that case, in what sense are you behaving as if C is true when you presumptively believe C?
Assuming these difficulties can be overcome (and I think they can), acknowledging that what we actually believe is often out of our control forces evidentialists to truncate their evidentialist principle even further. They can no longer say that, on insufficient evidence, presumptive belief can be okay but actual belief never is. Rather, they'll have to say that actual belief can be okay too, so long as we pair that belief with a clear recognition of our fallibility with respect to it—a recognition which serves to generate the functional equivalent of mere presumptive belief.
But now, an evidentialist challenge to theism that makes room for presumptive belief will have to make room for actual belief as well—so long as that belief is paired with fallibilism. In other words, if we follow this path, we no longer have an evidentialist opposition to theism at all. What we have is a challenge to fanaticism.
I suspect very many theists would be very happy to accept that conclusion--because it isn't really a case against theism at all, but rather a case for favoring moderate forms of theism over fanatical ones. And what this shows, I think, is that in order really to have an evidentialist case against theism, the evidentialist would need to argue that presumptive belief in God is illegitimate—in other words, that it is wrong to live as if there is a God.
I think an argument of this sort can be made with respect to what I call (in my book, following Plutarch) “the god of superstition.” And there may be other specific forms of theism for which a case can be made that presumptive belief is illegitimate. But I think it would be very difficult indeed to make this case with respect to every species of theism--for example, the species which conceives of God as that whose existence would (borrowing language from my book) fulfill "the ethico-religious hope" (the hope that, in some fundamental way, reality is on the side of the good).
Eric
ReplyDeleteHow interesting. I find the difference between actual and presumptive belief difficult (in my own case free will is the challenging area) and will need to think on this post a bit before launching into an instinctive response.
I do have a question about the notion of what counts as evidence though. Isn't there a way around the problem of deciding on the criteria of evidence simply by appealing to universal standards? I ask this because it seems to me it's roughly what science does and it works extremely well. If we all believe the earth is round, and we all believe this because we accept the standard of evidence provided (be it photographs from space, the angle of the sunlight or flying around the globe) then I don't see how the question 'but why should that be the criteria for evidence?' applies. It seems to come down to something like this: if the expectations you build upon a belief are consistently met, then you have evidence for this belief (put your hand in the fire long enough, it's going to hurt).
A problem then arises about the possibility of cobbling together alternative explanations that generate the same expectations, which is why science places such store in the generation of novel predictions. So, once the germ theory of disease is up and running, hygiene standards can be applied in the expectation that lives will be saved. And that is just what happened. Millions of lives. That's powerful evidence I think, and I'm not sure we have to twist our minds too much to see why it counts.
If this is our standard of evidence, then we can reasonably say that a belief in the earth being round is backed by evidence in a way that a belief in God is not. This is not to then dismiss a belief in God as unreasonable, because pragmatically speaking we all must live our life on the back of guesses, hopes and hunches.
Bernard
"First of all, as a challenge to theism it is radically attenuated insofar as it leaves space for the epistemic legitimacy of people organizing their lives around a presumptive belief in God."
ReplyDeleteGosh, that is giving yourself way more room than is right. If we understand nothing of, say, the origin of the universe, then does that allow us logically to set up communities like Heaven's Gate or Scientology, or the Moonies? Absolutely and categorically not. The issue is that communities of faith rest not on a presumptive, tentative, self-aware belief. No, they take your loophole of presumptive "belief" and drive a Mac truck through it, naming it "FAITH".
Where everything you have said up to this point conforms to the status of a scientific hypothesis for beliefs founded on shaky and uncertain foundations, (if any at all), here you would sanction something that goes far beyond, to a "belief" that is not presumptive or provisional, but is quite typically doctrine, sponsoring social hierarchies, taught to innocent children as truth, etc. and so on. That goes far, far beyond the warrant.
One can organize one's life around any number of delusions, and I think it is fair to say that psychology indicates that each of us does, as a rule, do exactly that. But that hardly makes it rational to make of one's choicest delusions a common social myth that, without serious evidence, goes on to blight mankind for hundreds of years under fantastical doctrines and falsely sanctioned social hierarchies.
I think therefore that the problem with your system in this post is that on a individual level, one's private religion, be it obsessive compulsive, mystical, or drug-addled, is relatively free and open to all kinds of provisional beliefs and unreal conceptions. Our common life, however, deserves closer reasoning and scrutiny, beyond the the simple sharing of common psychological syndromes.
It deserves to be put on a more secure evidential basis so that such unexamined, but breezily rationalized (provisional) syndromes don't drag us into dark psychological places, like rationalization of projected deities with emotional states that happen to call for hatred of the other, strict obedience, charismatic followership and leadership, and the like- problems that routinely go hand in hand with the sharing of psychological archetypes.
I guess this is a plea for taking a step back and recognizing the power of social organizations, both for good and for ill, and putting them on the most evidentially sound footing possible.
Eric
ReplyDeleteI've been thinking about the idea that the claim 'my senses are reliable' causes problems for an evidence based approach. We do trust our senses, most of the time. Living without this appears to be impossible. Some times we have cause to mistrust our senses, but isn't this only the case when the data from our senses contradicts either another sense (we misjudge the placement of an item under water because of diffraction, step and miss) or the sense data of others (who may be able to expose to our senses the working of an illusion).
So, trusting our senses, like embracing inductive reasoning, appears to be a forced move, I suspect for good evolutionary reasons. Because as far as I know nobody has proposed an alternative to making use of our sense data in this way, there doesn't appear to be any problem in establishing it as a bedrock principle. And I would support extending the same support to any other principle of reasoning for which we can find no working alternative.
Leaving aside the cases where there is no alternative available, I'm not sure I can envisage the examples you might have in mind when speaking of assuming propositions are true unless presented with contrary evidence. An example would help me.
Bernard
Hi Eric,
ReplyDeleteSurely you are not saying that, in absence of any contrary evidence, anything goes?
No, of course. The fact is that, when no direct evidence is available, philosophers will argue their case using some other method. But not any method will do: no philosopher will come up and say “I have looked at tea leaves and, ergo, God exists.” On the contrary, philosophers will argue one way or another that a particular method or approach is (at least) likely to produce correct results. For example, many here argue from intuition – not by saying simply “My intuition tells me so, ergo, such or such is true” but by giving reasons to believe intuition. One such argument (you use something similar in your book) is that some intuitions seem as true as our sense impressions do and, thus, must be as valid. And there you go: it boils down to evidence after all (whether or not it is valid in this case is another question).
Aren't we all evidentialists then? Not of the extreme variety you describe but maybe there is no escaping the necessity of using evidence of some kind.
jp
Let me be clear that I do NOT approve of a wholesale dismissal of any principle demanding that we base our beliefs on some kind of evidence. My point here is that the sweeping version of this principle that Clifford advocates won't do, because it erases the very possibility of HAVING evidence. The question then becomes one of qualification.
ReplyDeleteWhat my example of the reliability of the senses aimed to show a few things. First, a sweeping form of evidentialism undermines the very possibility of there BEING evidence, and so leads to radical skepticism. Second, the way we treat "My senses are reliable" is exactly as Bernard describes: we can't help but believe it, and we question it only when there is evidence AGAINST it's reliability (inconsistencies among the deliverances of the senses or conflict between what my senses are delivering and what most other people are telling me their senses are delivering to them).
Put another way, there are some things that "just seem right" to us in a very powerful and immediate way (deliverances of the senses are the clearest examples, but vivid memories also function here, as do a range of rock-bottom intuitions). With respect to these things, we aren't indifferent to evidence, but neither does evidence operate as a condition for belief. Where Clifford would have our default position always be non-belief until enough supporting evidence comes in, with respect to these things the default position is belief until enough OPPOSING evidence comes in.
The question, then, becomes WHEN the one default position is appropriate and when the other is. On the epistemic theory that's sometimes called "classical foundationalism" (which I'll have a post about a bit later in the fall), one is authorized to presumptively believe ONLY the deliverances of the senses, memory, introspection, and logic. All other beliefs must be justified on the basis of evidence gained from these sources.
But classical foundationalism is not unproblematic (again, I'll take this up in a later post)--and its problems raise the question of what principles we should use to decide what is to count as a starting point. Is universality of reliance on the starting point adequate, or is that just an appeal to numbers?
Bernard gestures towards one way of deciding what should serve as our starting points: pragmatic success. That is, rather than deciding this matter in some a priori fashion, we try out alternatives and see which ones defeat themselves (which generate evidence that call the starting points into question) and which don't. Again, this is something I'll explore more fully in a later post.
Burk,
ReplyDeleteI certainly did not intend to say that the version of evidentialism that precludes "actual" theistic belief but not "presumptive" belief would have nothing critical to say about the kind of true-believerism you talk about in your comment. Quite the contrary (as I hope my remarks a bit further along in the post make clear).
My point in the passage you quote is that this species of evidentialism makes room for the legitimacy of organizing one's life around a presumptive belief in God IN SOME FORM, not IN ANY FORM. But insofar as it does the former, what it is really objecting to is not (presumptive) theistic belief but rather certain FORMS of it. And so it isn't really an evidentialist challenge to THEISM as such.
(As an aside, a presumptive belief shouldn't be cavalierly equated with a delusion--that begs the question.)
But your comment gestures towards a very interesting question: whether there is a difference between privately organizing one's life around a presumptive theistic premise and collectively doing so. That is, should the latter be condemned even if we make some allowance for the former?
Certainly, there are risks arising with the latter that don't arise with the former--but that doesn't mean communities can't avoid those risks. For me, communal religion has one distinctly attractive feature that private religion lacks--relating, again, to the possibilities for the pragmatically testing of presumptive beliefs.
To put it simply, one of the things that I take to be among the most important pragmatic considerations in relation to a belief-framework is its implications for community. And so we cannot effectively assess presumptive beliefs on THIS level so long as they remain private.
But while most theologians would likely agree with this as it pertains to the community organized around the presumptive beliefs, I think it is just as important to consider what implications the belief framework has for the prospects of building relationship and community with those who do NOT ascribe to that belief framework. Most significantly, to what extent does the belief framework forge community at the cost of creating out-groups and exclusivism? Here is where I tend to be particularly critical of the ways in which so many religions play themselves out in history and contemporary life.
Eric:
ReplyDeleteYou write: “This is a variant on the problem of the criterion—basically, the problem of ascertaining in a non-circular way what criteria we should use for deciding what to believe. The problem can be summarized as follows: for any proposed criteria for deciding what to believe, one might ask, “Why should I believe that these criteria are the ones I should use?” If we answer this question by invoking the criteria in question, then we have begged the question. If we answer this question by appeal to different criteria, we can then ask the same question about them.”
Suppose I suggest that the criterion for deciding what to believe is ultimate success. In other words that we should believe those beliefs the application of which is empirically found to be effective in realizing what we wish. Or, in fewer words, that we should believe those beliefs that are successful. (Let us here suppose that what we wish is not a matter of belief.) Let me now ask the question you suggest: “Why should I believe that this criterion is the one I should use?” or, in our context, “Why should I believe that I should believe those beliefs that are successful?” The answer, it seems to me, is obvious: “Because they are successful”. After all, success succeeds.
So I don’t see any infinite regression, and the problem of the criterion does not seem to me to be a serious one. Still, I wouldn’t say that I am an “evidentialist”, because evidentialists claim that one should first have the evidence and then hold a belief (which, as you explain, is not realizable in real life), whereas I am saying that the evidence comes after the belief: What, I say, ultimately justifies beliefs (and belief systems) is their pragmatical usefulness. In practice one first assumes beliefs somewhat on trust, sees where they lead, and if they fail one discards them or at least one doubts them; and if they succeed one believes in them with greater confidence. (The dualist presumptive/actual distinction strikes me as too rough.)
Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteThe solution to the problem of the criterion that I favor is along the lines of the one you outline here. It is also, I might add, the essential core of the Hegelian solution. But, as you point out, this solution requires that we adopt beliefs in advance of confirming/refuting evidence, and so is at odds with a strict evidentialism.
What we might say is this: the problem of the criterion is a problem primarily for strong evidentialists (those who think sufficient evidence is a necessary prerequisite for any belief). The problem can be avoided if we follow a pragmatic approach which (within certain parameters, at least) allows testing of beliefs by provisionally ADOPTING them (with the understanding that evidence will follow).
Eric
ReplyDeleteI remain very attracted to a version of an evidentialist approach, despite the problems you raise for it. For me, the way we trust our senses does not transfer easily into the way some intuitions just feel right.
The difference I think is what I'd call objectivity, the ability of other people to verify my evidence. In my experience, my rock bottom intuitions are not always shared by others (the discussion on consciousness in this blog is an excellent example of just how fluid rock bottom intuitions can be) in the way my sense that the sun is hot is.
I like the idea of believing those things for which clearly established objective evidence is available, while remaining agnostic about the rest. This agnosticism takes a number of practical forms. So sometimes evidence is in principle available, but seeking it is inefficient or impossible within the available time frame. In these cases I use clues to make informed guesses, weighing up the cost of digging deeper into the evidence against the cost of being wrong. Almost all public policy is based upon a type of informed guessing, evidence is suggestive but not compelling, because by the time full evidence has been collected the moment for policy intervention has passed.
In these cases I'd rather we talked about things being likely, rather than saying we believe in them as such, it's how I like to think about it anyway.
Finally, in matters of the supernatural, it seems to me we have an entirely different category of belief. Here it's not the case that objective evidence is difficult to collect or analyse, rather it seems objective evidence just doesn't exist in any form. We can reason or intuit our way both to and away from the same sets of beliefs in this area simply by twisting out minds around the arguments in imaginative ways. So Hegel will feel compelling to some informed figures on this, and barking mad to other equally well informed folk (Popper's disdain for Hegel is breath taking isn't it?)
The best we can ever say then is 'this feels true to me but quite reasonably may not feel true to you' and this difference between public and private belief seems important enough to be worthy of different language.
Bernard
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteI agree with much of this. And I am not saying we shouldn't be evidentialists, but that we CAN'T be evidentialists about EVERYTHING.
It is certainly true that there is a difference between (a) foundations for belief that are not only universally regarded AS evidence but which are such that others can in principle have access to this evidence, and (b) foundations for belief that are not universally regarded AS evidence and/or are essentially private. But I am pretty sure that we cannot exempt ONLY things in the former category from the scope of our evidentialism without impoverishing human life. But it's also pretty clear that we cannot adopt an anything goes attitude towards things in the latter category.
Eric,
ReplyDeleteI find that the concept of “evidence” is often discussed in a way that is divorced from the human condition. This is a mistake because our condition is such that there is a complex interplay between beliefs, choices, and evidence. Significantly, evidence (which is always based on some experience) is not independent from the beliefs one has adopted. It is the case that evidence to some degree drives beliefs (in the evidentialist sense), but it is also the case that beliefs to some degree drive the evidence. After all the beliefs we adopt (provisionally or not) affect our life-stance, affect what we shall study, affect what choices we shall make – and in all these ways affect our future life, and hence our future experiences (both in their objective/public and their subjective/private dimensions), and thus the evidence we shall have at our disposal in the future.
I think there should exist a field of philosophy about the human condition, for it seems to me that much of epistemology is built on models of the human condition which are so primitive as to be misleading. For example our subjective sense of beauty is often simply ignored. But in real life our sense of beauty is not some minor and irrelevant detail. Indeed our sense of beauty is not a fixed given but a dynamic reality which is much influenced by the choices we have made in the past, in the context, say, of what we have studied (a virtually universal rule of our condition is that we experience what we understand as being more beautiful). Conversely, our current sense of beauty strongly influences how we shall choose in the future (in the context of what to study, of what work to do, of whom to befriend, of whom to marry, of how many children to have, of how much to value what money buys, etc), and thus also influences what we shall experience and what evidence we shall have at our disposal in the future.
