Tuesday, September 7, 2010

What Do Religious Claims Mean?

First of all, let me apologize for neglecting this blog for close to a week. This neglect is in part due to prioritizing time with my family over the Labor Day weekend, and in part due to my energies being directed towards something I hope to make an official announcement about by week's end.

That said, let's turn to something more philosophically substantive. There is an interesting connection between the topic of my philosophy of religion discussion this past Friday--namely, Anthony Flew's famous argument challenging the meaningfulness of religious claims (most notably the claim that God exists)--and the most recent installment in the New York Times philosophy forum, The Stone.

In Sunday's "Stone" installment, the atheist philosopher Tim Crane attempts to provide an honest account of what religion is about and why treating it as so many atheists do--as if its propositions were hypotheses capable of scientific testing--is inappropriate. Now let me begin by saying that my own perspective on these matters differs in important ways from Crane's. But I think he is asking the right questions. And I think he is pointing out some differences between science and religion that need to be taken seriously if we want to understand why, for example, Flew's argument falls flat among so many religious believers.

Of course, in some cases Flew's argument falls flat because the religious believers aren't listening, or they don't care about arguments. But many religious believers do care about arguments and have both listened to and understood Flew's case against the meaningfulness of certain kinds of religious claims--and yet they are unconvinced. The question is why.

Flew directs his argument towards untestable religious claims, claims that are consistent with any empirical observation we might possibly make. He summarizes his case against these religious claims as follows:

Some theological utterances seem to, and are intended to, provide explanations or express assertions. Now an assertion, to be an assertion at all, must claim that things stand thus and thus; and not otherwise. Similarly an explanation, to be an explanation at all, must explain why this particular thing occurs; and not something else... And yet sophisticated religious people...tend to refuse to allow, not merely that anything actually does occur, but that anything conceivably could occur which would count against their theological assertions and explanations. But in so far as they do this their supposed explanations are bogus, and their seeming assertions are vacuous.

The challenge that Flew lays down is specifically directed towards "sophisticated" religious people--those who care about science and its teachings, who care about facts, and who endeavor therefore to offer an account of their faith that is consistent with the facts as we know them. When new scientific discoveries challenge this account of their faith, sophisticated religious people neither reject the facts nor conclude "I guess there is no God after all" or something along those lines. Instead, they revise their account.

But if it really is possible to continually revise the faith to accomodate new facts, doesn't it follow that the underlying core beliefs--such as belief in something transcendent--are consistent with any set of facts we might discover? And if so, doesn't it therefore follow that these underlying precepts aren't saying anything substantive?

Rather than repeat what I say about this in my book, let me address this line of thought the way I do in a forthcoming article (following John Hick's lead), by invoking the famed "duck-rabbit" image:



The point I make in the article is that religious claims, instead of being primarily about what the (directly or indirectly) observable facts are, offer instead a way of seeing the totality of facts--what I call an "interpretive worldview." How does this relate to the above image? Well, with respect to the image above, we can offer descriptions of what is in front of us--for example, that there are two protrusions coming out of the left side of the image that comprise roughly half the width of the entire image at its widest point. In other words, we can describe details accurately or inaccurately in propositions which are therefore either true or false.

But we can also do something else. We can see the image as a rabbit or as a duck. Now there are certain "ways of seeing" that are precluded by the details of the image. For example, I'd be hard pressed to see the image above as a football player attacking a penguin using a wet piece of styrofoam. The details of the image are ambiguous enough to allow alternative ways of seeing--but some ways of seeing are, to put it simply, rather nutty.

The thing to notice about seeing this image as a duck or as a rabbit is this: whether we see it as one or the other does not have implications for what is there in the image to be described. It does, however, have implications for how we interpret the various elements of the image. The protrusions on the left are interpreted as ears or as a beak. The little knob on the right is either a random bump or a nose. In other words, how we see it has implications for the significance that we attach to the various components of the image. But it's the same whole that is being interpreted in different ways. To see it as a rabbit is not to assert that there is some descriptive detail there in the image that someone who sees it as a duck is asserting isn't there.

This is how interpretive worldviews operate in relation to the world we encounter in experience taken as a whole. They offer alternative "ways of seeing" this whole--ways which might postulate this whole as part of a larger whole that lends to it a significance it wouldn't have on its own (one way of understanding what supernaturalism is), or ways which sees the empirical world as the totality of what there is but may still see it in different ways.

R.M Hare, in his response to Flew (at the original panel discussion in which Flew's argument was first presented), is making essentially the same point I'm gesturing towards with the duck-rabbit image when he says that religious beliefs offer what he calls a "blik." A blik is a way of seeing the whole, rather than a claim about the specific details of the whole. Some bliks are sane and some are insane (Hare uses the example of someone who thinks that all English dons are engaged in a vast and brilliant secret conspiracy to bring him to ruin). Whether a blik is sane or not depends on its "fit" with what is being interpreted in its light. And since there is such a thing as a good fit or a bad fit, there are standards (however hard they may be to articulate and apply) for assessing bliks. But the question is whether these standards, when applied to the vast and astonishingly complex universe in which we reside, allow only one blik (a naturalistic one, or a Christian one, or a Buddhist one), or allow several.

One of the difficulties here is that, once you are used to seeing things a certain way, it can be very hard to imagine it any other way--even IF some other way is at least as good a fit as your way of seeing. I think this is particularly true when it comes to interpretive worldviews, which attempt to offer a holistic way of seeing everything that is a part of our lived experience--the physical world encountered through the senses, morality, aesthetics, consciousness, etc.

Of course, as the details of this whole become more clear, some bliks may cease to "fit." Perhaps, one day, if we ever got there, the image would be so clear that all ambiguity would evaporate and there would be only one "way of seeing" the whole universe that fits. But I doubt it, and we'll never get there in any event.

Be that as it may, it should be clear that there is a big difference between the project of clarifying the details of the picture and the task of offering and/or refining a way of seeing it. While the former is meaningful to the extent that it describes (accurately or inaccurately) various parts of the picture--and so says that things "stand thus and thus and not otherwise"--the latter gets its meaning in a different way. In effect, a "blik" makes a difference for how we treat what is observed, how we relate to it, what is appropriate in response to it--in short, a blik makes a difference on a more pragmatic (or moral) level.

38 comments:

  1. Eric

    This looks very like the claim Karl Popper made in his attempts to construct a demarcation line between science and other disciplines. He used Frued, Adler and Marx as his examples of theorists whose world views could be bent to accommodate any evidence, and contrasted this with science's insistence on testability.

