I think it may be helpful to summarize some points from my last “distinctions” post and bring them to bear explicitly on the question of “objective morality.”
Given the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity offered in that earlier post, it should be clear what I mean by the term “objective morality.” Put simply, I have in mind the conjunction of the following two theses: (1) Some moral judgments are true and others are false; (2) What makes a moral judgment true (or false) is never merely the fact that the one making the judgment is in certain subjective states (most notably in possession of certain attitudes and preferences) with respect to what the judgment addresses.
In other words, if the judgment at issue is “Rape is wrong,” the fact that I disapprove of rape is not sufficient to make rape wrong. If rape is wrong (which I am convinced it is) then what makes it wrong is more than the mere fact that I happen to disapprove of it. By implication, the mere fact that someone else happens to approve of it is insufficient to make rape right “for them.” In short, to be an objectivist about morality is to hold that subject S’s approval/disapproval of action A is not sufficient to render A moral/immoral “for S.”
There are two important points I want to stress about “objective morality” conceived in this way—points that I think it is crucial to keep in mind for the sake of avoiding confusions of various sorts. Both points have been made in other posts, so this is largely an exercise in recapitulation and reframing.
First, to say that morality is objective in the indicated sense is not to say that human subjectivity plays no role in constituting morality. This was part of the point I was hoping to make with my earlier April Fools Day post about amusement. In order for there to be such a thing as “the funny”, there have to be creatures like us who react to things with amusement. In the absence of such creatures having such subjective responses, nothing would be funny. Funniness exists only in relation to risible beings. (I love the word "risible").
But it doesn’t follow that something is funny just in case one is amused by it—that, in other words, being in a subjective state of amusement is sufficient to make it true “for you” that it is funny. It doesn’t follow because it’s possible that Linda Zagzebski is right about emotions: they are “ways of seeing” things in the world (to be amused is to see something as funny; to be offended is to see something as rude) that can fit their intentional objects or not (in something like the way color experiences can fit with what is going on in the physical world—such that when you see something as red, you might be mistaken if, in fact, something has broken down in your color perception mechanisms so that color experiences no longer track the ways in which different objects differentially reflect different wavelengths of light).
(For more on this, see Zagzebski's book, Divine Motivation Theory).
The point is not to argue here that Zagzebski is right about emotional fittingness, but simply to stress that the fact that our subjective states are bound up with moral judgments is not enough to conclude that they aren’t objective in the sense I have in mind.
My second point is that to say morality is objective is different from saying that it is absolute. The former is about whether there is more needed for the truth of a moral judgment than the attitudes and preferences of the one making the judgment. The latter is about whether what is true of something in one context is necessarily true of it in all contexts. As I noted in a comment on my earlier post, even if the boiling point of water varied enormously from case to case, such that it was true of water that it boiled at precisely 100˚C only in very rare but specifiable contexts, it would still be objectively true that it boiled at 100˚C in those contexts.
To think of this distinction in connection with morality, it may be helpful to think of it in connection with a particular ethical theory. I choose one that I do not personally accept, but which has the virtue of being easy to quickly explain: A simple version of preference utilitarianism in its act utilitarian form. Act utilitarianism holds that the right action to perform in any situation is that act which, among all the available courses of actions, has the best results for all affected. But what makes the results “best”? For the simple preference utilitarian, the value of an action’s consequences is a function of the actual preferences of the individuals affected. In other words, preference utilitarianism has an entirely subjective standard of value: what is good for me is determined by my preferences; what is good for you is determined by yours, etc.
But the utilitarian is convinced that it is not rational for me, in decision making, to prioritize my good just because it is mine. I must extend equal consideration to the good of all. And your good is what it is based on your preferences, not mine. And this means your good is, for me, an objective fact I must come to grips with: My preferring that you prefer Bellini to Lady Gaga does not make it true that you prefer Bellini to Lady Gaga. And so, what is true about the general good is determined almost entirely apart from my subjective preferences (which only determine what is good for me). And what is right for me to do is whatever maximizes the good of all affected—in other words, whatever does the most to satisfy the most preferences (typically weighted in terms of importance to the person).