Eric
ReplyDeleteYes, the notion of at what point a belief system, no matter how apparently coherent, might impoverish human life, is clearly complex and important. Consciousness, Free Will, Self are all examples of things we might simply be forced to adopt an attitude to despite rather than because of the evidence. I'm not sure.
I tend to think of attitudes and beliefs as being less tightly entwined than some seem to think, and this informs my role as a teacher in a number of important ways. So, while I like the thought of being able to encourage certain attitudes towards life in my students, say curiosity, hope, tolerance, enthusiasm, in my experience, at least with adolescents, the ability to embrace such attitudes to a large extent floats free from underlying belief systems.
Students respond to their environment and they key off role models. It is less, 'I have thought about this deeply and will live with this attitude because contemplation of my beliefs encourages the stance', and more a tendency to develop habits of mind and spirit that become reinforced through positive modeling and experience.
This raises the possibility that it is circumstance rather than belief system that primarily delivers up the opportunity for a rich life. So maybe a wide range of beliefs, be they theistic or not, can allow a community to gather about a shared set of hopes and flourish, and equally almost any system will flounder if some members of the community find themselves shut out from its dreams.
In this way I would claim it is possible to be both agnostic and live a life that is deeply meaningful.
Bernard
Is it possible that most of out intuitions are purely based on accumulated experiences?
ReplyDeleteFor instance we may intuitively distrust a particular type of person because of the accumulated experiences we've had with people over may years. This would make intuition a kind of short-cut/quick reference into our experiences that seems like an instantaneous non-evidential decision (in the sence that it is sub-conscously done). However, if that intuition comes up wrong enough times we will start to apply the rule of 'don't judge a book by its cover'.
I realise this example isn't great - is there any evidence (ha ha, yawn!) that the intuitions of the young are any more/less reliable than that of older people?
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDelete[...] it is also the case that beliefs to some degree drive the evidence.
This is true in more than one sense. In our daily life, many beliefs are forced upon us by a deeper and unconsciousness part of our mind because of some unexpressed desire or something of the kind. The part then taken by the conscious mind in rationalizing these beliefs is fascinating. Maybe most beliefs are derived this way. It is only when we question them that evidence explicitly comes into play.
My senses are reliable.
ReplyDeleteI would say they are not reliably reliable. Visual illusions provide striking examples of this. One of the best is here (and it's worth a click). Squares A and B are exactly the same shade of grey (which you can verify by looking at them through holes in a piece of paper). Now, even knowing they are identical, I find it is absolutely impossible to see it that way.
If something that seems so obviously true is in fact false, we should be wary of believing anything simply because “it seems right” or because “we can't believe otherwise”. We are easily fooled.
Hi Jeff,
ReplyDeleteIs it possible that most of out intuitions are purely based on accumulated experiences?
I think this is the case. If we exclude instinctive behaviour that may also count as “intuitive” maybe all our intuitions are such, I don't know. Can you think of a counterexample?
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “The difference I think is what I'd call objectivity, the ability of other people to verify my evidence.”
Why is it important for you that other people be able to verify your evidence?
After all, evidence is evidence no matter whether other people can verify it or not. For example it happens that I don’t like jazz; I simply do not see the beauty in it. That’s a piece of evidence that has given me quite some thought. But it’s private evidence that others cannot verify.
I’d appreciate you answered my question above, for I am really puzzled. It seems a very strange thing to me that so many people actively ignore all evidence which is not amenable to outside verification. Epistemically speaking that’s about the worse thing one can do, for a huge part of the data at our disposal is precisely of that non-objective kind, but still absolutely certain. The only reason I can see why so many people would make that kind of self-amputating epistemic choice is because they feel it’s a good idea to imitate the scientific method. It’s true that natural science does only use evidence of the objective kind, simply because what natural science does is to study objective phenomena. But it seems there is no reason whatsoever why one should transfer that obvious principle of the scientific method to fields which have an entirely different purpose. If one wants to understand the whole of one’s experience of life the last thing one should do is ignore a huge part of that experience, and, arguably, the most relevant part of it. Different purposes call for different methods, that much is clear.
“ I like the idea of believing those things for which clearly established objective evidence is available, while remaining agnostic about the rest.”
Do you believe that the Moon is still there when nobody is looking, or are you agnostic about it?
Jeff,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “Is it possible that most of out intuitions are purely based on accumulated experiences?”
I think all our intuitions are purely based on experience. On what else could they possibly be based? Experience is where all knowledge starts. Even if God were to miraculously speak into our mind, we’d be listening to what S/He says in our experience.
“is there any evidence (ha ha, yawn!) that the intuitions of the young are any more/less reliable than that of older people?”
Well, I’d say that fewer older people share the intuition of children about the Earth lying in the center of the world because all stars at night look equidistant.
On the other hand there are what I’d call incorrigible intuitions, i.e. intuitions that are based on past experience, but which I at least cannot unlearn no matter what new experiences I may get in the future. Or at least I cannot imagine what kind of experience could possibly make me change my mind about such intuitions, unless I first lost my reason. Examples would be the intuitions related to basic logic, to qualia (e.g. that there are different colors), to freedom of will (i.e. that I could have chosen differently than how I in fact chose), to objective moral values (e.g. that to torture a child for fun is wrong in itself), and so on.
Hi, Eric-
ReplyDeleteI was using the word delusion in a broad psychological sense, but yes, rolled religion into it as well. And why not? Your post was dedicated to the proposition that beliefs are sensibly held without evidence, and what could define that position better than a set of beliefs where no reliable evidence has appeared for hundreds, even thousands of years despite the most earnest searching and hoping?
In contrast, the eye's vision is supported by evidence on a minute-by-minute basis, as we don't bump into things, can pick up cups, etc. (Assuming that the metaphysician grants that "reality" is real, for practical purposes.)
Delusions can be quite useful and pragmatic. I might think, for instance, that my co-workers like me. That would make me happier and more effective at work (up to a point), even though they don't like me at all. It would be effective, and wouldn't be an unusual delusion at all.
The only problem is that the word "delusion" implies that I who use it am aware of the facts of the matter while those suffering under it are not. Given that agnosticism is the only airtight position, (however abused and anathema to everyone on both sides of the theism argument), that requires some presumption, which I base not on my exaustive knowledge of cosmic origins, but on human psychology and the sorry track record of theism in all its attempted explicit relations with reality.
Not only that, but when considering momentous and unsupported hypotheses, the presumption should go to disbelief rather than belief. It is one thing to suspend one's disbelief about hypotheses about, say, the taxonomic status of toad subspecies, for the sake of cool investigation. It is quite another to swallow the bizarre theories of theism, even in the attenuated form you hold, and call them "presumptive belief" in the absence of evidence as though this were the most natural thing that a thinking person might do.
You will have to forgive me. I am reading a biography of Stalin at the moment, where issues of truth and evidence in the public sphere are most dire.
Hi Dianelos
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure anybody does advocate ignoring data that is not amenable to verification. You are right, to do so would be quite foolish, and further than that, probably impossible.
The question I am interested in is how far one can extend the warrant of that data. Data that is available for public scrutiny can be handled in a different and powerful way and I think this difference that bears scrutiny.
So, I am quite happy to believe you when you say you don't much like jazz. Neither do I. Equally, if on a particular day I feel warm, then that is a useful piece of data that needs explaining. What we shouldn't do, I don't think, is extend this subjective data to make broader statements about the world. So, I may feel warm, but that does not mean the air temperature is warm, I may after all have a fever. But, if the thermometer shows a high temperature and others are also complaining about the heat, then the warrant of the 'I feel warm' statement extends.
In the context of these discussions, people have very strong, what you call incorrigible, intuitions about such things as ethical and spiritual realities. But, as with the personal experience of warmth, we must be careful to note other people's intuitions are leading them in different directions. We should not make the leap from 'I feel the presence of God in my life' to 'God is real' for just this reason. The first statement can be true even when the second is false, and the subjective data of others, supporting quite different intuitions, needs to also be accounted for.
For just this reason I do believe the moon is there when I'm not looking at it, I am able to rely upon the verification of others' observations and methods. (The curious possibilities of quantum indeterminancy notwithstanding, my understanding is that for macro objects like the moon decoherence rules supreme and it's not an issue, but I'm no expert and am happy to be swayed by those who are).
Bernard
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “The question I am interested in is how far one can extend the warrant of that data.”
All data are warranted by definition. After all, all data are absolutely certain. Don’t you agree? Can you suggest one datum that is false?
“ What we shouldn't do, I don't think, is extend this subjective data to make broader statements about the world. So, I may feel warm, but that does not mean the air temperature is warm, I may after all have a fever.”
How one *interprets* the data may be erroneous, I quite agree. Or, if you prefer, how one reasons about the data, or what beliefs one bases on them, may be erroneous.
On the other hand why single out subjective data as easier to lead into error? Do you have any reason for believing that? After all, people have been led into error by objective data very often. Think about how people believed that the Earth is flat, or that the Sun revolves around it, using only objective data. Or think of the uncountable erroneous inferences in the history of the natural sciences. Or, for that matter, think of astrology.
It seems to me that the idea that it is easier to be led into error by subjective data rather than by objective data is just one more myth sold by naturalists. And in any case the whole issue is irrelevant. What we all should be doing is use all data at our disposal, while being careful and thinking about how to avoid errors.
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “We should not make the leap from 'I feel the presence of God in my life' to 'God is real' for just this reason.”
I agree, up to a point. I mean when an experience is sufficiently orderly and fruitful then one is warranted to believe in its obvious interpretation. I am sure you agree that at some point one should make the leap from ‘I feel walls being hard’ to ‘walls are real’, or from ‘water quenches my thirst” to ‘water is real’. If somebody has an equally orderly and fruitful experience of the presence of God I don’t see why that person can’t leap to the conclusion that God is real.
“ For just this reason I do believe the moon is there when I'm not looking at it, I am able to rely upon the verification of others' observations and methods.”
My question was not whether you believe that the moon is there when you are not looking at it, but whether you believe that the moon is there when *nobody* is looking at it. (This question has nothing to do with quantum mechanics by the way.) I asked this question because you said that you liked “the idea of believing those things for which clearly established objective evidence is available while remaining agnostic about the rest”. The point I wanted to make is that there is (and cannot possibly be) objective evidence that the moon is there when nobody is looking.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteThis thought of why we should give extra credibility to objective data is an interesting one, and is, I agree, a point that is heavily weighted in most naturalist interpretations of the world.
Here briefly is why I prioritise objective data over subjective data. By objective data I mean any data that all people agree on, and I include here agreed upon models of that data because I think distinguishing between data and models is difficult.
Why do all people agree on a statement such as, the moon is a physical object? Either because no other plausible model exists, or because this is the minimal model required to generate our most accurate set of predictionis regarding the moon. So there exists if you like a set of criteria by which I can choose to believe.
If, in your wall example, somebody proposes an alternative hypothesis to explain the apparent existence of the wall then this can be examined, and because of the predictive power of physical hypotheses, can be tested. So I know how to choose between alternative hypotheses with objective data, indeed this very mechanism is the thing that creates the agreement and hence the objectivity.
So why shouldn't I have similar confidence in subjective data? Simply because I have no way of choosing between competing hypotheses. Yes, I might feel a God exists, I may feel its presence very strongly, but there are a range of possible explanations for this phenomenon. So how am I to choose between them? I could choose criteria like those you propose, coherence, plausibility, pragmatic value etc, but the trouble is that I have enough faith in my imagination to know I could manipulate these very criteria to again reach any of the available conclusions.
So, with subjective data I must simply make a guess (as I do) but I can see no reason to believe my guesses are more likely to hit the target than the competing guesses of others.
As for your moon example, yes I think the assumption of continuous existence, essentially a cornerstone too of the inductive assumption, is a tremendously useful simplifying assumption. As to the true existence of reality independent of our measurements, I have no problem leaving that as a relatively unimportant issue over which I am agnostic (unless, as at the quantum scale, experiments can nudge our intuition one way or the other).
Bernard
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteThis thought of why we should give extra credibility to objective data is an interesting one, and is, I agree, a point that is heavily weighted in most naturalist interpretations of the world.
Here briefly is why I prioritise objective data over subjective data. By objective data I mean any data that all people agree on, and I include here agreed upon models of that data because I think distinguishing between data and models is difficult.
Why do all people agree on a statement such as, the moon is a physical object? Either because no other plausible model exists, or because this is the minimal model required to generate our most accurate set of predictionis regarding the moon. So there exists if you like a set of criteria by which I can choose to believe.
If, in your wall example, somebody proposes an alternative hypothesis to explain the apparent existence of the wall then this can be examined, and because of the predictive power of physical hypotheses, can be tested. So I know how to choose between alternative hypotheses with objective data, indeed this very mechanism is the thing that creates the agreement and hence the objectivity.
So why shouldn't I have similar confidence in subjective data? Simply because I have no way of choosing between competing hypotheses. Yes, I might feel a God exists, I may feel its presence very strongly, but there are a range of possible explanations for this phenomenon. So how am I to choose between them? I could choose criteria like those you propose, coherence, plausibility, pragmatic value etc, but the trouble is that I have enough faith in my imagination to know I could manipulate these very criteria to again reach any of the available conclusions.
So, with subjective data I must simply make a guess (as I do) but I can see no reason to believe my guesses are more likely to hit the target than the competing guesses of others.
As for your moon example, yes I think the assumption of continuous existence, essentially a cornerstone too of the inductive assumption, is a tremendously useful simplifying assumption. As to the true existence of reality independent of our measurements, I have no problem leaving that as a relatively unimportant issue over which I am agnostic (unless, as at the quantum scale, experiments can nudge our intuition one way or the other).
Bernard
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteThis thought of why we should give extra credibility to objective data is an interesting one, and is, I agree, a point that is heavily weighted in most naturalist interpretations of the world.
Here briefly is why I prioritise objective data over subjective data. By objective data I mean any data that all people agree on, and I include here agreed upon models of that data because I think distinguishing between data and models is difficult.
Why do all people agree on a statement such as, the moon is a physical object? Either because no other plausible model exists, or because this is the minimal model required to generate our most accurate set of predictionis regarding the moon. So there exists if you like a set of criteria by which I can choose to believe.
If, in your wall example, somebody proposes an alternative hypothesis to explain the apparent existence of the wall then this can be examined, and because of the predictive power of physical hypotheses, can be tested. So I know how to choose between alternative hypotheses with objective data, indeed this very mechanism is the thing that creates the agreement and hence the objectivity.
So why shouldn't I have similar confidence in subjective data? Simply because I have no way of choosing between competing hypotheses. Yes, I might feel a God exists, I may feel its presence very strongly, but there are a range of possible explanations for this phenomenon. So how am I to choose between them? I could choose criteria like those you propose, coherence, plausibility, pragmatic value etc, but the trouble is that I have enough faith in my imagination to know I could manipulate these very criteria to again reach any of the available conclusions.
So, with subjective data I must simply make a guess (as I do) but I can see no reason to believe my guesses are more likely to hit the target than the competing guesses of others.