    Is it worth noting that there are many ways of viewing the rabbit duck picture? Some will see it as both rabbit and duck, or rather as a picture that can be seen either way, particularly if they have seen it before. Some, with a more literal bent, will see the pictuer in terms of the individual shapes that make up the image, some, the artists perhaps, will see it in terms of the shading employed, a zoologist will come at the picture a little differently (what are the ears doing there?) and so forth. With a little imagination we can construct endless 'sane' bliks.

    Is this a useful definition of religion I wonder, a personally chosen set of interpretations amongst an endless variety of potential stories? I think most atheists would accept this definition, and readily concede that they too have such a religion, they tell themselves stories in order to make sense of their world. They read, watch films, gossip, attribute motives, specualte. But for them words like culture or story seem to do an adequate job of describing this process.

    This particular version of religion seems to have so much in common with atheism that all that's left is to find a way of effecting the merger without either side losing face.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  2. Hi, Eric-

    This seems to be rather ducking the point (ouch, sorry about that!). Flew is talking about assertions and specially about how theists habitually worm out of their own assertions by reframing the claim, or calling it about something else.. no end of rationalizations to protect that which was not rational to start with.

    And here you are following the very same program. God exists? Well, you don't want to talk about that. That would be too... definitive, difficult, unsuported by evidence, unmysterious, non-artistic ... take your pick. You'd rather talk about how theism can reframe reality in new and glowing terms.

    But is it true? That after all is what philosophy is supposedly about. A harvey wallbanger can reframe the world for me as well, and more reliably. A "whole" world view should be able to be taken apart and analyzed, and each of its parts should cohere, as you admit lower down. Theism passes no such test. It is wholistically comforting while being impeachable in every detail.

    Holism is yet another way to evade the issue. One could add an option.. Rabbit? Duck? Or is it a mirage? A blik only works when, as you look closer, it remains consistent and defensible.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Bernard,

    Eric's post goes to many of the areas we have been discussing and partly shows what I meant when I said that your very "seeing" the facts is also story dependant. For instance, Eric notes:

    “This is how interpretive worldviews operate in relation to the world we encounter in experience taken as a whole. They offer alternative "ways of seeing" this whole--ways which might postulate this whole as part of a larger whole that lends to it a significance it wouldn't have on its own (one way of understanding what supernaturalism is), or ways which sees the empirical world as the totality of what there is but may still see it in different ways.”

    World-view is our interpretive story or narrative and is what allows us to “see” a “fact” or piece of evidence and then place it into a larger picture of meaning and significance. It is also why an atheist and a Christian can look at the same fact or piece of evidence and draw different conclusions within the totality of their thinking. It certainly doesn’t mean that the atheist is relying only upon the “facts” and evidence while the Christian is ignoring such and relying upon a “story.” Both are relying upon a “story” to make sense of the whole and the story is always in play from our “seeing” and interpretation of the facts to our organizing of them into models and pictures of the whole. And this certainly doesn’t mean that when we say “story” we are saying it is something untrue or made up. It is not as if we have “facts” and we have “stories.” They both make up a dialectic process that is inseparable and I will try to unpack that thought a bit in my other response.

    Also, I think Tim Crane's essay to be a very charitable attempt of reading "religion" and the claims that, at least, Christians make.

    By the way, I have tried to respond to some of your last comments in the earlier post, but my response keeps disappearing. I will keep trying.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Hi Darrell

    I tried to leave a comment regarding this business of facts versus stories, but it's disappeared. I'll wait to see if this technical problem gets resolved before commenting further.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  5. I've heard from several people now about the disappearing comments problem. This is, apparently, a widespread problem with blogger right now. They've created a site specifically for problems related to comments, and I've provided what I hope is helpful information. Keep your fingers crossed!

    ReplyDelete
  6. In the meantime, I'm composing what would have been a follow-up comment on this post and turning it into a post on its own. It is at least possible that the comment-disappearing glitch is somehow post-specific (triggered by something in the post or discussion thread), in which case it may be that comments on a new post won't disappear (or won't disappear as frequently).

    ReplyDelete
  7. I think science has its own history of revising itself to fit the evidence as well. When evidence ultimately accumulates in a certain direction, the paradigm inevitably shifts. That's just part of the human project of piecing things together, and religion is no different from science in that respect. You don't just throw out the whole thing - instead the way of putting it all together must change.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Hi Dianelos and Darrell

    You have got me thinking about this business of what I mean when I speak of something being a fact. Thank you.

    Dianelos, I was mistaken to state that truth is an unhelpful concept. What I should retreat to I think is that we have no way of knowing when a particular model has reached a level of fidelity with reality that we could say it represents the true picture. As far as I can see, we will never know this is the case. The best we can ever say is that our model provides reliable predictions, and it is this reliability that lies behind our facts. If I put my hand on a hot stove, I will get burnt. The relationship is sufficiently reliable that I call this a fact. Science extends the reach of such relationships, so in time our description of reality becomes more complete.

    While our facts are refined over time, I don’t think we get wholesale replacement. So, under Newtonian physics, the apple falls because of the gravitational pull of the earth. Although, as you note, general relativity extends this model, it is a more complete picture, the Newtonian relationship remains reliable at the coarse level. The apple still falls, structural engineers still use Newtonian models when considering the stresses on a bridge. Over time we dig deeper.

    We don’t yet have a complete theory of quantum physics, just loads of competing hypotheses. What we can say though, is that if/when this muddle is resolved, it will accommodate the predictive power of the equations currently used.

    Now, there may always be a deeper level of reality beneath all these models that the science haven’t yet got at. Perhaps your computer simulation, or a cruel trickster who brought the world into existence two weeks ago. But, given there are endless speculations available and no way, scientific or otherwise, or choosing between them, we are best to call these stories.

    And Darrell, can we separate the fact from the story? Absolutely we can. The stove burns the hand no matter what story we wrap the experience in. There is an intellectual discipline then in trying to tease the two apart. It is tremendously difficult, but I think honesty requires it, be we Christian, agnostic or whatever.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  9. Bernard,

    I think you are still missing the point. First, your example is why I was careful to talk about totality and “larger picture.” Other examples: “…different conclusions within the totality of their thinking.” “Both are relying upon a “story” to make sense of the whole…” “…the story is always in play from our “seeing” and interpretation of the facts to our organizing of them into models and pictures of the whole.”

    No one is saying that a “story” is going to change a “fact” like the stove example, so you are barking up the wrong tree to begin with. However, a story does make us “see” and interpret the fact the stove burns everyone all the time in a way that connects it to a larger picture. A pagan might, according to his world-view (story), believe that the stove burning his hand was the result of his offending the stove god, while the pagan from a different village may just think he was clumsy. In other words, we can still attribute different meanings and significances to the same fact. And this is true even if we attribute no significance or meaning. Even the assertion that a fact has no meaning or significance, is, in and of itself, a narrative or story of how would should “see” that fact.

