"Hopeful" vs "Dogmatic" Universalism: Some Thoughts on Terminology

There's a common distinction today between two broad species of universalism within Christianity: "hopeful" universalism and "dogmatic" (or "confident") universalism. The former holds, roughly, that given broader Christian teachings we have reason to hope that all will be saved. The latter holds that given broader Christian teachings it follows that God will save all--that God has both the resources and the will to achieve this end without thereby compromising  other divine objectives or values.

I suspect, however, that the terminology here may lead to some confusion. The language of hopefulness suggests humility in a way that the language of confidence/dogmatism does not. The latter suggests a certainty  about matters that many will find unsuitable to the subject matter. Many Christians with universalist leanings may gravitate towards the "hopeful" species for precisely this reason.

In fact, I think that those who are drawn towards universalism also tend to be the very people who are suspicious of "dogmatism" in the modern sense of the word, and who have a broad aversion to the kind of unquestioning certainty that characterizes fundamentalism.

The Landscape of Hellism and Universalism

In a comment on my last post, Dianelos made the following remark:

Perry’s argument turns on a equivocation of the meaning of the proposition P=“eternal creaturely existence of hell is compatible with God’s perfection”. Still, that equivocation apart, don’t both the hellist and hopeful universalist agree that P is true? After all they both agree that it is possible that in fact some creatures will eternally exist in hell. 

I agree. Hopeful universalists and hellists are both committed to P--and in exactly the same sense. But that then raises the question of how and where hopeful universalists differ from hellists in their beliefs. 

This, of course, generates the broader question of how best to distinguish species of hellism and universalism. In God's Final Victory (hopefully available in paperback very soon), John Kronen and I offer a strategy for doing so that I think is quite effective. But there are various ways to make the same distinctions--and it seems to me it might be helpful to use the point of agreement between hellists and hopeful universalists, noted by Dianelos, as a springboard for making some of the same basic distinctions in a fresh way (especially since John and I did not devote much attention to hopeful universalism in our book).