As for your moon example, yes I think the assumption of continuous existence, essentially a cornerstone too of the inductive assumption, is a tremendously useful simplifying assumption. As to the true existence of reality independent of our measurements, I have no problem leaving that as a relatively unimportant issue over which I am agnostic (unless, as at the quantum scale, experiments can nudge our intuition one way or the other).
Bernard
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “This thought of why we should give extra credibility to objective data is an interesting one ”
One of the more useful things of philosophy is that one learns to identify and question assumptions. One could say that philosophy is the science of critical thinking.
“ By objective data I mean any data that all people agree on, and I include here agreed upon models of that data because I think distinguishing between data and models is difficult.”
Perhaps you mean that when we perceive the moon (or a cow, to use JP’s example) we have already applied a model to the raw data of our vision. But even then, what we perceive *is* what looks like the moon (or like a cow). That’s the data, and as always is absolutely certain data. Similarly, an absolutely certain datum I have is that I perceive Halle Berry as being more beautiful than Winston Churchil. I don’t see why the fact that the former kind of datum is labeled “objective” and the latter “subjective” should carry much relevance in my thinking about reality.
“Why do all people agree on a statement such as, the moon is a physical object?”
If your meaning of “physical object” entails that the moon is there even if nobody is aware of it, then I don’t agree with that statement. With Berkeley I happen to believe that only what is perceived exists. - I am saying all this to show that you can’t hold on to the property of objectivity if you walk away from data. And even then the concept of objectivity is somehow hazy. A blind person cannot see the moon and therefore has not the kind of moon-related “objective” data seeing people have.
So to say that only if *all* people agree one has objectivity is too strong a criterion. Further I am not sure why the matter of agreement is relevant in the first place. Naturalists do not agree among themselves about the number of universes that exist, but this does not imply that the number of universes is not objective. At some point in time all people agreed that the Sun revolves around the Earth, but this fact does not make that statement objectively true, does it?
Actually, it’s important to notice that there are two distinct ways we use the concept of “objective”. First we use it to characterize that part of our experience which is measurable by scientific instruments. That is I presume the meaning you are using. Secondly, we use it to characterize those propositions the truth value of which does not depend on anybody’s opinion, or on social convention, or on how our brains have evolved. That second meaning simply describes part of one’s meaning when one claims a particular proposition. Theists and naturalists agree with the proposition “It is wrong to torture a child for fun”, but most theists mean that proposition objectively and many naturalists do not mean it objectively.
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “ So why shouldn't I have similar confidence in subjective data? Simply because I have no way of choosing between competing hypotheses.”
Sometimes this is indeed the case, but nevertheless all rational people have confidence in beliefs they build on subjective data. Take for example our belief that other minds exist, i.e. that the people around us are conscious beings like we are and not some kind of robots behaving as if they were conscious. We believe that because it subjectively feels right. Not to form the belief that other minds exist because one has no way of choosing between competing hypotheses would be irrational. Similarly one cannot choose on any objective data whether the world started 5 seconds ago instead of earlier. What I am saying is that the so-called “verification principle” that many atheists try to bear on the question of whether God exists is simply and obviously a wrong principle.
On the other hand, the above is sometimes *not* he case: Beliefs one builds on subjective data can quite often be verified empirically. Suppose Peter decides to marry Ann because he believes, on entirely subjective grounds, that he will live happily with her. Whether that belief is true is certainly something that John can verify. Or suppose Sofia believes, on entirely subjective grounds, that she can understand quantum field theory if she studies hard. After five years of studying she finds out that that belief was true. Or suppose that John joins a monastery because he believes, on entirely subjective grounds, that if he prays enough he will be united with God even in this life, and after 10 years of praying and of following all the spiritual exercises of his religious tradition he does unite with God.
“I could choose criteria like those you propose, coherence, plausibility, pragmatic value etc, but the trouble is that I have enough faith in my imagination to know I could manipulate these very criteria to again reach any of the available conclusions.”
Well, some of these criteria are quite objective (in the second sense of the word). For example this is the case for the important criterion of explanatory power. Pragmatic value too is quite objective: Psychologists have defined objective criteria about human well-being, and careful statistical studies can be carried out to measure whether theistic or naturalistic beliefs are more conducive to well-being. Finally, a very good way to control the effect of one’s imagination is to discuss with other people one’s application of such criteria. It’s doable.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteThe example you give of somebody saying 'I will understand so and so after study' is to me an entirely objective issue. At the end of the process, we test the understanding, the test can be applied and assessed by outsiders , it's like saying I believe if I drop this stone it will fall to the ground. We shouldn't confuse a belief we form in advance of testing with a subjective statement where the end product must be tested subjectively (as in only the person involved can make the assessment).
I think we are using different meanings of objective, as here I'm talking about the ability to verify through appealling to the judgements not just of myself but of others. It's a useful check against all our tendencies to see only what we want to see.
The other form of objective, matching some true state, I have no use for, because I know of no way of telling whether we have reached such a point in any description.
And I agree entirely, often we are forced to make guesses about issues in absence of verification, actually most of the time with most things. My point is this is just what they are, guesses (the guess about other minds is so tremendously helpful that we'd be foolish to attempt to live otherwise, so too the guess about the power of inductive reasoning).
So, you don't find me defending naturalism because it allows us to live without guesswork. I don't believe that at all. I do believe there is much to be said for admitting that's what we're doing, taking a punt. We can then ask, well what makes a good guess, and one that is backed up by evidence, can be checked by others and has resisted all attempts at falsification is for example, a pretty good guess in my book.
Now the guess that there is a God appears to many, including me, to be a most unhelpful one, and this can be seen from the fact that while many guess there is, many guess otherwise. This is in stark contrast to the other minds example.
I'm am sceptical of the claim that well being can be measured and the impact on this of theistic beliefs can be tested. It's extremely difficult to pull causation from correlation in these cases.
Bernard
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “The example you give of somebody saying 'I will understand so and so after study' is to me an entirely objective issue.”
Yes, that’s what I meant and that’s why I introduced that example, namely to show that beliefs that rest on subjective data can in the end be verified empirically or objectively. The example at hand is that Sofia forms the belief that she will understand quantum field theory if she studies hard for five years. She forms this belief based on subjective data, or on intuition, or, as Eric would put it, on hope. She studies hard for five years. After that period she can empirically and objectively verify if that original belief of hers was true or not, for she will know whether she now understands QFT or not.
I think that the above example is important because it elucidates a fundamental factor in our lives. Consider the following question: Why is it that we value holding true beliefs? I’d say that to a large degree we value holding true beliefs because beliefs influence our choices for future action, and we don’t want to choose unwisely. So an important subset of beliefs have the form: “If I do W I will reach personal state P”. (Pairs of {W,P} may be {drink water, satiate my thirst}, {go to the doctor, be healthy}, {grow muscles, get the girl}, {study business administration, earn a lot of money}, {learn English, enjoy reading}, {marry Helen, become happy} etc.) Now not in all but in many important cases such beliefs cannot be grounded on objective evidence at the time when one must make a decision based on them. And decide one must: I must decide to marry Helen before finding out whether I’ll be happy with her. Similarly I must decide whether other minds exist before realizing that such a belief affects my life in a good way. In real life it is then often the case that the empirical/objective evidence follows the belief, and that therefore one must form the belief without objective evidence, but only because it feels right, or because of one’s intuition, or on faith, or on hope.
This issue relates strongly to religion of course. When one thinks about the truth value of a {W,P} belief it is normally because one desires to reach state P. One doesn’t normally worry about beliefs about how to reach goals one does not desire to reach. Now it is a universal truth that the personal state that people ultimately desire to reach is something one may call “happiness” or “the good life” or perhaps “self-fulfillment”, and many people decide, on quite subjective grounds, that the way to get to that personal state is by committing to a religious way of life. After forming that belief and acting on it many do then realize that the religious way is effective, and hence, naturally enough, feel confident that reality is such as to comport with the effectiveness of that way of life. Empirical confirmation always increases one’s confidence in the truth of the beliefs that have been empirically confirmed (as is the case in science, for example), and hence religious persons will believe more confidently in the religious ontology that was taught together with the religious way of life they have committed to and have found to be effective. One major and quite plausible such ontology is based on the idea that reality is fundamentally personal and good, and thus favors ways of life that lead towards a life of personal goodness.
The above story is a simplified idealization, but I think does capture what is the essential nature of the religious life and religious belief. Religion succeeds because it works. It does not work universally as science does, nor is its effectiveness as easily to check as the {drink water, satiate thirst} belief, but works so well for so many people that some naturalists are now searching for a “God gene”.
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteWe may have different definitions of the word “evidence”, I don't know. But I would say that in the examples you give above decisions to believe ARE based on some evidence.
You decide to marry Helen because of the evidence you have about her personality, her tastes, her goals in life, common experiences. You cannot be sure that it will work but you have evidence it will.
You goto the doctor to get healthy because there is evidence that they can cure illnesses.
You decide to grow muscles to get the girl because you have seen this work with other people, maybe some of your friends.
Sofia believes she can learn QFT because she has done some difficult learning in her past and she knows she's very smart.
Same thing with religion. Nobody would spend years “trying” religion to find out if it works for him without any reason/evidence to believe the experience is worth it.
In any of these cases the evidence may be inconclusive or misinterpreted. Of course, the decision may also be tainted by wishful thinking and desires. But evidence there is.
In fact I expect you would criticize any such decision made without any evidence. If I decided to spend these few years mastering QFT, I could legitimately believe I can succeed. But if I told you I can train and eventually run 100 meters in 10 seconds you would rightly call me mad. If Sonia has never mastered even simple arithmetic, after years of trying, you would no doubt call her attempt foolish.
For me, the interesting question is not whether evidence is used or not but how much our decisions are tainted by our desires and to what degree these desires make us interpret the evidence in our favour.
Hi JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “We may have different definitions of the word “evidence”, I don't know. But I would say that in the examples you give above decisions to believe ARE based on some evidence.
I agree with most of what you say in the above post, but please observe that I was discussing the issue of *objective* evidence. Thus I wrote: “Not in all but in many important cases such beliefs cannot be grounded on objective evidence at the time when must make a decision based on them.” The belief about marrying Helen would be a good example. As you say we must sometimes form beliefs and act on them on inconclusive evidence. After the action though we often do get the conclusive evidence.
“ For me, the interesting question is not whether evidence is used or not but how much our decisions are tainted by our desires and to what degree these desires make us interpret the evidence in our favour.”
Undoubtedly this happens. But if desire pushes me to marry Helen, or if desire pushes Sofia to study QFT, after the respective choice both I and Sofia will have evidence about whether our original belief was true or not. That was my basic point: in real life it is often the case that good evidence (objective, conclusive, etc) follows the formation of and acting upon the respective belief.
Incidentally, it is not easy to say whether the effect of desire will tend to be positive or negative. If theism is true and we are built in the image of God then I’d say that desires when true to our nature will tend to serve us well.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteIs there a difference for you between the statements 'I believe acting as if God is real will make me happy' (which I agree, after the event can to some extent be verified) and the statement 'I believe God is real'.
I see an important difference, insomuch as a person who acts in accordance with the first, choosing beliefs on the ground that they serve a useful purpose, is being entirely reasonable. I'm not sure however that jumping to the next point, that a belief that serves me well is therefore a true belief, works.
I say this because different beliefs seem to suit different people, so believing God isn't real might make me happy in a very similar way that believing God is real serves you. I suspect this is roughly the case. But that would make God simultaneously real and unreal, or rather, real for some people and not others. That's a conclusion I'm happy to accept, which is why I would never suggest you shouldn't believe in God. If it works for you I'm truly delighted.
Bernard
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “ Is there a difference for you between the statements 'I believe acting as if God is real will make me happy' (which I agree, after the event can to some extent be verified) and the statement 'I believe God is real'.”
I suppose you are asking about the meaning of truth. That’s actually a fundamental question.
I think, first of all, that we should think about truth in the context of belief systems and not of individual beliefs. In a sense individual beliefs do not exist; the meaning of a single belief one holds derives or is dependent on the web of beliefs in which it is embedded. Speaking of belief systems then I do think that those belief systems that are empirically found to be more effective in realizing what we wish are closest to the truth.
Perhaps you agree on the above, but let me again suggest the analogy of the two gardeners. They both wish the same, namely to produce a beautiful garden, but they hold different belief systems about gardening. The first gardener using her beliefs produces a beautiful garden and is happy. The second gardener using her beliefs fails to produce a beautiful garden and is frustrated. Even though we don’t know anything about their individual belief systems, we may reasonable say that the first’s is closer to the truth than the second’s. Incidentally, there is a parallel here in the Gospels, where Jesus says that we recognize truth by its fruit.
Now a skeptic may argue as follows: “Those belief systems that produce actions which tend to fulfill one’s wishes are indeed true, but their truth may not refer to objective reality out there but refer to how one is.” I don’t think that skeptical worry holds water, for reality is not an independent and alien thing to one’s wish fulfillment. It is a truth about the gardeners that they wish to produce a beautiful garden, and it is a truth about the gardeners that for them a garden full of flowers is more beautiful than a garden full of dead plants. But, given these in a sense subjective truths, if the first gardener got objective reality to produce the beautiful garden, and the second gardener failed, then clearly the first gardener knew something about reality that the second ignored. (The analogy here should be clear: We are like the gardeners, and our life is like the gardens.)
Finally, let me turn the table and ask what the alternative is. Suppose an engineer builds an airplane that makes her happy because it successfully flies over the Atlantic. It would be absurd for the skeptic to suggest that the beliefs that the engineer used to build the airplane only refer to what makes her happy, and not to objective reality. Suppose theism satisfies me intellectually, because I find it works much better than naturalism when compared one to one under such criteria as compatibility with my experience of life, compatibility with science, explanatory power, freedom from conceptual problems, simplicity, etc. It would be absurd for the skeptic to suggest that the fact that theism gives me intellectual satisfaction only says something about what makes me happy and not about the probability of theism being true.
“I say this because different beliefs seem to suit different people, so believing God isn't real might make me happy in a very similar way that believing God is real serves you. I suspect this is roughly the case.”
Here you raise a very interesting issue, which gave me some thought. Actually you are raising two different cases. I am in a hurry right now so please give me a little more time to respond.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteYes, the thing to think about then is whether the analogy with the gardener holds. I like this idea of pragmatic truth, really the best we can say about some statement is that it serves our purpose. So, our knowledge of the world serves the purpose of allowing us to negotiate our way through it in a way that is satisfying.
I have an instinct to want to break this pragmatic knowledge into classes, I'm not sure why. So, there is knowledge that is useful because of its tight predictiveness and its ability to be expressed in terms of simple, abstracted models. That is scientific knowledge, and its usefulness is found in technology, but also in the ability to serve as the launching pad for new discoveries.
Then there is knowledge that is in a way a series of educated guesses, where the predictive fit may be poor, and the knowledge hard to transfer, but it's the best we have and we must use it. Guessing as to whether I'll enjoy a new movie, or wondering whether eating healthily is worth the pleasure forgone, etc. After the event, as you say, we can judge how good our guess was, the subjective hunch becomes objective.
And I would suggest the final category is that which is private knowledge, which is to say it can never be objectively verified, but can been seen as true for the individual. I think moral and aesthetic judgements fit into this category. The best I can say is this makes me feel happy, or righteous, or moves me, but I can't say this is therefore right, for fulfilling or beautiful for others (or at least I don't see how I can say this).
So, the garden analogy doesn't quite hold up for me for a few reasons. My observation of the world suggests strongly that if we are the gardeners and our lives the garden, then entirely different beliefs and strategies can produce the same results, and conversely the same beliefs and techniques can yield different results. Religious beliefs make some people profoundly happy, others profoundly unhappy. Temperament, personal experience, cultural backdrop, all of these things are in play.