    Here is the other problem: If you were to tell us that from now on, in this conversation, you were simply going to recite facts to us like, 2+2=4; the sun is hot; water is made up of H2O; the sun is 93 million miles from the earth, and on and on, we would all say, “Very well, good for you.” Unfortunately, that is not going to happen nor should it. For one if your response or comment to every question or comment was to simply recite a “fact” in a conversation like this no one would understand your point and it clearly would not be very helpful.

    Second, your just reciting facts to us is never going to happen. At some point (which is obvious in a conversation like this one), you are going to articulate, explain, elaborate, unpack, and tell us what you think all these “facts” mean or don’t mean and the only way you can do that is by story or narrative. This is why the narrative is truer than a “fact.” A fact is nothing until someone puts it into the larger narrative of meaning and significance. It is the difference between knowledge and wisdom. I can know all the “facts” about how a gun works and still not have the wisdom to know I shouldn’t fire it randomly into the air in a crowded market. Or, it is the difference between the law and justice. As a judge I can know all the “facts” of the written law, even memorize it, and still be unjust in my sentencing. At the end of the day, story will always trump “facts” as far as meaning and significance and the same is true for you unless you plan to just recite fact after fact to us and never tell us what you think all these facts should amount to, even if you tell us they should amount to nothing. Does that make sense?

    Here was why I raised the problem to begin with. The naturalist too often assumes he is simply basing his world-view upon the “facts” and evidence while Christians and others are neglecting the “facts” and basing their world-view upon stories. I don’t think anything could be further from the truth and I just think we need to move past such an unwarranted view.

    I hope this helps somewhat.

    ReplyDelete
  10. Darrell,

    Interesting conversation you're having with Bernard. I think I understand what Bernard is saying but I must admit I am confused by some of what you and Dianelos write.

    One thing Bernard is trying to do (I think) is to establish some concrete common ground between us all. This discussion is often too general and we get lost in misunderstandings, talking pass each other, using terms differently, and so forth.

    So, all this talk about “facts” is not because there is nothing else to talk about – obviously. And it is clear you want to move on (and we all do). But we won't get anywhere if we don't settle this first. Specifically we should see if we agree on this: there are all these “facts” out there (if you don't like the term, please suggest another one, but it will have to do for now) that we know to be “true” (with more or less certainty) and that their truths do not depend on anyone's world-view.

    Sometimes you seem to accept this but at other times you appear to dismiss the whole idea that these facts are independent of any story (although, of course, they may not be understandable to people lacking the necessary background). I think looking at a very simple, concrete, case will be helpful.

    So, to go back to a favourite, consider the following statement: The Earth is flat.. Do you agree that:

    1. The statement is false, independently of any story or world-view.
    2. Someone who believes the statement is in error.
    3. It is not reasonable to adopt a world-view that implies this statement is true.
    4. It is a fact that the Earth is round.

    If this whole thing seems simplistic or trivial, I am sorry, but we need to sort this out.

    ReplyDelete
  11. JP,

    Yes, the earth is round. I agree.

    ReplyDelete
  12. Hi Darrell,

    Ok. So we all agree that there are tons of facts (the shape of the Earth and the theory of relativity being two examples) that we all agree on and, furthermore, that the truthfulness of these facts (known with various degree of certainty) is independent of any world-view or story. It is understood that some of these facts may need to be revised in the future when more discoveries are made, and so on.

    Then I don't understand your disagreement with Bernard. I think this is what he's been saying all along.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Thanks Darrell and JP,

    Useful clarifications. So if we may tentatively move on from the acceptance that there are indeed facts that exist independent of our world view, whilst accepting that in order to make sense of, discuss, consider these facts we must bring a world view to bear...

    I don't know about you, but for me the interesting question then becomes, well are some world views more useful/consistent/satisfying etc, than others? And of course, here we will be using subjective measures, but it can be surprising how much shared ground there is on such things. For example, all the participants in this conversation appear to value internal consistency in their world views.

    You are right Darrell, I might attribute being burnt to clumsiness, or to the annoyance of the stove God. Now, depending upon what we seek from a world view, one of those might turn out to be a far smarter interpretation than the other.

    Here's one thing I want from my world view, in order to get things rolling. I want to acknowledge openly that my world view is to an extent self-constructed. I face choices as to how I interpret facts, and the human imagination being what it is, these choices are apparently endless. This is not true of the facts themselves, I can not choose whether or not the heat burns me. So, I choose, in my world view, to use language that explicitly addresses this choice issue. I can believe in any one of a great procession of Gods, or choose to believe in none at all. No evidence constrains me either way.

    Hence, the existence of God is part of a story I tell myself, and sits distinct from the facts of the world at least in this respect. Having committed myself to this stance, I then call myself an agnostic, as a way of acknowledging that whatever truth about God I was to commit to, I would be in some sense just making it up.

    Eric's point, that such belief can serve a pragmatic, moral purpose, fascinates me. I think there are excellent grounds here for believing in a type of God, but my world view pushes me up against a barrier here, which is to say knowing the God is indeed my own invention seems to diminish its pragmatic, moral use for me.

    You will disagree with elements of this I know and I would like you to. for this is how I learn.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  14. There is a fascinating observation in philosopher Tim Crane's piece (linked to by Eric in the post above): religious beliefs require that certain statements of facts be true but the contents of these statements is not really important.

    This certainly appears to be true historically, as illustrated by Anthony Flew's argument (Eric also provides a link above): factual beliefs shift over time to accommodate new knowledge. I am not sure it is true of an individual life: in many cases (but by not means all) evidence contrary to these beliefs is simply ignored – or even serves to reinforce the beliefs! This attitude, however, is consistent with Crane's observation about the relative irrelevance of the actual contents of the beliefs.

    It is also true, as Crane says, that many attacks on religion are targeted at these factual statements. According to Crane's observation, this boils down to attacking a straw man (however, for me, they nevertheless constitute a major barrier to religious beliefs).

    So, what's going on? Is it that these beliefs constitute a kind of scaffolding used to support some deeper world-view? In that view, the actual composition of the scaffolding is irrelevant: any one will do – consistent with Crane's observation.

    If this is true, the obvious question is then: why use a scaffolding at all? Is it not possible to get to the deeper stuff without this artifice? As Bernard says, why not simply recognize that these beliefs are pure invention, stories introduced only for their temporary usefulness?

    ReplyDelete
  15. Hi JP

    I've just read Tim Crane's piece and I'm interested in what seems to be a bit of fancy footwork that's going on in the argument, and it may be what you're also referring to. He says religion does make factual claims, but these claims are not central to religion. So for example, various forms of Christianity may make particular historical claims about Christ, but religious faith does not rest upon the ability to validate them.