Now as I said, I introduce this theory solely because it is a fairly simple one to understand, and hence one that can be introduced quickly for the sake of applying the absolutist/objective distinction to morality. What I want to do is suppose—purely for the sake of argument—that this form of utilitarianism is correct. If it is correct, what that means is that a judgment such as “John’s lying to Susan about his affair was wrong” is true or false based not merely (or even mainly) on the subjective attitudes of the one making the judgment, but based on the actual effect that John’s lying to Susan had on the welfare of everyone effect, where their welfare is conceived in terms of their actual preferences. And so, “John’s lying to Susan about his affair was wrong” is going to be either objectively true or objectively false, depending on the actual effects of the lie in the specific case.
But it should be clear that, given this version of utilitarianism, the moral status of lying will be highly context dependent. We will have to look at instances of lying on a case-by-case basis. In one set of circumstances lying may be the thing that does the best job of satisfying the most preferences. In another it may not. And so, if this theory is right, the moral status of lying will be highly context-dependent; but in each case, whether the lie is moral or not will depend on its total impact on preference-satisfactions, not on the approval or disapproval of the one making the judgment. Those who make moral judgments can therefore be mistaken. They can disapprove of what is right and approve of what is wrong—because the truth or falsity of such moral judgments is more than a matter of taste. Even though moral truth is highly contextual on this theory, it remains objective in the indicated sense.
I should also note how this theory is related to culture. Clearly, culture strongly influences our preferences. As such, cultural context becomes enormously significant for determining what is right and wrong. But it doesn’t follow that morality is determined by culture. If the preference utilitarian theory is right, whole cultures can be mistaken in their moral judgments. For example, a culture might maintain that the enslavement of blacks is morally acceptable—but if the preference-satisfactions enjoyed by the beneficiaries of slavery are outweighed by the thwarting of the slaves’ preferences, the practice would be wrong despite the culture’s endorsement. Put another way, in this theory cultural context plays a role in what is morally true, but culture cannot dictate moral truth.
Even if you reject this species of utilitarianism (as I do, for reasons I won’t get into here), you might still believe that this theory is onto something. You might think (as I do) that the effect of one’s actions on human welfare is part of what makes them right or wrong, and that human preferences are part of what constitutes human welfare (and hence that welfare is partly a function of culture). And if so, then you will think that context—including cultural context—will play a big role in determining what is right or wrong. And so you will not be a moral absolutist. But that doesn’t mean you won’t be an objectivist.
Hi Eric,
ReplyDeleteYes, if one accepts this version of utilitarianism (or another ethical theory) as a premise it becomes possible to objectively evaluate moral claims relative to this theory (at least in principle).
But isn't this moving the question from specific moral claims to the issue of which, if any, ethical theory is “right”? If so, the problem remains, I think.
"In short, to be an objectivist about morality is to hold that subject S’s approval/disapproval of action A is not sufficient to render A moral/immoral “for S.”"
ReplyDeleteThat is very interesting. I had assumed your definition would be something more positive and stringent.. that the objective moral is a property of reality in general, not solely of of us as feeling, subjective beings. Because even the subjective moralist doesn't sanction everyone to do whatever they please at any moment. Subjective morality accommodates (as it must) a corporate / communal sense of morals, by which we decide en masse that rape is bad, even if we or someone else in the society were to be mometarily tempted by it, because the consequences for our long-term happiness (subjective) are negative.
Other societies, incidentally, may (and have, I think) decide en masse (among the males, probably) that rape is good, or at least perfectly acceptable. At that point, that is what it is, however strenuously I and many others might argue that they are wrong and blighted in their mysogeny. Morals are not, for the most part, individual properties, but are corporate properties.. rules for how we treat each other. When I claim that a moral is "wrong", I may be saying that it is illigitimately arrived at (perhaps only takes into account the interests of some, at the extreme expense of disenfranchised others), or that in the long run, it has pernicious effects that others may not see as clearly.
All these are based on subjective evaluations of what makes people happiest. I think the franchise issue is perhaps the closest possible thing to objectivity, since if classes of people are excluded from moral decisions, the process doesn't do its Rawlsian job. That said, the point is to allow those otherwise excluded to express their quite subjective preferences in the corporate moral decisions.
To come back to our own society, I might well say that capitalism is immoral, for plenty of fine reasons of immediate feeling and empathy. But since it is a practical system, it is deemed moral, despite its countless drawbacks and injustices. So we are always making subjective and utilitarian tradeoffs and calling them moral, sometimes even objective.