The second problem for me is that even if we could isolate the types of beliefs that make life rewarding (and I agree this is worth trying, it is part of life's quest for us all) this would certainly tell us something about underlying reality, but not necessarily the thing you conclude. It may tell us something about our evolutionary past and genetic make-up for instance.
So it may be possible to imagine a machine that believes it has free will, even though its every move is determined. Behaving as if it has free will may make its existence infinitely more meaningful, even though the belief is quite wrong. Indeed we may be just such a machine.
Bernard
Hi, Bernard and Dianelos-
ReplyDeleteI also find the garden and other "by their fruits" analogies highly questionable. Theists typically pair unconnected things, such as the "lived experience" proving cosmic ontology, or one's "worldview" proving the existence of god.
The lived experience may prove one's ethical philosophy to some extent, (when have explicit ethical philosophies ever been determinative in practice?), but it has nothing to say about the cosmos. Was Einstein's relativity made subject to his personal probity? No- the fruit in this case was the empirical test. And that is exactly what theistic philosophy lacks. Making a cult's temporal happiness and moral probity (if any) the test of its ontology is simply a confidence trick. Likewise, making its success at brain-washing (a worldview) rather than fulfilling rigorous empirical tests the criterion for any sort of ontology is no better either.
Indeed, if one is serious about these supposed ethical-ontological connections, one would probably want to discard Christianity and adopt Buddhism or Jainism immediately.
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “I say this because different beliefs seem to suit different people, so believing God isn't real might make me happy in a very similar way that believing God is real serves you. I suspect this is roughly the case.”
Here there are two distinct cases to be thought about:
First the case that two gardeners wish different gardens, the first valuing a garden full of flowers and the second valuing a garden full of dead plants. They also hold different beliefs systems, and both are effective in producing for each one the garden that makes them happy.
The second case it that both gardeners value the same (a garden full of flowers), but hold different beliefs systems, and both belief systems produce the same garden that makes them happy.
In your more recent post you mention this second case when you write “My observation of the world suggests strongly that if we are the gardeners and our lives the garden, then entirely different beliefs and strategies can produce the same results” and then point to a third case when you write: “and conversely the same beliefs and techniques can yield different results.”
These issues are not simple to analyze. I’d like to concentrate on the second case because it is the more realistic one (I tend to think that the first and third cases do not obtain in real life), relates to the inclusivist/exclusivist debate about religions, and appears to defeat a pragmatist understanding of the concept of “truth”, namely that those beliefs (or rather belief systems) are true which tend to cause behavior which is effective in realizing our wishes. If a Christian believing in a theistic religion is moved into a path that leads to well-being, and a Buddhist believing in a non-theistic religion is moved into a path that leads to the same state, can it be that, as you say, God is both real and not real?
Perhaps the greatest theologian of the last 100 years, John Hick, after developing the theodicy which I judge to be the most successful one and is therefore the one I believe in, observed that people from different religions reached a state of high self-realization while holding different beliefs about reality. Thus these beliefs, including the foundational Christian dogma of the incarnation of God, should be understood as “true myths” and not as objective truths. Ultimate reality, “the Real”, must thus transcend all such human concepts. What Hick means, I take it, is that specific religious beliefs about reality, such as those of Christianity or Buddhism, are not actually true, but relate to reality in a truthful way, in the sense that they move Christians and Buddhists to assume the most appropriate life stance vis-à-vis reality. In other words that even though Christians and Buddhists hold a false understanding of reality, that understanding moves them as if it were true. Perhaps true understanding is not possible in our condition, so the closest to true understanding that is possible is one that moves one as the true understanding would.
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ReplyDeleteMy view is somehow different. Let me take a step back and observe that confusion often arises when one uncritically applies a method that has proven useful in one field of knowledge to another field. For example, it seems to me that much of the confusion that naturalists suffer from arises from applying the methodology of physics to metaphysics. Now, logic is a methodology too, one that has proven to be useful in a huge number of cases. But why assume that logic, or to be more specific, propositional logic, must be appropriate in all cases? Why can’t it ever by the case that both a proposition and its negation are both true in some cases? The idea is not as radical as it first appears. Consider the following analogy: Suppose you look at a ball and you notice it is red. Everybody around you agrees that it is red. So, naturally enough, you form the true proposition “the ball is red”. Now, unbeknownst to you there are people living on the other side of the ball. When they look at it they notice it is blue and thus they form the true proposition “the ball is blue”. This is a case then where two contradictory propositions are true. The analogy fails of course when one points out that one can walk around the ball and notice that it is painted red on one side and blue on the other, but the analogy serves to demonstrate an epistemic fact: that propositional logic may fail when applied to objects such that one cannot “walk around them”. Are there such cases in real life? I can think of at least two:
One such object is reality as a whole. Propositional logic may always hold when discussing objects that exist within reality, but this says nothing about whether propositional logic also holds when applied to the whole of reality. Thus, when discussing reality as a whole one has no grounds for assuming that propositional logic necessarily applies. Indeed, mystics who claim to have experienced ultimate reality find it often useful to describe it in contradictory terms, which may at least serve as an indication that logic is a law that does not reach the highest levels of knowledge. To put it in another way, perhaps truth is prior to method. This is again not as radical as it sounds; it turns out I dabble in art and I think I can accurately say that logic does not apply to creativity.
I mention the case above for theoretical reasons. The second case I am about to analyze is more relevant to our discussion, namely how fact that contradictory religious belief systems are observed to be equally successful, appears to defeat both the idea that some religious belief system is true, and the idea that truth is what characterizes successful belief systems.
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ReplyDeleteAll major religions agree on the following: First, that reality is transcendental, i.e. that the universe of physical phenomena we observe when we look around us is just a small and superficial part of reality. Secondly, that there is a way of life that leads to self-realization, which is state in which one increasingly experiences reality in its true transcendental “spiritual” nature (Christians speak of the Kingdom, Buddhists of illumination, etc). The latter claim lies in the neighborhood of a indisputable fact, namely that, even though we all live in the same world, one’s experience of life depends strongly on one’s past choices, and therefore on one’s beliefs and values. If I choose to learn Chinese I will experience spoken Chinese differently than if I don’t; if I choose to study music I will experience the sounds of music differently than if I don’t, if I choose to invest in my relationship with my wife I will experience my wife differently than if I don’t, etc. What does this all add to? Well, if what all religions say is true then different people who have followed different spiritual paths may experience reality, particularly spiritual reality, differently. Here then we have a case where somebody from her particular state of spiritual awareness may say “the ball is red” and somebody else from her different state of spiritual awareness may say “the ball is blue”, while both are saying the truth. And, obviously, it’s not possible to just walk around the ball to see the whole picture for there is no such thing. To reach the spiritual state of any of the two people above one should follow each one’s spiritual path. So the fact that different people, including different people of similar self-realization, talk somehow differently about transcendental reality is about what one should expect, and certainly does not evidence that they are “imagining” things, the same way that neither those who claim that the ball is red nor those who claim that the ball is blue are imagining things.
The point I am making is this: If, as all religions have it, reality is not just physical but fundamentally spiritual then one should not uncritically project empirical notions about physical reality onto spiritual reality. Objective facts in physical reality are experienced the same by everybody (hence it’s possible to base the natural sciences on “objective quantitative data”) and apparently contradictory claims can easily be dispelled just by “walking around the ball” (i.e. by checking what the other guy is claiming). That comfortable epistemic state of affairs need not hold for transcendental reality, indeed on a little thought about one’s own life (the meaning of language, the beauty of music, one’s love of wife – these are not objective phenomena amenable to scientific investigation but take place in transcendental reality) one can see that transcendental reality is *not* like that at all. Rather, transcendental reality “feels” like a personal relationship feels like, namely as a dynamic reality that interacts with one in a deeply meaningful and morally lawful manner.
One of John Hick’s latest books is called “The Fifth Dimension: An Exploration of the Spiritual Realm”. In it he describes what should be obvious to anybody who actually looks: That our life takes place in a spiritual place of deep order and meaning, a place both challenging and beautiful. The four physical dimensions of space time, themselves of an intricate mechanical beauty, really serve as props for the spiritual realm which is the fundamental nature of reality and our true home.
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ReplyDeleteBut let’s go back to the supposedly deep contradictions between the belief systems of religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. What are these differences exactly? After all both religions are really very much alike: Both teach a virtually identical way of life, namely a way characterized by self-transcendence; in fact I fail to see any difference in what a Buddhist would call a holy life and what a Christian would call a holy life. Buddhists speak of the Buddha nature, Christians about being like Christ. Buddhists pray to Buddha, Christians to Christ. Both religions speak of an ultimately good personal state, called “nirvana” there and “salvation” here, in which the individual is eternally joined to the fundamentally real. Of course there are also many differences. I suppose the most conspicuous difference is that according to Christianity reality is ultimately personal (based in the presence of the person of God), whereas according to Buddhism reality may be intelligently and morally structured (the law of Karma) but there is no mention of the central presence of a person such as God. But it seems to me that on this ground at least neither Christianity contradicts Buddhism’s understanding, nor the other way around. On Christianity it is not strictly speaking correct to say “God is a person”; rather one should say “God is not less than a person”. Indeed several of God’s attributes, such as existing outside of time, being the ground of all being (the “source of existence” in Eric’s words, or “that through which all exists” in St Anselm’s), being impassible, etc – these are all non-personal characteristics of ultimate reality (with which I suppose a Buddhist would agree with). So, fundamental reality, which Christians call “God”, has both personal and impersonal attributes, and thus can reasonably be called both personal and non-personal. Conversely, by praying to Buddha who cares for them I suppose Buddhists too hold that ultimate reality has some personal attributes.
My point here is not that there are no contradictory religious beliefs. What I am saying rather is: 1) That world religions are alike much more than they are different. 2) That where they appear to be different these differences may be the result of superficial understanding of those religions. 3) That where they are truly different in how they describe reality it may be the case that they just describe different aspect of reality (say by concentrating more on the personal or else on the non-personal attributes of ultimate reality), and 4) That there may of course exist contradictory beliefs that are just cases where one (or more than one) religions got it wrong. It’s not like a belief system cannot be true, unless every single belief associated with it is true also.
In conclusion I see nothing in what we know about religions that so much as suggests either that religious people are imagining things, or that a pragmatical understanding of truth does not work.
Thank you Dianelos for that long and thoughtful response. There is much there to agree with and admire.
ReplyDeleteThe case I am interested in is I suppose my own. While I don't exclude the possibility of some transcendental realm I do deny my ability to experience anything of it. So, in my life, I suspect the very same feelings you attribute to the spiritual, I attribute to a more prosaic cause, namely the material nature of my brain. So, in my life I deny any ability to experience God, whatever it might be.
And yet, I would claim, I do lead a highly satisfying, rich and meaningful life, despite denying what it seems to me is the key assumption of the religious life. If I am right, and my life is every bit as rich and delightful as your own, then I do wonder how the case for the pragmatic value of religion stacks up. Shouldn't we perhaps modify it to, religion belief has pragmatic value for some, but not all, people?
Either that or we extend the definition of religion to include literature, art, community etc. But either way the pragmatic truth value of God appears to be diminished.
Bernard
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteI hope you do not feel like I am swamping you with a torrent of words. My purpose is to put my own thoughts in order.
You write: “The case I am interested in is I suppose my own. While I don't exclude the possibility of some transcendental realm I do deny my ability to experience anything of it. So, in my life, I suspect the very same feelings you attribute to the spiritual, I attribute to a more prosaic cause, namely the material nature of my brain.”
Right. First of all please observe that my argument in the previous posts does not hinge on the claim that the transcendental realm exists. Rather my argument is that *if* (as all religions agree) there is a transcendental realm which one experiences differently depending on one’s spiritual state, *then* there is nothing in the facts we know about religion that would make one suspect that religious people are imagining things, or that a pragmatical understanding of the concept of truth does not work.
Now you say that you attribute to the material nature of your brain the same feelings I attribute to the spiritual.
Given scientific realism (a belief shared by most but not all theists), I agree that it is entirely reasonable to believe that everything we experience or feel is caused by physical processes that happen in our brain. I’d agree that there is more than sufficient evidence for that already. But this does not in any way imply that what we experience cannot be something of the transcendental realm. Similarly, when we see a tree we don’t say “what really causes my experience is a physical process in my material brain, therefore that tree does not really exist”. On theism all that physically exists (including the tree and your brain) are sustained and moved by God’s transcendental will. In the same God-willed way that you experience the physical presence of the tree through the physical processes in your brain, you also experience the transcendental presence of the beauty of that tree.
At this juncture you may think: Granted that the religious model works, and that there is nothing in science or in our knowledge of the brain that contradicts it, why should I actually believe that this model is correct? If the naturalistic model of reality explains all my feelings (including the ones we call “spiritual”) without assuming the existence of a transcendental realm, isn’t it more parsimonious to believe that no such realm exists? I completely agree that if the naturalistic model were successful it would indeed be more parsimonious to believe that no transcendental realm exists. Trouble is that naturalistic model does *not* explain all our feelings. It only explains the physical causes of our feelings, but fails to explain the elephant in the room, namely how come there are feelings in the first place. Until such time as there is a materialistic explanation of consciousness, all evidence, including the very fact that we are conscious beings, points to the existence of the transcendental realm.
I am talking of course of materialism’s famous hard problem of consciousness. It seems to me that naturalists systematically shove this central problem of their worldview under the rug claiming that science will in good time solve it. But this increasingly looks like a leap of faith, considering that science is not obliging, and considering the many arguments against the possibility of scientific advance in this field. In the real world science only deals with the so-called “easy” problem of consciousness, namely the problem about how brains produce intelligent behavior, including one’s descriptions of one’s feelings.
Hi Dianelos
ReplyDeleteNo, I don't feel swamped, I find this an interesting conversation.
I agree with you that the choice between a religious and non-religious outlook does depend greatly upon how one views consciousness. I, like you, think a pragmatic perspective on truth is also an important consideration, and finally for me the issue of how one constructs meaning in life (and here issues of morality, free will, and aesthetics all come into play) must also fit into one's chosen world view.
And, unlike what you refer to as naturalists, I don't think there's anything unreasonable about looking at these three questions and concluding that a religious world view is going to do the trick. I am genuinely respectful of that decision, I can see how it works. Perhaps where we differ is that, in having chosen a non-religious approach to these three key questions, I am of the mind that it is a mistake to believe either approach represents the truth of the matter. In this I remain agnostic.
We have discussed consciousness before, but just briefly, whether there is indeed a hard problem is part of the debate and if we assume this in advance there is a danger of cutting off one very interesting line of enquiry. Every naturalist's favourite analogy is life, I know, but that it has become a cliche doesn't rob it of all its force. There was once a hard problem thinking about life. It just seemed inconceivable that this mysterious quality of being alive should derive wholly from lifeless matter. Yet this turned out to be mistaken. In fact we were blind to the fact that life itself wasn't a mysterious quality at all, rather it was rendered apparently such by the complexity of the chemical reactions underpinning it. Life it turns out, just is chemistry. But we would never have known this or even have been able to conceive it until we understood the chemistry.
The hard problem of consciousness may turn out to be something similar, in fact an amalgam of a great many softer problems of networking, processing and so forth. Of course this is not inevitable, it is a mistake to assume analogies will work, so I remain for now agnostic on this matter.