    He also says that historical facts are not like scientific facts and he's right. No historian worth their salt is going to claim they deal in facts, rather they take the available evidence and construct narratives about it. Debate in history can then take the form of uncovering new evidence that the narrative struggles to accommodate, or constructing alternative narratives that seem to provide a better fit. It is openly acknowledged that such goodness of fit is heavily influenced by political considerations.

    Attachment to a religious idea then, by Crane's description, appears to be directly analogous to attachment to a marxist or feminist or freudian interpretation of the world (which some would also call religious). Now, sometimes theists appear to be defending this, and only this, view of religion, and I think it takes a particular desire for conflict to disagree with it.

    However, often on this blog other levels of claims for theism are introduced and I find it very tricky to know who is defending what in this regard. So, at times there is an argument that religion not only provides an organisational framework, but it also reminds us that there is a realm beyond the rationally comprehensible. I tend to accept this possibility.

    At the next level is a claim that religious thought allows us to somehow access hints of this realm. I am very hazy on who believes this claim, and how they think such access occurs. Because I'm also very sceptical about it, it would be useful to engage on this point.

    Finally, in my little ad hoc abstraction here, there is the level of theism that makes specific claims about the nature of the higher realm, usually through a anthropomorphic sort of God representation. This is the point I'm furthest from understanding and to be fair, it's only vaguely alluded to by most participants in this discussion.

    What I'm wary of, and what Flew may have been complaining about, is the tendency to use a defence of the lower levels of theism, easily constructed, as a validation for the higher levels. I can't work out if anyone's trying to do this.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  16. JP,

    I too agree with “the Earth is round”, but I’d like to point out that what one means by that proposition strongly depends on the context as well as on that person’s ontological worldview.

    If the context is talk about phenomenal reality then virtually everybody will mean the same, namely that one’s experiences will fit with the idea of a round (albeit quite large) Earth. So virtually everybody will agree that if one were flown to halfway he distance to the Moon the Earth would look like a big blue ball. Virtually everybody would agree that the hypothesis that the Earth is round explains why one first sees the peaks of the mountains when one approaches an island by boat. And so on. People who know some science will agree about phenomenal reality and the various facts in it.

    But if the context is ontology, namely about what is there in objective reality that produces our consistent experiences of phenomenal reality, then by “the Earth is round” people of different ontological worldviews may mean quite different things. For example the scientific naturalist will mean that the Earth consists of a large number of molecules held together by gravitational forces within a roughly spherical shape. The theist who is a scientific realist will mean that the Earth consists of a large number of molecules in a spherical shape, all upheld into existence by God’s will according to the physical order created by Him/Her. The theist who is a subjective idealist will mean that God directly produces for us the experiences of the Earth in a way that is consistent with the physical order created by Him/Her, including that of a round Earth. The non-theist who believes in the computer simulation hypothesis will mean that a computer directly produces for us the experiences of the Earth in a way that I consistent with the physical order of the universe implemented in it. The naturalist who believes in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics will mean something far more complex, namely that we happen to exist in a local family of universes such that the vast majority (but not all) of them include an Earth of a spherical shape.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Bernard,

    You write: “But, given there are endless speculations available and no way, scientific or otherwise, or choosing between them, we are best to call these stories.

    But there are ways of choosing between them, namely philosophical ways. For example one can show that the computer simulation hypothesis explains many more phenomenal facts than scientific naturalism, and if one believes (as virtually everybody does) that powerful explanations are more probably true than weak explanations, one will conclude that the computer simulation hypothesis is more probably true than scientific naturalism. I have tried to post a more detailed description of this in the “intuitions” thread, but unsuccessfully. In that thread you say that some ideas strike you simply as “silly”, but then the relevant question is why do they strike you as silly. If there is some reason, then you should identify it and use it consistently. If there is no reason, then simply finding something “silly” is irrelevant.

    In short, the basic point to keep in mind is that one can reason beyond natural science. To think otherwise is to subscribe to “scientism”, and scientism is not a good idea. Actually all the really important and relevant thoughts go beyond the natural sciences. In our times the natural sciences are esteemed beyond any reasonable proportion, and this is unhealthy. After all the theory building within the natural sciences is just a project of discovering mathematical patterns within phenomena, a process that may (and I think will) one day become fully computerized. I suspect that in the future the great scientists will be those who discover new phenomena.

    ReplyDelete
  18. Bernard,

    You write: “Eric's point, that such belief can serve a pragmatic, moral purpose, fascinates me. I think there are excellent grounds here for believing in a type of God, but my world view pushes me up against a barrier here, which is to say knowing the God is indeed my own invention seems to diminish its pragmatic, moral use for me.

    All beliefs beyond direct experience are “one’s inventions”. The important question is which of these beliefs are true, and how to find out if they are true. Pragmatism is certainly central; for example scientific truths are justified by their pragmatical success, namely how well they fit phenomena and how successful their predictions are. The same goes for math, or for logic, or for marriage, or for politics.

    In this context consider the following story. Suppose you visit a foreign village where everybody’s hobby is to tend their garden. You don’t know anything about gardening yourself, but you observe two neighbors A and B working equally hard on their garden, and you see how A gets splendid results and looks quite happy, while B gets bad results and looks quite unhappy. Naturally you conclude that A’s beliefs about gardening are closer to the truth than B’s. Now suppose B comes to you and claims that A has simply “invented” her beliefs about gardening, whereas his (i.e. B’s) beliefs are based on strictly naturalistic grounds. Would that claim (even if factual) somehow diminish your trust that A’s beliefs about gardening are closer to the truth than B’s? – If you now substitute “good garden” with “good life” you’ll get theism’s argument from pragmatism.

    What I am saying is that pragmatic usefulness is ultimately the only reason we call a belief “true”. Conversely, nobody would call a belief “true” if its adoption is found to hinder one from realizing one’s goals. Now it is easy to find counterexamples to this definition of “truth”, say by pointing out the case of placebos. Still I think these counterexamples are superficial and that the main idea is sound, especially when applied to the truth of a system of beliefs rather than individual beliefs.

    ReplyDelete
  19. Hi Dianelos

    Thanks for that. The gardening example is perplexing for me, because naturalism would ask first and foremost that you examine the results of the garden. A naturalist would argue that the gardener with the best results is probably following a better gardening method, and would therefore be interested in finding out what that method is, and in particular how the variations with gardener B's approach are affecting growth (keeping open the possibility that they just have a better plot of land, or some other technique independent explanation). Who cares what beliefs the gardener holds, it's the link between action and result that is interesting.

    I like your idea that we sometimes must simply plump for the most likely explanation, in day to day life we do this all the time. But is it not true that evidence trumps likelihood, which is to say we use likelihood as a guide when there is no conclusive evidence, and it supports only our tentative explanations? I can not think of an example where the more likely or plausible explanation has been used to over ride a piece of unambiguous data in science. Can you?