"Even though moral truth is highly contextual on this theory, it remains objective in the indicated sense."
I don't think this is actually so. The judgement you are making here is a vast sum over all the utilities of everyone that flows from this act. But each utility is individually subjective. So however complex and implacable the calculation of "goodness" or "wrong", its criteria are all subjective, and will change as the subjective desires and viewpoints of the "everyone" change through time. The whole exercise is thus subjective, not objective.
This goes to the point you float at the top, that objectivity means that a moral rule is not purely self-oriented and self-derived, but takes others into account. This is quite insufficient to claim the field for objective morals.
Eric
ReplyDeleteTwo questions hover over such discussions for me. First, how could we possibly know (in the sense that reasonable people could be expected to agree) whether there are or are not objective moral values? It seems to me any evidence in favour for their existence is either of the hunch variety, or is identical to the evidence for a set of subjective preferences. And trickier, perhaps, if such things do exist, how would we get any reliable information about them? In other words, how to rule out that objectively speaking, rape is good, despite the fact that it repulses us?
Bernard
Hi Burk
ReplyDeleteI think the argument is that the decision to apply such a sum of personal preferences algorithm is itself the objective part. So, if moral good truly is determined by such an equation, then it is objective in the sense that this, and not some alternative ethical model, is the correct one. And here I agree with JP, this just shifts the problem to showing that our preference for one ethical model over another is not itself subjective.
That would seem to me to require a demonstration that there is some mechanism by which knowledge of the true ethical system might leak in to our human brain. For me this is where the existence of an alternative theory; the well established explanation of evolutionary and cultural pressures on preferences, becomes pertinent. Wouldn't the objectivist have to show their model of knowledge accumulation is both plausible, and more sound than the established alternative? Preferably by some form of evidential test. This is the means by which physical explanations are usually established, and the ethics-in-the-brain model appears, at least as I understand it at the moment (and I look forward to the subsequent posts on this) to be a physical one.
Bernard
My friend and co-author, John, has a computer that doesn't play well with blogger, such that virtually all his attempts to post comments here have failed (and no, they don't go to my spam filter either). Nevertheless, he occasionally e-mails me helpful comments. Here is what he has to say with respect to the current post:
ReplyDeleteIn order to make clear some points in your last post it might help to note that if there were no minds then nothing would, strictly speaking, be true or false, but it doesn’t follow from that that just thinking that something it true makes it so. For a belief is true just in case it corresponds with what is the case, and even if there were no minds there could be states of affairs that obtained and others that didn’t (i.e. there could be truth makers even if there were no truth bearers). Similarly, even if there were no minds, it could be true that there are possible states which are such that, if they obtained, it would be fitting for any possible mind that perceived their obtaining to have certain emotional responses to them and inappropriate to have others. Finally, before any humans existed there was nothing that had the intrinsic value characteristic of humans, but it was still the case, even then, that humans could exist—let us suppose this was true in virtue of the property “being a human being”—then it seems it is essentially true of that property that anything that instantiated it would have more intrinsic value than anything that instantiated the property “being a pile of *!$%!”.
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteRegarding this: I think the argument is that the decision to apply such a sum of personal preferences algorithm is itself the objective part. So, if moral good truly is determined by such an equation, then it is objective in the sense that this, and not some alternative ethical model, is the correct one.
This is right. Note, however, that I was simply inviting readers to assume for the sake of argument that simple preference utilitarianism describes the truth-maker for moral utterances, since on that assumption moral truth would be objective but highly contextual, thereby helping to highlight the distinction between objectivism and absolutism in ethics.
With respect to the deeper question of whether morality is IN FACT objective in the indicated sense, one onviously cannot answer this by simply assuming that a certain moral theory is correct which, if it were, would render morality objective. Because, of course, there are many different rival moral theories (and the one I introduced for the sake of highlighting the distinction is one I don't accept in any event).
In the case of this simple form of preference utilitarianism, establishing it as true would require defending its key contentions against challenge. For example, the simple identification of welfare with the satisfaction of actual preferences faces the problem of accounting for cases in which people get what they want only to find it utterly dissatisfying. One way to address this problem is to revamp the theory in terms of hypotheticals: Well-being is identified with the preferences one WOULD have under conditions of complete knowledge of what it would mean to have those preferences satisfied. But Robert Adams and others have raised some significant challenges to this hypothetical reformulation.