Pragmatically speaking, a nonreligious framework works well for me. I find I can ground the values I find most worthwhile and satisfying (tolerance, curiosity, a sense of service, of gratitude and humility) within this worldview. And, for me, our morality is raised to a higher level by the acknowledgement that it is a thing we actively construct as a community, rather than as some external thing that we seek to discover. I understand not everybody will find this metaphor appealing, but that too is part of my world view, that ultimately different things work best for different people. Indeed, I suspect our best chance at peace starts with this understanding.
Bernard
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDelete“[the] naturalistic model [...] fails to explain the elephant in the room”
“naturalists systematically shove this central problem of their worldview under the rug”
On the other hand, theists are completely ignoring what are in my view real problems raised by the theistic approach. I have mentioned some of them a few times (for example here), without much success I admit. For me these questions are real show stoppers. Of course, they may be scientific problems, but they arise only because of theism.
I think philosophers of old were interested in this. Have these questions simply become unfashionable?
JP,
ReplyDeleteYou wrote: “On the other hand, theists are completely ignoring what are in my view real problems raised by the theistic approach. I have mentioned some of them a few times (for example here), without much success I admit. For me these questions are real show stoppers.”
Let me then try to comment on the questions you raise in that earlier post and see if we can clarify some issues.
You wrote there: “Take the alleged fine tuning of physical constants – it's probably fair to say that physics cannot explain at this moment how they came about with any degree of certainty (I say this tentatively, being no physicist, but let's suppose it's the case). Physicists advance many hypothesis concerning this and we have now no way to know if any of them is correct. ”
Physics may explain the values of these constants by building a more fundamental cosmological model. One idea is that perhaps some inflationary process at the Big Bang would produce many separate universes. No such model (to my knowledge) works even as a hypothesis for solving naturalism’s problem, for they all appear to be even more fine-tuned than our universe.
But in my judgment in the context of naturalism’s problem of the apparent fine-tuning of our universe, all that cosmological talk reduces to a red herring anyway. I think many naturalists overlook or misunderstand the hard problem which is this: Out of all the logically possible naturalistic universes the proportion of universes with the knowledge promoting properties that ours has is vanishingly low; it turns out we live in a very special universe. This, by the way, is *not* a scientific problem, because science’s job is to describe how the universe is, such as it is, and nothing more. It’s naturalism that has the problem. And a very serious problem it is, because not even the fantastic hypothesis that as a brute fact all possible naturalistic universes exist, would solve it. For, out of all the universes where intelligent life will naturalistically evolve, only a vanishingly small proportion has the mathematical elegance that ours has and thus allows for the elegant science that is possible in our universe.
“Now, what is theism saying? That God determined the values of these constants – somehow.”
Naturalists often ask theists to explain “how” God did this or that, or else point out that theists failed to explain “how” God did this or that. Please observe that if there were an answer which would explain by what mechanism God did something then such an answer would falsify theism. Why? Because if God would require a mechanism, or any kind of a “naturalistic means”, to do something instead of doing it instantly and effortlessly by the application of divine will, then God would not be the “greatest conceivable being”. I trust you see that it is not reasonable for a naturalist to ask theists to describe theism in ways that comport with naturalistic norms or expectations, never mind in terms that defeat theism.
In many cases such questions also reveal a misunderstanding about the notion of God. God is that through which all exists; it’s not like God is one more thing that exists inside of the world and needs to push things around in order to affect them. Rather God’s will upholds the physical order that science studies and models through physical laws. So when you see an apple fall towards Earth you are not observing the application of a physical law; you are observing an application of God’s will. To ask “how” God manages to move the apple, is akin to ask “how” God manages to will – it’s a nonsensical question.
So it’s no wonder that you are not getting any theistic answers to the questions you mention. They are questions that are meaningless in theism. Similarly, there are some questions that are meaningless in naturalism, such as “What I the purpose of death?”. The fact that a theist will not get a naturalistic answer to such questions only shows the asking theist’s ignorance of naturalism.
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oc
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ReplyDelete“Where does [consciousness] come from?”
This too is a meaningless question to ask in the context of theism. For on theism consciousness is given; all reality is God-structured, and God is a person and thus a conscious subject. This question only makes sense to ask in the context of those who believe that ultimately the only thing that exists is matter possessing purely physical properties. In theism the question that makes sense is to ask where matter comes from, and that question is easy to answer.
“How is the correlation [between consciousness and brain] maintained? What are the interactions between consciousness and the brain? How are they controlled?”
I need not repeat why such “how” questions are nonsensical on theism, but please observe that strictly speaking there is no such correlation between consciousness and brain. Rather, what our brain does is ultimately known within our experience (i.e. making scientific observations about the brain). So, the only thing one can reasonably point out is that our experience of brains, as is the case with our experience of any other physical object, does not show any signs of magic. Which is true enough; few properties of the physical universe are more conspicuous than that no magic is to be found there. The only reasonable question then to ask in the context of theism is *why* it is that God has created the physical universe with such a property.
And that’s the type of questions which theism may and should answer: questions about the *purposes* of God, and how they all *fit* within God’s primary purpose for creation, and how that primary purpose *fits* with the idea that God is the greatest conceivable being. That’s the field of theistic explanations, where sensible questions may be asked and sensible discussions may ensue.
“Can you see my difficulty here?”
I think I can, and I hope I have shown how they are based on a misunderstanding. Please let me know if you still see some problematic lack of explanatory power in theism, for this issue interests me a lot.
Hi, Dianelos-
ReplyDelete"Out of all the logically possible naturalistic universes the proportion of universes with the knowledge promoting properties that ours has is vanishingly low; it turns out we live in a very special universe. This, by the way, is *not* a scientific problem, because science’s job is to describe how the universe is, such as it is, and nothing more."
This a remarkable string of assertions.
- How do you come up with logically possible, naturalistic universes? We don't even know how this one came to be. How do you presume to know what the spectrum of other possibilities might be? That is completely unknowable by our current information. What it seems like you are saying is.. out of all the universes I can idly imagine in my armchair, without knowing whether they would be internally consistent or in any other way possible...
- The supposed knowledge-promoting properties you mention are pure invention. If it takes four billion years to make something as patently fallible as us, one could easily regard it as knowledge retarding as much as promoting.
- Science's job is to describe how things work and came to be in terms that humans can understand. That includes the origin of the universe and anything else we can pose questions about. Suppose that the origin of the universe were an open book, described by some equation.. would that not be a field of science? A speculative one, insofar as experiments might be impossible, but we can't create planets either, yet we still do planetary science.
Hi Dianelos
ReplyDeleteThis business of 'logically possible universes' comes up a lot, and has been used in relation to the ontological argument too. While I understand this term is used metaphorically in modal logic, this extension you favour leaves me thoroughly puzzled. What are the criteria by which a universe is considered logically possible? I can't imagine any such set of rules working, simply because if we examine our own history of thinking about the universe we inhabit we find the concept of logical possibility to be rather malleable, and in particular changing to accommodate new discoveries. A world where The Uncertainty Principle holds doesn't feel at all logically possible to me, and yet it is as best we can tell the one we inhabit. The calculations of the likelihood of a particular universe existing, using this sort of reasoning, is wholly dependent upon what we do and don't allow as logically possible, and as such I can't bring myself to give it any credence whatsoever. Logic, by a naturalistic account, is nothing more than a cobbled together set of make do rules in response to the observations and psychological quirks of one particular form of evolved life. Your version of possible worlds seems to elevate it to something else altogether.
Your response to JP, that essentially says we don't have to explain God's working, because God is just, well, sort of everything, is in danger of equating the theistic God to the naturalistic description of existence. Just brute facts we don't understand, without either mechanism or quality. However, you don't appear to stick to such a God, for you are then quite happy to attribute qualities to this God, and so JP's mechanistic questions become highly pertinent, namely, by what mechanism do we come to have knowledge of God's qualities?
This is important because it sits at the heart of our ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate representations of God. As best I can tell, your method for divining God's qualities amounts to something like 'it feels right to me'. And, to return to my favourite theme, your conception of God doesn't feel at all right to me. So how are we to discriminate between the two if not by examining the mechanisms by which our knowledge is formed?
Bernard
Hi Burk,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “How do you come up with logically possible, naturalistic universes?”
I’d say that any universe of a kind that can be simulated up to any degree of precision by a universal Turing machine is a logically possible naturalistic universe.
“What it seems like you are saying is.. out of all the universes I can idly imagine in my armchair, without knowing whether they would be internally consistent or in any other way possible..”
True; I mean I have not actually computed probabilities or anything. Still, my justification for the belief that the type of our universe, namely a mathematically elegant one, is incredibly rare among the naturalistically possible universes in which intelligent life evolves is this: We think we know (or at least we agree) that intelligent organisms in our universe have evolved by a Darwinian process that can be interpreted naturalistically, i.e. by a blind/unguided/purposeless and hence naturalistic evolutionary process (“NE” process henceforth). Then the same NE process that leads to intelligent mechanisms can be recreated in a computer by simulating our universe in it; that’s of course a hugely complex undertaking that far exceeds our current technological capabilities, but it is certainly doable. On the other hand we already know quite a bit about simulations of NE processes, to quite confidently see that in order to recreate in a computer the NE evolution of an organism as intelligent as we are one does not really has to simulate our type of universe; a much simpler naturalistic environment (as far as mathematical nature goes) would do. Therefore there is a much larger number of mathematically simple naturalistic environments in which an NE process produces intelligence, than the number of our type of deeply mathematical universes.
“If it takes four billion years to make something as patently fallible as us, one could easily regard it as knowledge retarding as much as promoting.”
If I understand you right, that’s a variation of the argument “our universe is not really fine-tuned for life; look at all the lifeless space out there”. I don’t think that’s a good argument. After all, all kinds of life require stable building blocks, and the evolution of atoms that remain stable for a few seconds already requires a lot of fine-tuning.
“- Science's job is to describe how things work and came to be in terms that humans can understand.
No. As I have been arguing a lot, the job of science is to mathematically model physical phenomena. That’s it. Quantum mechanics does *not* describe how quantum reality works, and is nonetheless the most useful science yet discovered. And of course no human actually “understands” quantum mechanics.
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “What are the criteria by which a universe is considered logically possible?”
I’ve just answered that same question of Burk. A universe that can effectively be simulated in a computer is a logically possible naturalistic universe.
“A world where The Uncertainty Principle holds doesn't feel at all logically possible to me, and yet it is as best we can tell the one we inhabit.”
I think you are here conflating “logical impossibility” with “difficulty to conceptualize”.
“Logic, by a naturalistic account, is nothing more than a cobbled together set of make do rules in response to the observations and psychological quirks of one particular form of evolved life.”
Sure, that’s how the dominant “scientific” type of naturalism understands logic. But that’s also all such a naturalist has on which to base her rationality. If you are saying that if naturalism is true then we should not really trust our reasoning capacity for it is the result of a haphazard process, then you’d have to agree the belief in naturalism, which is a product of such reasoning capacity, is quite uncertain. (In this context see Plantinga’s EAAN argument which says that naturalism is epistemically self-defeating.)
“Your response to JP, that essentially says we don't have to explain God's working, because God is just, well, sort of everything, is in danger of equating the theistic God to the naturalistic description of existence.”
Oh, not at all. Nor is it a deistic view of God. Against naturalism or deism, theism says that the reality we experience (our condition of life) is deeply purposeful and saturated by God’s general and special providence. And against supernaturalism, theism says that God is one person who is perfect in all respects, and thus omnipotent and capable of effortlessly doing what S/He wants without the need of any mechanisms of any sort. To ask “how” God does something, is like asking how God is not God. (One should be careful though: God effortlessly does what she wants to do. That’s not the same as saying that God effortlessly achieves what she wants to achieve.)
“by what mechanism do we come to have knowledge of God's qualities?”
That’s an entirely different question. Indeed that’s I think a case where what God wants to achieve is not something that God wants to do Him/Herself. I have a backlog of two posts of yours I’d like to comment on, Bernard, and in which perhaps we can discuss this important issue.
“This is important because it sits at the heart of our ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate representations of God.”
Yes, quite important, but I think there are more important things than knowing God. Such as having faith in God. Or even having faith in what one finds best in oneself.
“As best I can tell, your method for divining God's qualities amounts to something like 'it feels right to me'.”
Not exactly. Rather I’d say that we all have an intrinsic capacity of discernment about “greatness” in the sense of St Anselm’s definition of God. That’s how philosophers of religion (both theistic and atheistic) manage to productively and intelligently debate the qualities of God. On the other hand it’s not the case that the acuity of that discerning sense is equal in all people. That acuity I believe depends on many factors, and primarily on the purity of one’s heart. But I think other factors, such as carefully and freely thinking about God (whether one believes God exists or not) also help, and that’s why philosophers of religion (including those who perhaps are not very pure in heart) manage so well.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteI think I must be misunderstanding your take on computer simulations here, as it appears to be making a rather extraordinary claim.
I think you are saying that if we compare two universes, one much like our own, and one involving a computer more complex than anything we have or are likely to have in the near future, set up in such a way that within its running programme a form of conscious intelligence like ours emerges, then we can conclude the second universe is the more likely.
This seems odd to me, and I'd be interested in how such probabilities are calculated. Presumably you include a calculation for the process by which the computer itself emerges, or do you simply compare the computer starting position with the universe starting position? (How to claculate this when no such computer exists?)You would also I imagine be claiming to have solved the problem of showing exactly what constitutes intelligence, and in particular conscious intelligence. How do you deal in this calculation with the possibility that our type of consciousness is indeed dependent upon the physical characterisitcis of the brain? (A computer simulation of a muffin may not produce the required tastiness for example).
I will be upfront and express my scepticism here. I do not for one moment believe you are able to make this calculation, and suspect there is a certain degree of bravado in your claim.
I would be delighted if you were to prove me wrong.
The suggestion that only the pure of heart can understand God fully is to my mind a particularly sinister one. If I use the fact that I have no such sense of what a maximally great being could be to guide my repsonse, and you ncna claim this is because my heart is not fully open to the possibility, then you grant yourself a wonderful springboard for intolerance, which I would respectfully submit is worth avoiding at all costs. Such hubris can easily give religion a very bad name indeed.
Bernard
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your answers. I am not sure however I explained myself clearly enough.
See, if you were saying only things like God is that through which all exists (another way to express the mysterious order of the universe perhaps) or that the idea of God is a rich provider of meaning (which it is), then there would be little ground to quarrel. But you say much more and my questions relate to actual claims about reality made on theistic ground and to the assumption that theism provides better explanations than other approaches.
Take consciousness. The claim is that it cannot be explained on naturalistic grounds. I take it to mean that it cannot arise as the result of purely natural processes. However, it undoubtedly exists. What is it?
- Is it an autonomous, immaterial, entity, a soul if you wish, interacting with matter in the brain?
- Is it instead a diffuse property of all reality particularly “focused” by the human brain? Why?
- As it clearly interacts with matter, what are the mechanisms?
- Can we interact with consciousness with a machine? If not, why?
- And so on, and on and on.
Your answer is that these questions are meaningless under theism. But I am not asking these questions of theism; I am asking them about reality. If the theistic claims about consciousness are true (and I understand there are many variants of them), then questions like the above follow immediately. You may not be interested in them but I think they are, to use your expression, the elephant in the room. If you say that asking these questions about reality is also meaningless, then you need to explain why.
I suppose you can wash away the need to answer these questions by claiming that God takes care of everything. But you cannot, at the same time, claim that theism explains consciousness in any real sense.