    One of the things I enjoy about science is its openness to the astoundingly unlikely. Like the thought that complex life could arise without a hands on design process. Stupendously unlikely at first glance. Luckily we looked again.

    I don't know the computer simulation argument, but am guessing it may have much in common with the popular floating brain hypothesis (consider all possible worlds where intelligence may have developed, what subset of these has this development occur alongside complex brain structures etc.)

    There is something barking mad (and delightfully so, it's great fun) about this approach, if it's the one you're referring to, specifically the probabilities are calculated on the backs of starting assumptions about the conditions under which intelligence can operate, despite us having no data to support these assumptions. It is an excellent example of the limitless oddnesses available to us if we turn our back on falsifiability.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  20. Dianelos

    You can help me on this point perhaps, it relates to something you have said to both JP and me. At the level of phenomenal reality, there exist methods of discovery upon which we all pretty much agree, or at least should agree, hence your round earth example.

    Now, at what you call an ontological level, there are many potential back drop explanations. You name a few and of course there are vastly many more. Now, you suggested to me philosophical methods can help us sort through these, in much the same way as scientific methods can allow us to sort through alternative physical models. Rather than evidential arguments, we rely upon things like explanatory power, plausibility and probability, if I am reading you correctly.

    Now, I agree with you both that we must do something like this to construct our big pictures and that some of the methods you suggest appear to be in play. And I would also concede to Darrell that exactly these same methods are used in science when we construct hypotheses, imagine methods for testing them and even when we argue about how to interpret the results. So we don't disagree on much.

    Where I find it hard to follow you (and it may just be because I misunderstand you) is at the point where it seems that you are suggesting some big pictures are more worthy of belief than others.

    For a belief like the earth is round, I can see exactly why one belief works better than another. But computer simulation, versus scientology, versus the probability reversing dog of existence or floating brain partial universes... I'm left with the suspicion that why some feel silly to me is purely cultural, and somebody with a different upbringing/personality/lifeline will quite reasonably plump for a different explanation.

    So are you saying your big picture belief is right for you, or that it has some sort of objective validity that makes it right for other people too? If the former, then I don't think I disagree with you about anything. If the latter, I am still at a loss to see how you can determine which version of objective reality is best.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  21. Hi Bernard,

    You mention many interesting issues in your comment about Crane's article, some of them very close to the top of my list of questions about religion.

    You say “there is the level of theism that makes specific claims about the nature of the higher realm, usually through a anthropomorphic sort of God representation. This is the point I'm furthest from understanding and to be fair, it's only vaguely alluded to by most participants in this discussion.

    I understand that someone can argue for the existence of a God defined as some “ultimate cause”, a “prime mover”, that sort of things. I expect that all such arguments are ultimately question begging but, nevertheless, I can understand what's going on.

    What I don't get at all is how we can go from this to a conscious, personal, good and very much anthropomorphic God. I once asked a philosopher friend (a theist) what the connection was and he answered right away there was no connection at all – which left me more confused than ever. What I think he was saying is that belief in a God with the appropriate attributes comes from another source and that logical arguments serve only as some kind of support – without claiming to prove anything at all. Very hazy.

    What I can understand is that an evil or cruel God or a God uninterested in humans would not do at all as a foundation for theism. Eric discusses this at length in his book but, as far as I remember, he is not making the case that these attributes logically follow from the existence of a creator God. (I cannot check as I have lent my copy to a friend.)

    From looking around, it would seem that such an omnipotent being would be, at best, completely indifferent to humans (but he would love colliding stars and black holes). And, at worst, evil and cruel, taking pleasure in torturing us. Not necessarily out of malice, however. We might be to such a being no more than specks of dust are to us, hardly the subject of moral consideration.

    In any case, this question is a big mystery to me.

    jp

    ReplyDelete
  22. Bernard,

    You write: “The gardening example is perplexing for me, because naturalism would ask first and foremost that you examine the results of the garden.

    In real life the analogy of the good garden would be to have a good life and to be a good person. That is the goal of virtually all people. There is already some research, but I wonder: If it were scientifically demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that all other things being equal those people who interpret phenomenal reality theistically are on average better off than those who interpret it naturalistically, would you then agree that theism is more probably true than naturalism?

    In other words, if there is a belief system which in comparison to an alternative belief system moves people to adopt such values, stances, and actions which more effectively lead them to the kind of life they wish to have – isn’t it then the case that the former belief system is closer to the truth than the latter?

    Who cares what beliefs the gardener holds, it's the link between action and result that is interesting.

    Ah, but the gardener’s actions are not independent from her beliefs; quite on the contrary, beliefs are a major driver of peoples’ actions, especially in goal orientated enterprises.

    ReplyDelete
  23. Bernard,

    You write: “So are you saying your big picture belief is right for you, or that it has some sort of objective validity that makes it right for other people too?

    Both. I believe that there is some concrete objective reality which produces all of our experience of life. On the other hand one major way to find out which big picture worldview about objective reality is more probably true is to consider how pragmatically useful this worldview is. Another major way is to consider which worldview has the greatest explanatory power for the whole of our experience of life. Another is to consider how internally coherent, free from conceptual problems, and intellectually satisfying an ontological worldview is. (It goes without saying that only those ontological worldviews which are compatible with our experience of life, and hence are compatible with all of scientific knowledge, are viable worldviews.)

    If the latter, I am still at a loss to see how you can determine which version of objective reality is best.

    Given that all viable ontological worldviews are compatible with science, the idea is to use epistemic criteria beyond the science. Which epistemic criteria one should employ when comparing alternative ontological worldviews is not a given, but I think virtually all people agree that pragmatic usefulness, explanatory power, internal coherence, freedom from conceptual problems, etc, are eminently reasonable epistemic criteria. The reason I am a theist rather than a naturalist is that I find that theism works better than naturalism under each one of the epistemic criteria I have.

    ReplyDelete
  24. Dianelos

    You ask: 'If it were scientifically demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that all other things being equal those people who interpret phenomenal reality theistically are on average better off than those who interpret it naturalistically, would you then agree that theism is more probably true than naturalism? '

    Good question. Were this to be demonstrated, then there would be at least two live hypotheses to consider wouldn't there? The first, as you say, is the advantage is occurring because this is a true belief. The second would be that our pyschological make-up responds well to theistic style metaphors because of the evolved, cobbled together nature of our mind.

    At that point I'd want to get on with the next step and start examining which made better predictions about how the brain responded to particular variations on the the theistic theme, trying to isolate which aspects of theism in particular led to the behaviours and states of mind measured as 'better off', and whether non-theistic parallel beliefs did or didn't offer similar benefits and so forth. So, I'd see it as the starting point for a fascinating investigation.