And that's just one set of challenges.
The question is whether think there is promise in this task of developing alternative moral theories, subjecting them to critical challenge, refining them in the light of challenges, comparing evolving contenders against one another, pursuing syntheses of the most robust contenders (finding more enveloping theoretic perspectives that unify what had previously been distinct moral theories), etc.
Put another way, "the issue of which, if any, ethical theory is 'right'" (to borrow JP's terms) cannot be simply ignored or assumed away--but neither should the question be treated as merely rhetorical. There may well be productive ways of critically assessing and developing rival theories (I'm convinced there are). The fact that this process of critical assessment hasn't yet demonstrated that one existing theory is unassailably correct doesn't mean that the correctness of a theoretic perspective is wholly subjective (that for a theory to be a good one, it is sufficient that I have a subjective state of approval towards it).
For example, many of my religious students go into the class discussion about the "Pure Divine Command Theory of Ethics" approving of it. But few who understand the criticisms of it continue to approve of it. Rather, they conclude that they had naively approved of a bad theory, one which has now been shown to be bad.
But when it comes to ethical theory we face the prospect of pluralism--that is, the prospect that while there are some moral theories that are just bad, once we have refined the contenders as far as possible in terms of the standards of coherence and explanatory power, more than one contender remains--and no further critical will ever narrow it down to a single "right" theory.
ReplyDeleteBut suppose that each remaining theory is such that it provides a basis for deciding moral questions that goes beyond mere appeal to one's private subjective states; and suppose, furthermore, that with respect to very many moral questions, each remaining theory gives exactly the same answer (there is enormous convergence among the chief philosophical contenders today, so this seems not-so-far-fetched a possibility to me). Suppose all of them condemn rape. In that case, isn't there a sense in which rape is objectively wrong even if it is just a matter of subjective preference which of the remaining "acceptable moral theories" one happens to adopt?
We might say, "By any plausible account of morality, rape is wrong. Hence, rape is wrong regardless of your subjective preferences." The point is that it is at least conceivable that specific moral judgments of this sort are objectively true even if on the theoretic level there isn't one objectively true theory (but many objectively false ones).
Burk,
ReplyDeleteWith respect to this: "I had assumed your definition would be something more positive and stringent.. that the objective moral is a property of reality in general..."
You may have been anticipating a definition of moral realism. Objectivism and realism in ethics are related, but one can be an objectivist without being a realist. The realist takes it that moral properties such as "right" and "good" are part of the furniture of the universe" (to borrow a phrase from Erik Wielenberg)--real properties that are not reducible to physical properties.
The difference between objectivism and realism in ethics might be helpfully understood in terms of the Platonic realism ascribed to by some mathematicians with respect to such mathematical entities as numbers. Are numbers "real"? Even those who say no still think that "2+2=4" is objectively true (it isn't rendered false for you just because you happen to have a certain mental attitude towards it, say of disbelief).
I’d like to comment on John’s email. He writes: “ In order to make clear some points in your last post it might help to note that if there were no minds then nothing would, strictly speaking, be true or false, but it doesn’t follow from that that just thinking that something it true makes it so.”
ReplyDeleteOf course it’s not the case that thinking that something is true makes it so. On the other hand it’s not just “strictly speaking” but “clearly” the case that if there were no minds then there would be no truths. Now “truth” is a difficult concept, but it is clear that it can’t be separated from minds. For example most people would agree that truth is a property of beliefs, and beliefs cannot exist without minds.
“For a belief is true just in case it corresponds with what is the case, and even if there were no minds there could be states of affairs that obtained and others that didn’t (i.e. there could be truth makers even if there were no truth bearers).”
Here I have a serious objection. First of all, how can we possibly know that “even if there were no minds there could be states of affairs that obtained and others that didn’t”? And secondly and far more seriously, the problem I see here is that this innocuous sounding phrase makes only sense within a non theistic view of reality. A theist should not express ideas in a way that does not make sense within a theistic understanding of reality, because doing so is hugely misleading. After all, just making sense of what the idea means is to conceptualize a non-theistic reality, and that’s certainly not what the theist has in mind. What most bothers me is that theists who use that kind of language may end up misleading themselves. Theism entails a relationship between thought and objects (such as states of affairs) which I think renders unintelligible any proposition of the form “even if there were no minds X would obtain”.