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteLet me elaborate on the computer simulation idea.
What characterizes naturalistic worlds is the idea that the current state of a physical system defines its future evolution (either deterministically or probabilistically) following blind/impersonal/purposeless laws. No meddling from outside this mechanical evolution is allowed; if there were such meddling it would amount to some supernatural effects which naturalism prohibits. All worlds then, the state of which evolves in such a naturalistic way are naturalistic. Finally, given what characterizes naturalistic worlds (namely their mechanical evolution) all naturalistic worlds can be simulated in a digital computer of sufficient power.
Our own world has several interesting features. That it includes consciousness is certainly one of them, but nobody has really any idea what it takes for consciousness to evolve in a naturalistic world, so that key feature is unusable in our context. Another feature of our world is that it includes intelligence, and here we can explain naturalistically how it can evolve in a naturalistic world, namely by naturalistic evolution (i.e. unguided Darwinian processes). Incidentally there are criteria for measuring the presence of intelligence in a naturalistic world. For my purposes we don’t really need to detect the presence of human-level intelligence (this is a complex issue, see the so-called Turing test). Observing that, say, some basic propositional truths of arithmetic have been discovered within the simulation of a naturalistic world would suffice as evidence for the evolution of intelligence in it. Finally our world has a very conspicuous feature that modern science has amply demonstrated, namely that it is deeply mathematical.
And here comes the argument: We already know enough about naturalistic evolution (it has been simulated in computers for many different purposes) to see that one can recreate the evolution of intelligence in a simulated world which is not at all deeply mathematical. One does *not* need a deeply mathematical environment in order for intelligence to evolve naturalistically in it; simulated environments which are mathematically simple suffice. Therefore out of all the naturalistic worlds in which intelligence will evolve there is only a vanishingly small proportion that are deeply mathematical. And our world belongs to that vanishingly small proportion. On naturalism this fact about our world cannot be explained by raising the anthropic principle, or by hypothesizing the existence of many parallel universes, or by hypothesizing some Darwinian process that works on baby universes - the way one can explain (or explain away) the apparent fine-tuning of the fundamental constants. Here then we have a major feature of our world that appears to be designed (put there on purpose by an intelligent being) and which naturalism does not explain.
That’s why I think that this is the most powerful version of the argument from design against naturalism. I don’t know of any naturalistic response to it. I have tried to imagine how such a response might look like, but have not gone very far.
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteI’d also like to comment to this bit you write: “The suggestion that only the pure of heart can understand God fully is to my mind a particularly sinister one. If I use the fact that I have no such sense of what a maximally great being could be to guide my repsonse, and you ncna claim this is because my heart is not fully open to the possibility, then you grant yourself a wonderful springboard for intolerance, which I would respectfully submit is worth avoiding at all costs. Such hubris can easily give religion a very bad name indeed.”
All great religions agree about this feature of reality: That for one to truly succeed in it and for one to truly understand it, the path is not one of material or intellectual power, but of moral goodness, of “being pure in heart”. Theodicy, I think, particularly well explains that feature of reality. What’s more this claimed feature is empirically testable: Become pure in heart and you will reach the highest levels of wellbeing and knowledge. (The problem of course that it requires that one more or less dedicate one’s whole life to that test, so few people, including few religious people, really perform that test. Few people have that kind of faith. But the hearsay evidence of those few who do try it is consistent with that general religious claim.)
But there are other, more prosaic, ways. Please remember that this discussion started when you said that it seemed to you that my method “for divining God’s qualities amounts to something like ‘it feels right to me’”. Feelings, of course, are famously fickle things in many contexts. In response I claimed that all people have an intrinsic cognitive capacity to discern greatness (in the sense of St Anselm’s definition of God) and thus to think about God’s properties. As evidence I pointed out the fact that philosophers of religion (both theists and atheists) productively and intelligently debate the qualities of God, sometimes at a very sophisticated level. One may interpret this fact by holding that such philosophers, theists and atheists alike, are fooling themselves into believing that they know what they are talking about. The more plausible interpretation, it seems to me, is that they do know what they are talking about, especially if one, like me, find that what they are talking about makes perfect sense.
On the other hand there also disagreements of a basic kind, i.e. disagreements where two people (perhaps both theists) simply disagree on some issue. Here I claimed that, as is often the case with other sense powers we have, different people may have that power of discernment with different acuity. And, as is again often the case, one can “train” that acuity by various methods. One such method, I said, is to think carefully and freely about God. Such a way to see clearer what qualities God has is open to all, including to those who believe that the God of St Anselm’s definition does not exist.
So I am not really proposing some kind of trick to exclude those who are not “pure in heart” from discovering truths about God’s qualities. Obviously, many immoral people think quite effectively about God. Incidentally I hope you did not interpret my previous post as insinuating that I am one pure in heart, for I am certainly nothing of the sort. On the other hand I do think a lot about God.
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteI am intrigued by your computer simulation argument. But before I comment I'd like to look at the details.
You write that we “[...] already know enough about naturalistic evolution [...] to see that one can recreate the evolution of intelligence in a simulated world which is not at all deeply mathematical.” You add that “only a vanishingly small proportion [of worlds with intelligence] are deeply mathematical”.
Do you have any reference on this?
jp
Hi JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “Your answer is that these questions are meaningless under theism. But I am not asking these questions of theism; I am asking them about reality.”
What I said is that the question “Where does consciousness – as a fact of reality -comes from?” is meaningless on theism. I trust we agree that, given that theism and naturalism are radically different views about reality, it’s not the case that all questions that are meaningful on naturalism must also be meaningful on theism, and vice versa. Please observe that many questions, such as “What’s the purpose of death?” or “Why is there evil in the world?” are meaningless on naturalism, but eminently meaningful on theism. So when we ask metaphysical questions we must also make clear whether we mean these questions on theism or on naturalism.
Having said that, let me stress that I did not mean to say that all questions about consciousness are meaningless on theism. Indeed the basic question of why there is human consciousness in the first place is already a meaningful question. As is the question why we experience both natural and moral evil. As is the question of whether animals are conscious beings. And so on.
The questions you ask above, as far as I understand them, strike me as quite meaningful on theism. In the next post I try to offer answers to some of them:
JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “- Is [consciousness] an autonomous, immaterial, entity, a soul if you wish, interacting with matter in the brain?”
According to theism all persons (including ourselves) are primarily non-physical conscious beings, but there are two basic theistic theories about the relationship between that primary nature of ours and our material bodies, or the material universe in general: One, “idealism”, is monistic and holds that material things exist only as stable patterns in our conscious experience of life. The other far more common theory is “substance dualism”, according to which God has created physical things and gave us each a physical body (our body) to which our consciousness is intimately bound, at least in our current condition. The latter theory strikes me as unnecessarily complicated, and I find idealism to be by far the most powerful understanding, never mind the most parsimonious. Your question makes sense only within a dualistic understanding of reality, and here the obvious answer is that Yes: we interact with our brain all the time.
“- Is [consciousness] instead a diffuse property of all reality particularly “focused” by the human brain? Why?”
I am not sure I understand how you mean that, so perhaps I am answering to a question you are not asking. Anyway let me say this: Dualistic theism holds that God has created human persons (i.e. human conscious subjects with cognitive powers that are sufficient for moral knowledge) and also a physical universe, in such a way that these created persons interact with the physical universe in which they experience life through their physical bodies, and particularly through their brains. Why God would create human persons interacting with their physical environment in such a way is a big question, which goes back to the question of why God created anything in the first place. This is really a big issue and pertains to theodicy. Let me know if you want us to discuss it further.
“- As [consciousness] clearly interacts with matter, what are the mechanisms?”
As I have tried to explain before, to ask about mechanisms in the context of the realization of God’s will is meaningless. Rather the relevant question here would be: Doesn’t the idea that God has created transcendental and immaterial humans freely interacting with matter contradict the fact that matter is governed by physical laws? The answer to that question is No: The probabilistic nature of the physical closure of the universe is compatible with transcendental/immaterial human will freely interacting with matter. Indeed it is compatible with God designing the Earth´s geography, guiding the evolution of the human race, interacting with human history, etc. Much of what classical theism claims that God did is entirely compatible with scientific knowledge as well as with the physical closure of the universe.
The probabilistic nature of the physical closure of the universe is not compatible with miracles though. To be precise, miracles are not prohibited by physical law but the probability of them taking place is just vanishingly small. Actually it’s possible today to scientifically estimate the probability of, say, walking on water, or converting a jug of water into wine, etc. In other words, miracles, assuming they happen, are extremely powerful evidence of a supernaturalistic action and thus for all practical purposes falsify naturalism.
“- Can we interact with consciousness with a machine? If not, why?”
That question I don’t understand. I can only say that on theism the only coherent position on machine consciousness is that if a machine displays human like intelligence and is hence capable of moral knowledge then it is also a person.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteThank you for the computer clarification. It seems to hinge upon a number of different premises and I'm not sure how best to untangle them.
The argument appears to run:
If we run computer simulations we can find ways, starting from a set of simple rules, of evolving something you define as intelligence. Because this can be done without reproducing a particular quality you claim exists in our world (mathematical complexity) our version of an intelligence producing universe is improbable and needs explaining.
If I have it right, this is a very odd version of proablity you are referring to. A computer simulation could very simply create faces for example, without having to go through the greatly complex real world path of billions of years of evolution. Do we extend the same reasoning to the appearance of faces, or the colour green, or wind, or you know, anything?
This argument is in essence hopelessly teleological. It assumes that the purpose of the universe is to create a certain quality (in your case a truncated version of intelligence) and then asks why such a complex or mathematically elegant version of the universe was needed to create it. Take out your teleological assumptions and the question upon which this thought experiment is based becomes redundant.
The universe as it exists is exactly as elegant, complex etc as it needs to be to exist as it does. Look for purpose and of course you will find a purposeful creator.
This claim that religious knowledge is revealed rather than reasoned does of course open up two problems for the non-believer. The first is that alterantive hypothesis, that this knowledge is nothing more than an individual invention with no higher inspiration remains live. The only way to test it apears to be to take the word of those who are sufficiently moved. Drug users give quite remarkable accounts of their trips but it does not move me to conclude they have touched a higher realm.
The second problem is that it shuts the enquiring mind out of the debate. To discover the truth one must first submit to it. The ability to examine, critique and verify disappears. I suppose my instinct is that this particular approach to knowledge has a terrible track record, and so I remain suspicious of it.
Bernard
JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “You write that we “[...] already know enough about naturalistic evolution [...] to see that one can recreate the evolution of intelligence in a simulated world which is not at all deeply mathematical.” You add that “only a vanishingly small proportion [of worlds with intelligence] are deeply mathematical”.
Do you have any reference on this?”
As for the first proposition, I’d point to two facts: In biology we have intensely studied Darwinism for over a century now, and we have found nothing that so much as points to the necessity of a deeply mathematical environment. My reference here would be all books on Darwinism one cares to read. Secondly, we have quite a bit of experience simulating Darwinian processes in a computer (search for “evolutionary algorithms”), again without ever encountering the need for simulating a deeply mathematical environment. Our experience shows that not any environment works, indeed one must fine-tune it for an evolutionary algorithm to take hold, but to my knowledge there has never been the case that the simulated environment should work on deeply mathematical principles.
As for the second proposition, I am not aware of any reference, but, given the truth of the first proposition, the second one strikes me as self-evident. For given that worlds with intelligence do not require a deeply mathematical nature it follows that of all possible words with intelligence only a very few will be of a deeply mathematical nature. Perhaps an informal argument to justify this can be built on an analogy: Consider some other case of a set of complex things, say the set of all possible bags of coins. Adding one more property, such as that each bag contains only Greek coins, or that the total value of the coins in the bag be 1000 Euros, etc, clearly defines a small subset of the original set. Similarly, consider the set of all possible naturalistic worlds with intelligence, knowing that for the evolution of intelligence a mathematically simple world suffices. Adding one more property, namely that of being of a deeply mathematical nature, defines a small subset of the original one.
Another informal argument for the second proposition would be this: If one gave 1000 students the task of simulating the evolution of intelligence within a simulated naturalistic world, one would get 1000 different simulated worlds but most probably not one of a deeply mathematical nature.
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “ The argument appears to run:
If we run computer simulations we can find ways, starting from a set of simple rules, of evolving something you define as intelligence. Because this can be done without reproducing a particular quality you claim exists in our world (mathematical complexity) our version of an intelligence producing universe is improbable and needs explaining.”
Right.
“If I have it right, this is a very odd version of proablity you are referring to.”
Not at all: In any context of a theory, if some new feature is discovered which is very improbable *on* that theory then that feature cries out for an explanation. This is a general principle and applies in the case in science, or when solving a murder mystery, or when proposing ontological worldviews. Let’s see an example:
Suppose you have the theory that a coin is fair, you toss it many times and you get the following sequence:
(a) 001011010100010101101010101110101000101100100111
The improbability of the sequence itself is irrelevant. There is no feature of that sequence that is improbable on the theory of a fair coin, so that evidence is not at all problematic. But suppose one would instead get the following sequence:
(b) 000111000111000111000111000111000111000111000111
The improbability of (b) and (a) are identical, but that’s again irrelevant. (b) has a very peculiar property, namely it is periodic, and *that* property is very improbable *on* the theory of a fair coin. Unless one finds an explanation for (b) that is consistent with the theory, (b) will count as evidence against the theory.
Are there features that evidence purposeful design? I think clearly they are. Suppose in some SETI research scientists would receive the following signal:
(c) 010110110110001000110110001110111001000110001111
That sequence looks at first similar to the kind of sequence that (a) is, i.e. it does not look surprising at all. But in fact it is has a deep mathematical property for it codifies the first 24 primes larger than two [1]. Unless one finds an explanation for (c) that is consistent with the theory that that signal has a random source, that signal will count as evidence for the presence of intelligent design.
[1] Here’s how: If you count the number of contiguous identical symbols you’ll get:
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 3 2 1 3 2 3 4
If you double each of these numbers you’ll get:
2 2 2 4 2 4 2 4 6 2 6 4 2 4 6 6 2 6 4 2 6 4 6 8
If you start with the number 1 and sequentially add to it the above numbers you’ll get:
3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59 61 67 71 73 79 83 89 97 – all prime numbers.
[continued in the next post]
[continued from the last post]
ReplyDeleteNow a basic claim of naturalism is that our universe has not been created by an intelligent being, and hence that all its features can be explained assuming ultimately only impersonal/purposeless/mechanistic processes, or “naturalistic” processes for short. Any feature of our universe that appears to be designed counts as evidence against naturalism unless an explanation which is consistent with naturalism is forthcoming. I trust we agree on this. Surely if science were to discover that the stars around our solar system are positioned in such a way that they form letters which read “made by God” when looked at from the center of the galaxy, then that would count as evidence against naturalism, unless somebody found a naturalistic explanation for it.
One such feature of our universe that appears designed is the functional complexity of species. The Darwinian theory of evolution plus the extensive paleontological record have established beyond reasonable doubt the descent of the species by smallish modifications from a common ancestor. But this, contrary to what virtually all naturalists believe, does not amount as a successful naturalistic explanation. For that one would have to demonstrate that the whole process was driven only by naturalistic forces, but there is nothing in science that implies that. At best one can say that there is no evidence that the forces that shaped evolution were not naturalistic, and therefore that it is possible that the only forces at hand were naturalistic. But from “X is possibly true” to “X is true” there is a vast epistemic distance.