    There is a related point which interests me, and that is, theism and non-theism aside, what style of clearly fictional narratives lead to a better life for a community? This leads into the vexed questions of censorship in the tales we expose our young to, the styles of video games, films and so forth we expose them to, and the more subtle narratives embedded in the behaviour of their immediate role models.

    I am tempted by the faith you have in the application of what you call epistemic criteria. The observation I would offer in return is that different, reasonable and well informed people applying these very criteria reach very different conclusions. From this I conclude there is sufficient wiggle room in these criteria to prevent them from being reliable guides to objective truth. In other words, I don't trust my intellectual capacity.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  25. JP,

    You write: “What I don't get at all is how we can go from [the uncaused cause] to a conscious, personal, good and very much anthropomorphic God.

    I would say that the purpose of the various theistic arguments (including the venerable cosmological argument you refer to) is twofold: First to show that it is more probable that reality is ultimately personal/purposeful and not mechanical/blind. Secondly to elucidate some properties of that personal/purposeful reality. If by “God” we for now understand the fundamental structure of reality, than, in my judgment, the cosmological argument elucidates some non-personal attributes of God, such as that God is eternal (and thus outside of time and in this sense unchangeable), the ground of all being, simple, etc. Please observe that God is not supposed to be just a person, but is not less than a person (by “person” philosophers mean a conscious being intelligent enough to have moral knowledge). Thus apart from personal attributes (being perfectly loving and good, powerful, knowledgeable, etc) God has several non-personal attributes too.

    From looking around, it would seem that such an omnipotent being would be, at best, completely indifferent to humans (but he would love colliding stars and black holes). And, at worst, evil and cruel, taking pleasure in torturing us. Not necessarily out of malice, however. We might be to such a being no more than specks of dust are to us, hardly the subject of moral consideration.

    Yeah, it would be much easier for theists to posit an imperfect person as God, wouldn’t it?

    It is interesting to consider how the personal understanding of reality has evolved in history. It started with the idea of a menagerie of grander and lesser all-too-human deities, to later turn into the idea of a single personal being of utter perfection. Take for example Yahweh of the Old Testament, who at first appears as one god among several, albeit a jealous one who exacts exclusive worshipping from his people. Later he morphs into the only deity, but still one whom the respective writers of the Old Testament clearly did not conceive as morally absolutely perfect, but rather as quite bossy, vengeful and kind of capricious. It was only later that the idea of perfection evolved.

    How come then theistic humanity inched its way towards the view of a perfect divine being, when that view is much more difficult to justify? The common answer from wishful thinking doesn’t cut it, for several reasons, not least that virtually all theists even today believe in an eschatology which is closer to the worse possible nightmare than to wishful thinking (which makes it even more remarkable that even such theists insist about God’s perfection). So what is it that drives people to the view of perfection, despite what they get from looking around, as you put it? How can people cling to the view that God is all-good and all-powerful and all-knowledgeable, despite the amount and type of evils they observe in the world? My answer would be twofold: First, being persons, people sense that personhood in its deepest nature is orientated towards perfection. Secondly, I’d say that people, no matter how dimly, perceive God.

    ReplyDelete
  26. Bernard,

    You write: “Were it to be demonstrated [that theists are better off then non-theists], then there would be at least two live hypotheses to consider wouldn't there? The first, as you say, is the advantage is occurring because this is a true belief. The second would be that our pyschological make-up responds well to theistic style metaphors because of the evolved, cobbled together nature of our mind.

    The second hypothesis I take it is this: It’s not like the theist lives more successfully because her true beliefs about reality drive her to assume a truth reflecting life-stance and act in ways that are more in tune with reality, but because her beliefs drive her to act in ways that her brain happens to find more pleasant. If that’s what you are saying then I think you are kind of putting the cart before the horse. To go back to the analogy of the good gardener, her success does not consist in that her brain is pleased with her garden; her success consists in that her garden is well done, and thus pleases both her and everybody else who beholds it. Similarly, in the real world there is a kind of life we all value, namely a life characterized by virtues such as being loving and giving, as having courage, as spreading knowledge and beauty around, as being a “blessing”. It’s not like such a life is good because the brain of the person who has it feels happy. Rather that person (as well as those around her) feels happy because it is a good life.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Bernard,

    You write: “There is a related point which interests me, and that is, theism and non-theism aside, what style of clearly fictional narratives lead to a better life for a community?

    Fictional narratives, such as fairy-tales, myths, parables, books and films of fiction, etc, can influence our stance vis-à-vis reality, and hence our ontological beliefs. If we agree that reality is such that knowing the truth about it has positive value (which is clearly the case on theism, but probably not the case on naturalism), then we should favor those fictional narratives that nudge us towards the direction of true beliefs or of adapting a truth reflecting stance vis-à-vis reality. This issue quickly becomes complex:

    It seems clear the abject kind of violence one finds in games and films for the young is not of the kind that should be favored. On the other hand sugar-coated fiction, where good people are always beautiful and ultimately win and bad people are ugly and ultimately lose, should not be favored either, for reality is not “sweet” and it is misleading to teach that it is. I’d say that good fiction is that fiction that resonates in us in a challenging way, the fiction that is emotionally powerful and makes us think.

    Secondly, fictional stories have clearly the advantage of simplicity. For many people truth can in many cases be too complex or difficult to understand, unless presented as a tale, or as a parable, or even as a joke, as is sometimes the case in the Eastern Orthodox tradition I form part.

    Thirdly, there is the idea that some truths are beyond our current cognitive capacity, and that therefore we need fictional stories which nudge as into assuming a truth reflecting stance vis-à-vis reality. Thus philosopher and theologian John Hick, who I gather is far in front of the curve, speaks of “true myths”, and interprets the variety of the world religions under that prism. I understand Biblical scholar Marcus Borg holds a similar interpretation about the world religions. I once had an exchange with him complaining about his view that Christianity will certainly disappear in the future. What he meant though is that the kind of language and narrative that is used in today’s Christianity, i.e. Christianity as a cultural phenomenon, responds to the current world’s needs and will probably be superseded in the future when humanity has reached a much higher level of spiritual awareness.

    ReplyDelete
  28. Hi Dianelos

    You write:

    'It’s not like such a life is good because the brain of the person who has it feels happy. Rather that person (as well as those around her) feels happy because it is a good life.'

    This may be case, or perhaps it is the other way around. Which is the cart and which is the horse is the nub of the problem isn't it, and interestingly my tentative conclusion on this is the exact opposite from yours.

    I think once we have in place a world view that accepts this external source/definition of goodness then a lot of things can fall in place around it. In my experience however, if such an assumption is not the starting point the same observations, values and yearnings can be rearranged in such a way that they still make satisfying sense.