Here is my larger point: I see much of philosophical discourse being dominated by language coined by naturalists in their effort to make sense of their God-absent worldview. Which is entirely natural. But why should theists emulate that language? Language is not neutral nor inert; quite on the contrary it has the power to move one’s thoughts. Therefore a theist should always use language which comports with the foundations of one’s metaphysical worldview.
Perhaps the idea is to find a language which comports both with naturalism and theism. This can’t work I think, for the two worldviews are completely different. Such language may lead many people to believe that theism is nothing more than the idea that there is not just the universe but the universe plus God. Perhaps the theistic philosopher thinks that a common language is necessary for communicating with non-theists, but this too I think is wrong. For what ultimately must be communicated is the theistic mindset (or the theistic way of being), and that cannot be communicated using language which does not make sense within theism.
The only common ground language that can be used in philosophical discourse is language that refers to the common ground that actually exists, which is the human condition. So, for example, if a theistic ethicist wants to discuss ethics in a way that is intelligible to non-theists, the theistic ethicist should use exclusively language that speaks to or refers to the human condition – i.e. a humanist language. The theistic meta-ethicist cannot speak in a way that is not explicitly theistic, simply because on theism the very meaning of ethical talk is directly grounded in God. (Come to think of it, it is possible to talk ethics without reference to God only because we are made in the image of God.)
Hi Eric
ReplyDeleteI may have mistaken what you were claiming for objective morality. Certainly the method you outline here seems reasonable. Any society with civil ambition should, I think, concern itself with the building of ethical systems, for the sake of its own stability and the fulfillment of its citizens.
Any such attempt will presumably be constrained by the nature of those citizens, their natural sympathies and yearnings. It is unlikely to succeed if it is inconsistent with our evolved instincts, nor our cultured aspirations. Presumably, to be sold as a working model, it will have to appeal to our need for coherence and meaning. And presumably, if it is to achieve any sort of longevity, it will promote a type of harmony.
Such systems will also presumably be dynamic; both respectful of the great ethical traditions of the past, and mindful of our everchanging circumstances.
Given these constraints, I would expect a great many systems to reach broadly similar conclusions over a range of issues (and to be stumped by a great many too). If we are to define moral objectivity as the measurement of goodness against any such emerging consensus, then I would happily call myself a moral objectivist.
However, at times you seem to be making a stronger claim; namely that this consensus, to the extent it exists, reflects more than just the physical history of the species. In other words, that for a thing to be right, it needs to have some quality other than the tendency of a certain group of people, at a certain point in time, to call it right (either instinctively, or as the outcome of a rigourous process of rational enquiry). I'm not seeing what this extra thing is, yet, unless we make the assumption that such a process of enquiry, by its nature and the nature of the universe, will bring us close to deeper truths.
Sounds a bit like Hegel again, perhaps? I don't pretend to understand him yet.
Bernard
Bernard,
ReplyDeleteThe gesture towards Hegel is apt, because I DO believe that as societies wrestle with moral issues in the face of the human condition and lived experience, what is happening is that they are revising their moral understanding under the influence of a "noumenal reality" that transcends direct experience.
And so I do think that the ethical is in a deep sense part of the fabric of reality, something we encounter in our life journeys that challenges and transforms us. Can I prove that? Probably not.
But I think it is important to distinguish this view from ethical objectivism. The idea that there are standards we can and should invoke in the assessment of moral claims--standards which transcend subjective attitudes--is defensible apart from the conviction that the noumenal reality behind and beyond phenomena is in some fundamental sense ethical.
Eric,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “And so I do think that the ethical is in a deep sense part of the fabric of reality, something we encounter in our life journeys that challenges and transforms us. Can I prove that? Probably not.”
I wonder about that. I think that existential truths can be proven on the existential level, which is the only level where they can meaningfully be proven.
I mean take a physical truth such as “if you sufficiently cool liquid water it will turn into a solid”. How does one prove that proposition? By inviting others to make the relevant experiment in the physical dimension of the human condition and see for themselves. Exactly analogously, I think, one proves that the ethical is part of the fabric of reality by inviting others to live in such a way that this property of reality will transform them in an enriching way. That such a spiritual experiment is far more difficult to carry out than a physical experiment such as freezing water does not mean that spiritual truths cannot be proven. The only difference I think is that one cannot videotape such spiritual experiments, which, given that these are existential and not physical experiments, is no surprise.