Another feature is the apparent fine-tuning of the fundamental constants. That feature is not immediately evident, indeed it has been discovered only in the 1960s. It is though a deep feature of our universe. Here, in my judgement, naturalism offers no explanation at all, except for the mostly ad-hoc hypothesis that there are many parallel invisible universes with different sets of constants. And that hypothesis is unfalsifiable, and thus, according to naturalism’s own epistemic standards, should not be taken seriously.
Another feature is the deep mathematical nature of the laws of physics. Here not even an ad-hoc naturalistic hypothesis is forthcoming, indeed it is difficult to even imagine how a naturalistic explanation might look like.
“A computer simulation could very simply create faces for example, without having to go through the greatly complex real world path of billions of years of evolution.”
The computer simulation I was talking about is a simulation of randomly driven Darwinian processes. Such a simulation will most probably not produce organisms having “a face” like our. Or perhaps I am misunderstanding you.
“This argument is in essence hopelessly teleological. It assumes that the purpose of the universe is to create a certain quality (in your case a truncated version of intelligence) and then asks why such a complex or mathematically elegant version of the universe was needed to create it.”
The argument simply notes that of all possible naturalalistic worlds in which intelligent beings would naturalistically evolve (to think about this issue like we are doing now) only a vanishingly small proportion would have a deeply mathematical nature ours has. This looks like a purposefully designed feature of our universe, indeed designed by somebody who knew a lot of math. Imagine that this situation should continue, and that in the next decades physicists would keep discovering ever more sophisticated math incorporated in the laws that describe physical phenomena. Surely, at some point, the whole thing will begin to look like a true to God miracle.
In conclusion I find that the theistic argument from design is alive and well, indeed is getting stronger and stronger thanks to science’s discoveries.
[continued in the next post]
[continued from the last post]
ReplyDelete“The universe as it exists is exactly as elegant, complex etc as it needs to be to exist as it does.”
I am not sure I understand how you mean this. Why does the universe “need” to have such designed-like features in order to exist? In the context of the fine-tuning some naturalists say that the constants need to be fine-tuned for *us* to exist and discuss this issue. Which is certainly true but does not amount to an explanation. Our Sun needs to be hot in order for us to exist, but this does not explain why our Sun is hot.
“Look for purpose and of course you will find a purposeful creator.”
I agree but only up to a point. If science were to discover the sign “made by God” in the position of the stars in our galaxy, the idea that we are just imagining a purpose behind that feature would certainly not cut it. I haven’t done the math, but the improbability (on naturalism) of the features that science has already discovered may be much higher than the improbability of an arrangement of the nearby stars that reads “made by God”. And much more conclusive. After all the “made by God” sign might have been the work of a prankster alien civilization with the technology to move stars around.
“This claim that religious knowledge is revealed rather than reasoned does of course open up two problems for the non-believer.”
That’s not my claim. Anyway *on theism* reason is founded in God too, so ultimately all knowledge is revealed: When one sees an apple tree then that vision is revealed by God. When one thinks that that there are more than 50 apples on that tree, that one basket holds at most 50 apples, and that therefore one needs more than one basket – then that truth is also revealed by God. (In this context see the so-called argument from reason against naturalism.) When one decides that given God’s perfection the idea of hell is wrong, then that truth also is revealed by God. Let me be plain here: God is not some very powerful effect existing out there; rather God is the ground of all being, the foundation of all reality. All existence is God based, and thus all knowledge and all ways to get to knowledge is God based too.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteThere remain a pile of assumptions here, regarding possible worlds, computer simulations, conscious intelligence and more. You seem a little reluctant to examine these. Fair enough. The thing about these is that they guarantee the conclusion you wish to reach in advance, so rather than reasoning your way to the existence of God, you are assuming your way there. I think my key message on this is that we are better able to meaningfully share our views if we are as transparent as we can be about our methods.
The other theme for me is a convenient and false dichotomy that is set up between theism and naturalism. This amounts to a straw man argument simply because even the most vitriolic naturalists do not appear to hold to the form of reasoning you attack (Dawkins certainly doesn't). Rather they argue than in the face of an unsolved mystery, we keep digging, that's all.
So you are impressed (I think unduly) by the power of mathematics to model our world. Note that this is not the same as saying the world is mathematical, as you are keen to do. The best we can conclude is that our maths has been a helpful tool. There are some genuine puzzles here. The ability of complex numbers to model quantum behaviour is a good example. But to then make the leap to suggesting this is evidence of a designer is brave and frankly speculative. The disciplined naturalist has what I think is a far smarter approach, which is to say, let's keep working on this quantum stuff and see if this apparent coincidence can't help us get at what's really going on. But let's not draw conclusions before the evidence is in.
And yes, I absolutely hold that our reason is an unreliable tool. History shows that we have had to frequently recalibrate it against the evidence. This does not, as you think, make naturalism self defeating, so long as one's naturalistic stance embraces the unknown as just that.
Bernard
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteYour simulation argument is based on assumptions I would challenge but let's assume for a moment that you are right and, in particular, that our universe is deeply mathematical (DM). Then, your argument seems to run like this:
1. For intelligence to appear it is not necessary that the universe in question be DM.
2. DM universes (DMU) are rare.
3. Therefore... I am not too sure what your conclusion is but it seems to be: because DMU are rare among those universes harbouring intelligence, there is something to explain (leading to design).
If I have it right, this is a very strange conclusion. In fact it appears to be the opposite of the fine-tuning argument. In the latter it is argued that because our universe choice of constants is improbable AND necessary for life then there was design (or whatever). In the DMU case, it goes like this: because a DMU is rare AND irrelevant to intelligent life then there was design. For all we know, our universe may have a whole bunch of features that are neither necessary for intelligence nor likely. Surely you are not saying that a DMU makes intelligent life improbable?
Now, is our universe in fact DM? First, what does it mean to say this? Maybe that the whole of it can be expressed or explained in mathematical terms - in other words, that we can build a complete mathematical model of reality. You seem pretty sure of this but I don't find this obvious at all. What is clear is that whatever knowledge we have of, say, physics is mathematical. On the other hand this may be an artefact illustrating the limits of our capacities. I mean that whatever we know must be expressed in some language. And it so happens that the most precise and powerful language we have is the mathematical language. Perhaps there is no other way... The universe might be deeply un-mathematical, if you wish, but we would never be able to express it. What we can know might be just the little part that is amenable to mathematical or ordinary language.
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteThank you for your answers. I understand that theism is not primarily about these questions and I appreciate that you take the time to address them. It is a vast and interesting topic but I would like, if you wish, to take on one particular aspect of this that I find troublesome.
I think it's fair to say that theism implies, one way or another, interactions between the physical world and some transcendent reality. I mentioned the connection between our non-physical consciousness (implied by theism, I think) and the brain but any such interaction would do. The point is that, somewhere, some interaction takes place – whether it is non-physical consciousness acting on the state of the brain or something else. Inversely, changes in brain state (think anesthesia for instance) cause a change in conscious state.
In fact, it does not really matter which interactions actually occur. What is important is that theism implies some form of interface between the physical and the transcendent.
My point is that this interface should be amenable to scientific investigation. Why not? If, for example, our physical brain interfaces with the non-physical consciousness, why could't we investigate this interface with instruments? The alternative is to claim that the interface cannot be investigated, which seems rather incredible.
I don't expect that you (or anybody else) can explain this interface in any detail at this point. But why isn't there more interest in this? If I were a theist, I would certainly want to know.
It simply seems to be a fact that theists, by and large, ignore these questions. I am not sure what it means but this is certainly significant.
Hi JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “Now, is our universe in fact DM (deeply mathematical)? First, what does it mean to say this?”
It means that the order present in physical phenomena and which the natural sciences discover (say, the order present in the orbit of the planets), requires sophisticated math to describe. Is the universe deeply mathematical in this sense? Yes, definitely. Again and again physics could advance only when the required mathematical tools were available. Indeed the reason that learning physics is so hard is that one must first understand the required abstract math. It’s a very conspicuous and (on naturalism at least) a very unexpected deep feature of the universe. The person who first wrote about that feature was Nobel laureate physicist Eugene Wigner in his classical paper “The Unreasonable Effectiveness o Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”, which you can read online.
“I mean that whatever we know must be expressed in some language. And it so happens that the most precise and powerful language we have is the mathematical language.”
Not in *any* language. Mechanical order must be expressed in mathematical language. The question is why our universe is such that its order requires such a sophisticated mathematical language. Why isn’t it much simpler as far as its mathematical nature is concerned?
“3. Therefore... I am not too sure what your conclusion is but it seems to be: because DMU are rare among those universes harbouring intelligence, there is something to explain (leading to design).”
Consider an analogy: According to theism it is God’s will that has formed the universe; thus it is expected that the universe will have features which is compatible with such purposeful origin (including being fine-tuned for life, being mathematically elegant, etc). When, on the contrary, features of the universe are surprising given how theists think of God (including the presence of moral and natural evil, its sheer size, God’s hiddenness, etc) then theists have some explaining to do. Now, conversely, according to naturalism the forces that have formed the universe are impersonal/purposeless/blind. On naturalism then such features as the presence of evil or the size of the universe are to be expected, or are at least not unexpected. But other features, such as the existence of consciousness, or being fine-tuned for life, or being mathematically sophisticated, are not. Here naturalists have some explaining to do. In my judgment at least the idea that impersonal forces would produce such a deeply mathematical universe is hugely implausible. And other possible naturalistic solutions such as a Darwinian process or the existence of a multiverse do not work. (And the multiverse hypothesis does not work because the argument only takes into account those parallel universes which already harbor intelligence.)
Hi JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “My point is that this interface [between the transcendent and physical dimensions of reality] should be amenable to scientific investigation. Why not? If, for example, our physical brain interfaces with the non-physical consciousness, why could't we investigate this interface with instruments? The alternative is to claim that the interface cannot be investigated, which seems rather incredible.”
Actually I think that’s a very plausible sounding argument for naturalism. The idea, I take it, is this: Science has proven beyond reasonable doubt the causal closure of the physical, namely that one needs to assume no transcendental (“supernatural”) effects to explain any physical phenomenon. It follows that if such a transcendental effect were present it would show up as some kind of anomaly in the otherwise physical closure of the universe. Any causally significant supernatural meddling in the mechanistic working of the universe would be noted. So, either there is no transcendental dimension, or else if there is it’s completely toothless and irrelevant. At best then a scientifically informed person might be a Deist, but certainly not a theist who believes that God designed the universe and in particular ourselves, interacts with human history and even with individuals, responds to prayer, has created us possessing free will and thus with some kind of supernatural power, etc.
Some time ago I have analyzed this so-called interaction problem. Please see: http://thepietythatliesbetween.blogspot.com/2010/06/what-is-naturalism-part-v-alternative.html?showComment=1278660617361#c883817128621853447
If you see any error in my reasoning there then I’d be very much interested to know about it.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteYou write 'mechanical order must be expressed in mathematical language.' This is a remarkably strong claim that I don't suspect you can justify. It is true that the best method we have found for modeling some aspects of physical interactions involves mathematics. But you appear to be ruling out some other method, currently unknown to us in the way that mathematics was once unknown to humans, that would do the job even better.
Imagine perhaps an alien civilisation visiting us and laughing at our crude mathematical approach. They, using principles of logic unknown to us, have a far better way of modeling mechanical processes, one that amongst other things makes perfect sense of quantum mechanics. What's more, once we get our heads around it, we go, 'dang, of course, it's just so obvious. What were we thinking?'
The claim you are making, that the universe is deeply mathematical, requires not just that this scenario is unlikely (as it clearly is) but rather impossible. If not, then the effectiveness of mathematics is no more unreasonable than the effectiveness of sight, language or smell. It's just a handy little trick we have inherited and we're making the best of it that we can.
So, how do you establish the necessary relationship between mathematics and physical processes? My guess is it can't be done.
Bernard
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “ 'mechanical order must be expressed in mathematical language.' [is a] remarkably strong claim that I don't suspect you can justify.”
I need not justify it, for I meant it as a tautology. I understand “mechanical order” as the kind of order that can be expressed in mathematical language. It’s the kind of order that can be fully captured in a mathematical model. As with any kind of model, given some data one can make predictions about other data, and in the case of mechanical order that prediction can be computed. The idea of a mechanical order that cannot be described mathematically is incoherent for me. The mathematics of an alien civilization may be far more advanced than ours, but they will always be mathematics: true propositions about the formal manipulation of symbols.
Incidentally not all order can be captured in a mathematical model. For example the behavior of a free person has an order related to that person’s character, but that order cannot be described fully in mathematical language, and is therefore not of a mechanical nature.
“So, how do you establish the necessary relationship between mathematics and physical processes?”
I am not quite sure I understand the question. We know that physical phenomena can be mathematically modeled (for science has by now mathematically modeled virtually all phenomena), and thus we know that there is such a necessary relationship.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteI suppose the point I'm getting at is that if the mathematical nature of the world is based upon such a tautology, then there's nothing unlikely about it, is there? Rather, the deeply mathematical nature of the world is made inevitable by your chosen definitions. This is the trouble with loose definitions, they allow us to sneak our conclusions in up front. And so we are left, not with a deep puzzle of nature to be explained, but rather a linguistic conjurer's trick to be unpicked.
Bernard
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteBernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “I suppose the point I'm getting at is that if the mathematical nature of the world is based upon such a tautology, then there's nothing unlikely about it, is there? Rather, the deeply mathematical nature of the world is made inevitable by your chosen definitions.”
But I have never claimed that there is something remarkable in that the nature of the universe is mechanical/mathematical. Indeed, if it weren’t so then science wouldn’t be possible. Neither would Darwinian evolution exist. Neither would morality be possible. What is remarkable is that this mathematical nature is amazingly sophisticated. Sophisticated far beyond the call of duty, if you will. Wastefully and exorbitantly sophisticated. You don’t need such mathematical sophistication present in the mechanical order of the physical universe for intelligent life to evolve. Nor for morality to be possible. On naturalism then I see here a major apparently purposeful feature of the universe that naturalism fails to explain.
On theism I see a major feature of the universe the purpose of which I can only understand as representing a signature of God. You see, on theism we are built in the image of God, and thus the primary signature of God in creation is ourselves, the very way human nature is structured. In the physical universe I’d say the primary signature of God lies in its beauty. But it turns out that the signature of God is also present in the objective dimension of the physical universe, indeed at its deepest level of that objective dimension, namely in the remarkable nature of its mechanical order. As seems that the world is such that any direction one looks carefully enough one will find God.
Thanks Dianelos,
ReplyDeletethat's a useful clarification, sorry I misunderstood you.
I am returned to my former puzzlement then. If the purpose of the universe is to create intelligent, moral creatures, and if the universe is more mathematically complex than it needs to be to achieve this task (I remain unconvinced), then there is a question to be answered regarding the creator's slightly wasteful methods. If however we do not see the universe in these teleological terms, then the argument loses its power. Otherwise we can argue that a simpler version of a universe could still have produced tides, or ice cream or whatever, and question the redundant complexity ours exhibits. But for any universe, some subset characteristic will appear unnecessary if we allow this line of reasoning. Your conundrum stems from the way you set the problem up I think.
Bernard
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “If the purpose of the universe is to create intelligent, moral creatures, and if the universe is more mathematically complex than it needs to be to achieve this task (I remain unconvinced), then there is a question to be answered regarding the creator's slightly wasteful methods.”