    How then to choose? Is there a clinching argument available or does it really just come down to our personal experiences/tastes/needs? I do like the pragmatic idea that we remain open not just to listening to, but also to actually experiencing the views of others, all though in practice this is difficult. I suspect that's the only way of really seeing how good the personal fit is.

    This is one thing that I do find frustrating about the increasing militancy of the new atheists, they seem unprepared to walk in others' gardens, so to speak, and that impoverishes us all doesn't it?

    Thanks as always for your patience and generosity in the face of disagreement. I enjoy it.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  29. Bernard,

    I wrote: “It’s not like such a life is good because the brain of the person who has it feels happy. Rather that person (as well as those around her) feels happy because it is a good life.

    To which you responded: “This may be case, or perhaps it is the other way around.

    No, I think it’s demonstrably true that the latter is the case: Imagine you have a baby daughter and you receive a visit by a extraterrestrial from a vastly more advanced civilization, who proposes to take your daughter and plug here into a machine where she will live the longest possible life while her brain is fed signals that will make her feel as happy as biologically possible. Would you agree with the extraterrestrial’s suggestion?

    I know I wouldn’t, because I see clearly that having a brain that feels happiness is not what makes a good life. Which insight is relevant to the problem of evil by the way: if we value a good life over a happy life, so will God. The very interesting philosophical question then is what makes a good life.

    ReplyDelete
  30. Dianelos

    Here is where our intuitions part. I'd consider the alien's offer very carefully.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  31. Hi Dianelos,

    [...] having a brain that feels happiness is not what makes a good life.

    There is something that is puzzling me in connection with this idea of a good life. You can probably help me out here.

    Take your example of ET and the baby girl. You argue that ET's proposal should be rejected because the resulting life would not be a “good” one. I may misinterpret but this decision seems to be reached in an entirely rational manner: you have some notion of what a good life is, look at the proposal and conclude that it won't do.

    In my case I'm not sure at all I would ultimately make a rational decision in such a case. I would imagine the girl getting older, running in a field full of flowers (not very original I fear), laughing, and so on, all the good things, and I would think no, she can't miss that... Or, arguing for the other side, I would imagine all the terrible things she would avoid, and so on. I would certainly not invoke, as you do, any abstract notion of “good life” or such. The decision would end up being founded on strong emotions, probably rationalized in some way (because this is what we humans do).

    As I said, I no doubt misinterpret, but I find the abstract approach that comes out of your text coldly rational. In fact, I have had many discussions in which the notion of “good life” came up and, almost every time, I got the impression that the loser was the “life” part of it. There is some disconnect here and, the way it comes through, it's the “good life” that does not seem worth it.

    ReplyDelete
  32. Dianelos and JP

    The alien thought experiment challenges us to consider what happiness is all about, and whether one can aspire to anything more than that.

    I think the word happiness is perhaps too weak, as it is often associated with a transitory feeling of euphoria whereas, if I understand your proposition properly Dianelos, you are speaking of the greatest happiness possible. So this would include the joy of discovery, the contentment of a job well done, the glory of overcoming a hurdle, the joy of discovery, the tingle of anticipation, the thrill of connection with another, the peace of surrender, the whole works. The child gets all of this, and what's more, gets it for the longest available life span. A life of purpose, meaning and satisfaction (or at the very least, feeling exactly like that), lived not physically but through the brain. Remember the childhood joy of disappearing inside a wonderful book or film? Like that only infinitely better.

    And we would deprive a child of this heavenly existence why? My only reason would be a selfish one, because I would be deprived of sharing in this joy. I couldn't walk with them through their existence, I couldn't observe the joy, discuss the triumphs and honestly, take some credit for it. But that is an awfully low reason to submit my child instead to the fates, loaded as they are with depression, abuse, disease and despair. To my mind it would be cruel to unnecessarily subject my child to such pains in the name of this elusive, culturally defined 'good life.' I am tempted to see it as a peasant mentality, a version of the 'no, no, give me my suffering, life was never meant to be easy' that has through history served the ruling classes so very well.

    Bernard

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  33. Hi Bernard,

    I didn't take position one way or the other concerning ET & the baby girl. To be honest I admit that my first reaction is rather on the negative side but it's clear I'm not being very rational. In any case, my point was rather to question the concept of “good life”. I find the idea of an entirely rationally established life model slightly repulsive but I may misunderstand what philosophers mean by this.

    Let me downgrade the ET versus baby thought experiment and consider a more realistic situation. Suppose again you have a baby girl and that, due to some external circumstances, your life suddenly turns for the worse and all you can expect is a life of hardship (although not of extreme misery). You then learn that a well-to-do family would gladly adopt your child on the condition that you never try to see her again. They are good people and, in all probability, your baby would have a very happy life with them. What is the right decision? More generally, how bad must your situation be to make the deal acceptable?

    ReplyDelete
  34. Hi JP,

    You write: “You argue that ET's proposal should be rejected because the resulting life would not be a “good” one. I may misinterpret but this decision seems to be reached in an entirely rational manner: you have some notion of what a good life is, look at the proposal and conclude that it won't do.

    That’s not how I meant it. What I meant was that given ET’s proposal the parent must make a *value judgment*, namely to decide what is best for her daughter, i.e. what alternative life for her is more good. So the issue is indeed about what the good life is. And it seems there is a right value judgment and a wrong value judgment about this issue. I suppose one could call “rational” that the process by which one arrives at right value judgments, but that’s just a labeling issue.

    If we take a step back and consider the place of choices in our lives, I think we’ll see that even though the beliefs we hold (scientific and metaphysical) do affect how we choose, the value judgments we make affect them much more. If, as I trust we all agree, our choices greatly affect our future and thus ourselves, it seems we should be more concerned about making the right value judgments than about holding the right beliefs.

    Now we know quite a bit about how to choose beliefs well. In comparison it is quite a mystery about how one should choose values, notwithstanding the fact that we do make value judgments every day of our lives. Beliefs (scientific and metaphysical) can affect our value judgments, but only tangentially if at all (perhaps beliefs only affect the effect of our value judgments). Indeed despite their often diametrically opposed ontological beliefs most theists and naturalists agree about basic values, such as that freedom and justice are good things to live with, that honesty and charity and courage are good character traits to have, that love and beauty are good things to experience, that knowledge is a good thing to have and to give, that peaceful solutions are better than violent ones, that to torture a child for fun is a bad thing, that to live even when life is hard is better than not to live, and so on. I think it’s quite clear that we agree in our basic value judgments much more than we agree in our basic ontological beliefs. (Apart from the theist versus naturalist issue, consider how grave the internal disagreements are within each camp, naturalists disagreeing among themselves about whether there is one universe or many, and theists disagreeing among themselves about whether God’s perfection implies salvation for all or for a few.) It is remarkable that reality is such that it is easier to agree about what which value judgments are right and than about which beliefs about it are true.