Dianelos,
ReplyDeleteI'm sympathetic to what you say here, since the reason why I am convinced that in some sense the ethical is built into the fabric of reality is because my experience so closely fits this description. But, of course, there are those who are inclined to explain away the experiences that lend themselves to this description in terms of reductionist physicalist accounts. And there are those who--perhaps for reasons that can be helpfully characterized in terms of your landscape metaphor--don't know what I'm talking about when I say this. And then there are those who have this experience, are not ready to explain it away reductionistically, but for other reasons are resistant to describing it in these terms.
Perhaps what I should have said is that, in such cases, I'm not convinced that I can offer a proof in the sense of offering a non-question-begging argument whose premises are accepted by the skeptic and which implies moral realism.
What I can do is invite reflection on their moral experiences as participants in communal life shaped by (evolving) moral norms, where such participation and reflection on experience is informed by their own best efforts at careful thinking and the insights of other careful thinkers. And I can be a conversation partner in this process.
What I want to say, however, is that if one is convinced in advance that moral and value judgments are wholly subjective, in the sense of being true or false entirely by reference to the subjective states that the person making the judgment happens to be in, then this process of communal inquiry will seem pointless. If there's nothing to be learned--no improvement to be made in one's judgments, since they'll be perfectly right so long as they are honestly expressed--well, why bother to participate in the collective endeavor? As such, a presumption of objectivism (in the modest sense defined here) seems crucial.
Hi, Eric-
ReplyDelete"What I want to say, however, is that if one is convinced in advance that moral and value judgments are wholly subjective, in the sense of being true or false entirely by reference to the subjective states that the person making the judgment happens to be in, then this process of communal inquiry will seem pointless."
Not true at all. Firstly, communal morals arise after negotiation among the subjective individuals.. if each gives their input, then there has to be a communal process of negotiation that turns individual sentiments into a cultural rule. We enforce rules against murder, even on those sentimentally inclined towards it, because it serves most of us in society, and often the murderer as well, in the very long run.
Secondly, communal inquiry is essential in bringing out utilitarian consequences of any moral position for our consideration. Societies are complex, and change tends to have far-reaching and unintended consequences. The gay marriage and rights issue touches on this, where some believe this change in cultural mores will .. bring the gay agenda into kindergartens, and destroy the Western way of life generally. A good deal of discussion and inquiry is needed to help a society look ahead as it re-visions its moral code.
Thirdly, we are impressionable, social beings, whose sentiments are subject to persuasion and inspiration. Why else is the religious right so hell-bent on running our social & political institutions? They know, as much as god may be responsible for every breath of wind and every flea on every dog, that temporal social influence counts for a lot if you know what's right and what's wrong for others to do. Education can open one's eyes to whole vistas of "what is good" that the untutored moralist wouldn't have any idea about, just as education in music can open similar vistas in artistic experience.
Just positing that the subjective position is unimprovable if honestly expressed is far from a realistic portrayal of our true moral lives, and it doesn't require moral objectivity to see that, only an open-ness to true inquiry, which can show us many ways to get to the ultimate good we want ... happiness.
Eric
ReplyDeleteI'm still not sure subjective isn't being used in two different senses in this conversation. To clarify, are you holding that our moral judgements are objective in the same sense that our judgements about what makes good food are objective?
With food, although individual bring their own personal tastes to the table, there exists a culinary history that might be thought of as a experimental negotiation over time. Through this, traditions both of food preparation and judgement have arisen. Restaurant critics exist because we buy into the idea of a shared appreciation of these negotiated standards. I can't see any difference between the ethical negotiation you have outlined and the way we approach food (unless something like Hegel is introduced).
And, I would still prefer to use the word subjective to describe such a process of developing collective tastes, simply because in the end that traditions upon which it is grounded are taste based. Doesn't objective carry a connotation of being about more than taste? Perhaps this is just a difference in language preference, or a difference between everyday use and the tradition that has arisen within philosophy.
Bernard
Hi eric,
ReplyDeleteIf there's nothing to be learned--no improvement to be made in one's judgments, since they'll be perfectly right so long as they are honestly expressed [...]
You're losing me here. I don't understand your point at all.