Sure. So here’s the answer I’d like to suggest: A universe appropriate for soul-making that is also mathematically sophisticated is more valuable (and beautiful – ask any physicist) than a simplistic mechanical universe that is also appropriate for soul-making. Moreover, God probably wants us to be aware of His/Her existence, not in any overpowering or freedom numbing sense but in the sense that one can’t fail to notice the presence of God any which direction one might look carefully, including in the direction of the physical phenomena that science studies.
“If however we do not see the universe in these teleological terms, then the argument loses its power.”
Quite on the contrary. On the assumption that the universe is not teleological, a major feature of the universe which appears to be possible only if purposefully put there by some great intelligence cries out for a non teleological explanation, *especially* when that feature appears to be entire superfluous on the respective ontology. Pure math, more than anything else, evidences an intelligent source. Conversely, if an intelligent source would like to make its presence known it would use the language of mathematics, for it’s a universal language. If a SETI researcher received a message with deep mathematical truths encoded in it, then this would count as proof positive that some extraterrestrial intelligence designed that message. Similarly, if one were to find on the moon a stone formation of an notable topology which on further study were found to codify deep mathematical truths, then, again, people would consider that fact as evidence that some intelligence had visited the moon in the past and had left a message there. In Stanislaw Lem’s 1960 sci-fi novel “Solaris” it was decided that the planet of the same name was intelligent because the ocean that covered it displayed wave formations which represented sophisticated math.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteYou seem to jump happily between two definitions of mathematical complexity, and I am having trouble pinning you to one. This becomes a kind of sophistry, because attacks against one definition are parried using the second, and then the reverse cheat is employed, to cover your bases.
You write for instance of "a major feature of the universe which appears to be possible only if purposefully put there by some great intelligence.." What is this feature? I suspect you mean mathematical complexity. But what do you mean when you say our universe is mathematically complex? I think you mean that it has features amenable to mathematical modeling.
If this is all you mean, then the argument doesn't follow at all. Take a sand dune. The action of wind on its surface will create the most beautiful and sophisticated patterns. Patterns that can sometimes be modeled by extremely complex mathematical models. But, does that make the sand dune explicable only in terms of an intelligent creator? Clearly not.
So, when you say the world is deeply mathematical, you mean something more than it is mechanical in its nature. But when challenged to explain what that something is, you are reluctant to answer clearly.
So, I will try again, lest I am missing something important. I think my basic understanding of physics is good enough that I will be able to follow if you provide me with a single simple example of this mysterious deeply mathematical nature of the universe.
I don't mean something like 'we don't understand why electrons exhibit the behaviour they do, but we can anticipate it well enough using complex numbers' because that only establishes that our mathematics is useful sometimes, as is our sense of smell or humour. That doesn't make the world deeply smelly or deeply funny though (although it often appears this way to us). You must mean something more than this if your argument is going to work. But what?
Bernard
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “Take a sand dune. The action of wind on its surface will create the most beautiful and sophisticated patterns. Patterns that can sometimes be modeled by extremely complex mathematical models. But, does that make the sand dune explicable only in terms of an intelligent creator? Clearly not.”
Actually I think the example of a sand dune can be useful to explain what I mean. Sand dune formation by the wind will create beautiful and sophisticated patterns, but in order to mathematically model the formation of sand dunes one does *not* need sophisticated math, for Newtonian mechanics will do. Indeed the complexity of the sand dune is the effect of adding up many simple phenomena, such as the trajectory of a single grain of sand. The same goes for Darwinian evolution; one needs only simple math for that model.
The same does not hold for the most basic phenomena in our universe though. You can’t model them without first knowing some sophisticated math. It’s as if one needs a password to unlock them. (I recommend you read physicist Eugene Wigner’s paper about “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”; you can find it online). And, contrary to the sand dune example, the relative simplicity of the large scale phenomena we observe is the effect of adding up many complex elementary phenomena, such as the state evolution of elementary particles.
In conclusion I am making two factual claims: One, that there are many possible mechanical universes which will produce highly complex phenomena including the evolution of intelligent life, but which phenomena can be modeled *without* the need of sophisticated math. Two, that our universe is not of that kind, as the modeling of its phenomena is impossible without the use of sophisticated math. Our universe is such that unless you have already discovered some deep abstract truths of mathematics, you will not be able to go very far in its modeling.
Dianelos
ReplyDeleteYou fail to provide an example which is telling. You are perhaps alluding to the mathematics used in wave function modelling, but an undergraduate can deal with that without too much trouble, hardly mysteriously complex.
Your assertion that the aggregation of newtonian factors is never mathematically complex is also self servingly arbitrary.
This is the old problem. Because there is no objective definition of complexity, it can be twisted to assert mystical influence.
The argument boils down to, as our mathematical capacity rises, so to does our modeling capacity. This is hardly a startling observation.
One believes in God because one finds the stance helpful, not because there is some set of hidden clues left for us (or else all humans living in the time before 'complex' math were being deliberately deprived, which is cruel surely).
Bernard
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “You fail to provide an example which is telling.”
I suppose you are asking for examples of the sophisticated math that is needed for the modeling of phenomena.
Classical physics including Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell’s electrodynamics require calculus, which is already quite sophisticated.
General Relativity requires the use of tensor fields. The required math was too difficult even for Einstein, who in order to fully develop his theory had to ask for the help of mathematician Marcel Grossman. In this context, in what is one of the great surprises in the history of science, it turned out that non-Euclidean geometry first developed as a curiosity turned out to be the correct description of space.
Quantum Mechanics requires the use of infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces over complex numbers, a field first developed in pure mathematics, but which then found an unexpected and rich application in physics. My guess is that students of physics need to study the required mathematics for at least two years before mastering QM.
String theory is so deeply mathematical, that it is fair to say that research is waged on a purely mathematical level with no recourse to experiment. The math needed is mind-boggling, comprising fields such as “lie groups” and “homology”. Nevertheless it is widely believed that we don’t yet know enough math to do string theory well, i.e. that what holds back the advancement of the physical theory is the limited state of mathematical knowledge. Here is how Berkeley math professor Mina Aganasic puts it: “Unlike in Einstein's time when the relevant mathematics was already in existence, the mathematics we need now hasn't been fully developed yet.”
Now I personally lack knowledge of the required math, and that’s why my knowledge of non-classical physics is sketchy. Nevertheless I am capable of simulating the the formation of very complex looking sand dunes, or of cellular automata capable of producing very complex looking results, or of implementing Darwinian processes capable of producing very complex, and indeed intelligent solutions. And for doing all that I only need primitive math, actually nothing more than primary school arithmetic. Thus, the question remains: Why is our universe so deeply mathematical in nature, in the sense that in order to understand it one must first know some very deep math? Why should there be this link between necessary truths about abstract objects and contingent truths about physical objects?
“Because there is no objective definition of complexity, it can be twisted to assert mystical influence.”
Actually there are objective definitions of complexity, and in any case my point in not about complexity. My point rather is factual: Since its inception in the late 17th century advance in physics has required the discovery of ever more sophisticated math. This reveals a factual property of the universe, which is I think difficult to explain by naturalism, and is thus mysterious on naturalism. And that’s why I argue that the deeply mathematical nature of the universe grounds the strongest argument from design, i.e. for the idea that the universe must have been designed by some intelligence.
“The argument boils down to, as our mathematical capacity rises, so to does our modeling capacity. This is hardly a startling observation.”
But that observation does not obtain in many other fields. For example, as our mathematical capacity rises, our capacity for counting sheep, or for building houses, of for doing biology does *not* rise. Nor is a growing mathematical capacity needed to model other mechanical universes in which intelligent life would also evolve. So it is rather startling that the modeling of our universe does require an ever increasing level of mathematical knowledge.
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “One believes in God because one finds the stance helpful, not because there is some set of hidden clues left for us (or else all humans living in the time before 'complex' math were being deliberately deprived, which is cruel surely).”
That one believes in God for many other reasons, does not imply that there may not exist hidden clues in the objective phenomena that science studies. Indeed it’s not only the case of the deep mathematical nature of such phenomena that makes trouble for naturalism (and for any mechanistic / non-teleological understanding of reality). One also has the difficulty of naturalistically interpreting quantum mechanical phenomena, the difficulty of explaining that there is no inkling of consciousness producing properties of matter despite all the advance of physics, the apparent fine-tuning of the fundamental constants, and so on.
Now I find your last observation interesting, because it has the proper form of a theological argument, for it discusses God’s purposes on moral grounds. You argue that it would be cruel for God to leave objective evidence for His/Her existence buried so deep that people would find out about it only when scientifically advanced like we are now. But perhaps it is only now that such evidence is needed, for it is only now, precisely because we are so scientifically advanced, that knowledgeable people of good will may find non-religion to be a viable option.
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteYou provide interesting examples but I think we must tread very carefully here. And, yes, I have read the paper you mention but that was a long time ago. I will try to have another look if I have time.
What we can agree on is this:
(1) Physics require advanced maths to model reality.
What you claim is:
(2) Reality is deeply mathematical.
Now, you must prove that (1) implies (2). Statement (1) certainly says a lot about our capacities and tools but jumping to (2) does not seem warranted. It's somewhat the same as saying that because we use language to talk about reality, reality is deeply grammatical.
The movement of planets can be described by differential equations. But, surely, you are not saying that planets are solving these equations in real time to determine where to go? Something else is going on.
Maybe (1) is in fact an indication that reality is not deeply mathematical. The argument might be that, if it were, it could be modelled more easily. Maybe, limited as we are, we can only understand a small part of reality and, as must happen, this part is what we can model using the tools at our disposal.
I am not saying that there is nothing to ponder (and this is a very interesting topic). And I certainly don't claim to know the nature of reality any more than anyone else. But I don't think we are in any condition to confidently make this kind of claim. But speculating we can, of course.
Hi JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “ What we can agree on is this:
(1) Physics require advanced maths to model reality.
What you claim is:
(2) Reality is deeply mathematical.”
I am saying (2) as a shorter way of saying (1). Also, to be precise, I am not talking of “reality” but of the “physical universe” or, even better, of the “physical phenomena” that science studies. One way or the other this fact remains: We find ourselves is a physical environment which has a remarkable property, namely that in order to understand it better one must first discover ever deeper mathematical truths.
“The movement of planets can be described by differential equations. But, surely, you are not saying that planets are solving these equations in real time to determine where to go? Something else is going on.”
Right, I am not saying that in this context. As for what is going on, on theism the answer is easy: God has designed the physical laws and is doing the computations to keep the universe moving according to them. On naturalism though we get yet *another* mystery: How does the elementary electron manage to behave in such a computationally complex way?
“Maybe (1) is in fact an indication that reality is not deeply mathematical. The argument might be that, if it were, it could be modeled more easily.”
Being deeply mathematical makes the universe more difficult to model. But also makes the task of modeling it more interesting. And makes pure math useful. And supplies theists with one more argument against naturalism based on the discoveries of modern science.
“And I certainly don't claim to know the nature of reality any more than anyone else. But I don't think we are in any condition to confidently make this kind of claim.”
Well, perhaps we can do better. Metaphysics is hard, but, in my judgment, the idea that reality is fundamentally of a mechanical nature suffers from too many conceptual problems to a remain viable option.
Dianelos
ReplyDeletePrecisely the opposite. The teleological form creates the problem. Without this you only have, as you concede, JP's first statement, that physics require advanced mathematics to model reality. And even require is too strong. It may just be we're not smart enough to yet see how simpler mathematics could do the work.
Nevertheless, there are many mysteries left unsolved here, and the reason particular mathematical techniques do prove useful is worthy of further examination I am sure. The agnostic in me is just wary of jumping at one's favourite story to fill in the gaps. It shows I think a lack of patience and humility. Our children's children's children might get it, or maybe we'll never know.
Bernard
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteI am saying (2) as a shorter way of saying (1)
But they are not the same thing at all. (2) is about reality and (1) about our knowledge/description of it. Saying that they are the same is an extraordinary claim.
Even if you restrict (2) to the phenomena that science studies (can study?) you assume, as Bernard points out, that we won't find simpler laws in the future. Note also that by so restricting (2) the claim of a deep mathematical reality becomes much weaker – because it doesn't take into account a possibly vast realm of deeply un-mathematical reality that we cannot study (perhaps for this very reason).
Hi JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “But they are not the same thing at all. (2) is about reality and (1) about our knowledge/description of it. Saying that they are the same is an extraordinary claim.”
I am not sure I see the problem. An epistemic property of a thing is after all a property of it. Suppose we observe a newspaper in Chinese. The propositions (1*) “One needs to know Chinese before reading this paper”, and (2*) “This paper is written in Chinese”, say pretty much the same, even though (2*) is about reality and (1*) is about our knowledge of it. Similarly, the fact that one needs ever deeper mathematical knowledge for better modeling physical reality, is a property of physical reality, a property I call "being deeply mathematical". But if you still think there is some significant distinction between (1) and (2) then feel free to read (1) wherever I wrote (2).
“Even if you restrict (2) to the phenomena that science studies (can study?) you assume, as Bernard points out, that we won't find simpler laws in the future.”
Almost everything is possible, but there are two reasons why I think this won’t happen. First, the history of fundamental science in the last 300 years is one where ever deeper mathematical knowledge is required for it to proceed. By induction we know that it is improbable that this trend will reverse itself. Secondly, suppose some time in the future we shall find a way to model phenomena using only simple math. Then there exists a way to model, say, quantum phenomena using only simple math. If so, how come physicists have not discovered that method already? When physicists first encountered quantum phenomena and tried to model them they *had* to resort to using sophisticated math. If simple math were sufficient they would have chosen it instead.
Incidentally, the answer “perhaps in the future naturalism will find a solution to that problem”, while true enough, becomes lame after a while of using it to deal with the many problemas that naturalism suffers from, one after the other. I mean if naturalism were true one would expect the number and scope of its problems to at least slowly decrease instead of to quickly grow, as is now the case.
“Note also that by so restricting (2) the claim of a deep mathematical reality becomes much weaker – because it doesn't take into account a possibly vast realm of deeply un-mathematical reality that we cannot study (perhaps for this very reason).”
I was not talking of all reality, but just about the physical phenomena that science studies. To my knowledge no such realm of deeply un-mathematical physical phenomena has been discovered, and I think it is a safe bet that it won’t. The physical universe appears to be “rational” (i.e. amenable to scientific understanding) through and through.
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteWhat we know about a phenomenon is determined by the reality of it and our descriptive tools (like language). It is obviously impossible to describe a phenomenon using tools we don't have.
Now the tools we have to describe reality are different kinds of languages, mathematics being one of them. It is by necessity that what we can understand of the world is described using these languages. Parts of reality we describe using maths, others using metaphors, and so on. This may be the best we can do.
I'd say we should reverse the argument. Given the tools we have we can only describe and understand those parts of reality that “match” these tools. We find mathematics in our description of reality because we put it there.
Hi JP,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “We find mathematics in our description of reality because we put it there.”
I am pretty positive that virtually all physicists would disagree with that proposition. When Newton had to develop the mathematics of calculus in order to model the order present in gravitational phenomena, it’s not like he was putting calculus in the order present in gravitational phenomena. Rather he was dealing with the fact that he could not model that order without first knowing calculus, in a way akin to how one needs a key to unlock a door.
Hi Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteI fear I am not very clear.
What I am saying is similar to the following: we find English (or Greek or French) in our description or reality because, by necessity, we need to use a language for this. It does not mean that reality is deeply English (or grammatical). English is part of our description, not part of what is described.
The same, I think, may be true of the use of mathematics. When ordinary language becomes insufficient we must resort to the more precise and powerful mathematical language. But, again, this is part of our description, not necessarily of what is described.