    Still, agreements about value judgments are not complete. I introduced the ET’s proposal thought experiment to demonstrate that what we value is not “brain pleasure” by itself but something else which often leads to brain pleasure. I am not sure I have succeeded in that demonstration though.

    ReplyDelete
  35. Bernard,

    You write: “The child gets all of this, and what's more, gets it for the longest available life span.

    No, not at all. The child *may* get all of this if she stays with her parents. With ET she will get electrodes planted into her brain making her feel the greatest levels of pleasure which are biologically possible, while her body is kept alive for the longest possible time. What I was trying to show is that pleasure by itself is *not* what we value, or what characterizes the good life. I think it was Plato who said that pleasure is a good goal for cows, but not for people. (And, it goes without saying, not for God when S/He created people.)

    At this juncture it is perhaps a good idea to rewind the tape and see how we got to the ET’s proposal thought experiment in this thread: I first suggested a concept of truth based on pragmatism, i.e. the idea that true beliefs are those that tend to succeed in getting what we wish, which is, ultimately, to have a good life. To this you responded that perhaps theism is preferable in this sense not because it is true but because our brain tends to respond positively to the theistic story, and that it is for this reason that theists may ultimately be better off. To which I argued that you were putting the cart before the horse: It’s not like the kind of life we value is good because the brain of the person who has it feels happy. Rather that person feels happy because it is a good life. At this juncture I introduced the ET’s proposal thought experiment trying to demonstrate that mere “brain pleasure” is not what we value and hence what we wish for.

    My broader point is that to think about the brain is a waste of time, because one can easily accept that all our experiences and thoughts and beliefs and value judgments originate or have a physical analogue with particular brain processes, and be done with this issue. The question at hand is not how beliefs and value judgments are represented in our model of the physical universe, the question is which beliefs are true and which value judgments are right. To miss this point is to commit the so-called genetic fallacy (see: http://www.philosophicalsociety.com/Logical%20Fallacies.htm#genetic). Don’t you agree? Can you give an example of how studying the physical process that take place in our brain will in some way help us decide about which ontological beliefs are true or about what value judgments are right?

    ReplyDelete
  36. Hi Dianelos,

    [...] it is quite a mystery about how one should choose values [...]

    Do you really think we choose values? Or are they, so to speak, “imprinted” on us by our environment (some of them perhaps being innate)?

    It certainly does not feel as if I had any choice in many of the values I hold. Most, almost all, value judgments are made in what appears to be an entirely automatic process. Isn't also true that, in many cases, when someone acts contrary to some basic value he/she gets there by rationalizing away his/her instinctive judgment? I'd like your thoughts on this.

    ReplyDelete
  37. Dianelos

    Yes, clearly there s a difference between the shallow, transitory rush of a sensation which we might choose to call happiness, and that deeper sense of satisfaction and peace that we associate with a life well lived, and this how I interpret Plato's comment in this regard.

    So, if in your thought experiment our ETs can provide shallow but not deep happiness with their wonderful machine then of course it's a no-brainer. And so we are back to our old problem with thought experiments, tweak them any way you like. But, think of the power of a great novel to transport you and there is at least room for suspicion that a very deep level of experience can be achieved through nothing but stimulation of the brain (in this case through the patterns of letters on a page rather than electrodes).

    This though is not where the difference lies. Which value judgements are right? you ask. Well, you will know as well as I that this has changed from time to time and place to place. We appear to have some great flexibility in the way we respond to cultural processes. In each time and place we are tempted to believe ours is the best and most righteous perspective, but it is so very hard to know how future times will judge us (we will quite likely be seen as the generation that fiddled while the globe warmed I suppose).

    Some values appear to transport well across time and space which a theist may attribute to some greater influence, and a naturalist will attribute to evolutionary considerations. Our difference in this will be that I am, in the end, a moral relativist. I know what I believe is right, and when a community consensus can be built about such values I am interested in how best to achieve a world where theses values prevail. But this is for me nothing more than a pragmatic interest in finding peace in my life.

    I am suspicious of notions of absolute goodness, simply because history appears to show how very easily these can be co-opted into abuses of power. It seems to me a society where the constant negotiation of values is the norm does provide a more secure set of checks and balances. Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies is interesting on this.

    So your question about how studying the brain will tell us which value judgements are right doesn't work for me, just because the idea that there is such a thing as a right value judgement is not one I can grasp.

    Studying the brain can however transform the quality of life available to those suffering from mental illness, and their friends and families. In the best instances the transformations are life saving and life affirming. So the model that says in the end it does all come down to physical processes (not the same as saying all treatments should be chemically based by the way) does in some cases deepen our appreciation of life considerably.

    Bernard

    ReplyDelete
  38. Hi JP,

    You write: “Do you really think we *choose* values? Or are they, so to speak, “imprinted” on us by our environment (some of them perhaps being innate)?

    It certainly does not feel as if I had any choice in many of the values I hold. Most, almost all, value judgments are made in what appears to be an entirely automatic process. Isn't also true that, in many cases, when someone acts contrary to some basic value he/she gets there by *rationalizing away* his/her instinctive judgment? I'd like your thoughts on this.


    These are important and difficult questions. I wish there were a “philosophy of the human condition” to respond to them. All of knowledge ultimately rests on the human condition, so it would be very useful to have more clarity on this issue, especially given the fact that the human condition is not really a fixed thing.

    Let me first discuss the simpler question about whether one can choose beliefs. On one hand it would seem one can’t; it’s certainly not in my power of will to believe, say, that the capital city of Greece is London. On the other hand it’s clearly not the case that one’s choices do not affect one’s beliefs. So, for example, if I decide to read a book on Africa when I finish reading it I shall have different beliefs than I would if I had not decided to read it. To decide to think carefully and self-critically looking out for hidden assumptions, etc., will certainly impact my future beliefs. And so on.

    I think a similar state of affairs holds for values. I cannot choose values, on the other hand the values I have today are at least in part the result of the choices I have made in the past. As it happens I don’t like jazz, but I feel pretty confident that if I listened more carefully to it, discussed matters with my jazz loving wife, got to listen to some great jazz performances, I would finally recognize the value in jazz I don’t today. Here are some more cases: If we choose to forgive those who we feel have wronged us (and that is a choice we can make) then we shall value them more than if we choose to keep a grudge. In general if we choose to invest in a relationship we shall end valuing that relationship more.

    As far as I can see there are several important factors at play in the human condition, including values, beliefs, choices, thinking, and experiences – and also something about being consequent to one’s values and beliefs, which we might call “faith”. There is a complex and dynamic dialectic between these factors, in fact it seems to me that each one of them to some degree affects each one of the rest.

    ReplyDelete