Perhaps an analogy will be helpful. Certainly no one believes that there is anything absolute, universal, embedded in the fabric of reality, or what have you, in enjoying good food. What we humans like is no doubt entirely grounded in our biology.
Yet, this sense may be trained, improved. We may learn to appreciate subtle tastes that evaded us before, and so on. All this, presumably, because we have some built-in capacity that allows us to enjoy food and learn to tap into it more efficiently. And all this, moreover, without any thought of looking for “gastronomical truth”.
Of course if you see moral improvement as the process of looking for “moral truth”, you need to assume that such truths exists. But, even if they don't, the idea of moral improvement (perhaps in the sense of aiming for more moral “satisfaction”?) seems legitimate - as well as the process of communal inquiry you describe.
In any case, I wonder if looking at morality in terms of truth and falsehood makes sense at all.
Hi Bernard,
ReplyDeleteJust saw you came out with the same food analogy a few minutes ahead of me...
Must be a good one!
Eric,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “But, of course, there are those who are inclined to explain away the experiences that lend themselves to this description in terms of reductionist physicalist accounts.”
The physical closure of the universe plus the supervenience of the mental on the physical (i.e. the perfect correlation between mental and physical) on the one hand do make naturalism internally coherent (and indeed unfalsifiable as long as these two principles hold up to scrutiny) but on the other hand do not in any way contradict moral realism. They are not even relevant to moral realism, according to which moral values are a non-physical property of reality. Thus, those who think that the physical closure of the universe plus the supervenience of the mental have some relevance to bear on the question of moral realism are wrong.
“And there are those who--perhaps for reasons that can be helpfully characterized in terms of your landscape metaphor--don't know what I'm talking about when I say this. ”
Or at least some people say they don’t know what you’re talking about. I am personally
Inclined to be skeptical of peoples’ talk, for it does happen sometimes that people (whether theist or naturalist) simply boast. Here’s what troubles me: Even though I am confident that the landscape metaphor is valid, I am not confident about the shape of that landscape any small distance away from where I am or where I’ve been. But the human condition has many dimensions and, at least, I think I understand the mindset of the consistent naturalist pretty well.
“And then there are those who have this experience, are not ready to explain it away reductionistically, but for other reasons are resistant to describing it in these terms.”
Here the epistemic circumstances distinction is relevant I think. Those who have had the relevant experience (i.e. have performed the relevant spiritual experiment in their lives and have seen with their own eyes that the spiritual claim is true) as well as those who while not having had that experience themselves are confident that others do - come at different epistemic circumstances, and basically the religiously inclined, the agnostically inclined, and the naturalistically inclined. The latter two may point to the physical closure of the universe and the supervenience of the mental and claim that our brain is fooling us. But the latter two should consider this: First, that at some point to interpret away consistent and useful experiences as illusions becomes intellectually untenable. And, secondly, that at some point the “our brain is fooling us” defeater becomes self-defeating. In other words moral non-realism at some point becomes unvible. Which comports well with the fact that so many non-theists are moral realists and/or objectivists despite the problem that moral realism and/or objectivism suffers from in non-theistic worldviews.
[continues bellow
(this is a repost)
ReplyDelete[2nd part; continues from above]
“Perhaps what I should have said is that, in such cases, I'm not convinced that I can offer a proof in the sense of offering a non-question-begging argument whose premises are accepted by the skeptic and which implies moral realism.”
An experiential proof of the proposition “if you do this then you’ll experience that” does not use any premises nor makes any question-begging assumptions, whether in the contexts of physics or in the context of religion. So for example one can test for oneself that water freezes at low temperatures quite independently of one’s metaphysical assumptions or commitments. Exactly the same goes for spiritual experiments; the only difference being that non-spiritual people are less apt to try them, or may at some point fail to understand the language of the spiritual claim and thus find themselves at a loss of how to perform the experiment even if they wanted to. But here too there is a symmetry between the physical and the spiritual. After all, somebody who doesn’t know what “water” means or what “to cool” means etc. will not be able to understand the proposition “if you sufficiently cool liquid water it will turn into a solid”. So, if the existential distance is sufficiently large both physical and spiritual claims become unprovable, simply because they become cognitively meaningless.
My larger point is that the subjective/objective distinction has driven a wedge into philosophical discourse that shouldn’t be there. There is a difference in degree, but not a difference in kind, between so-called objective and so-called subjective claims to truth.
Burk, Bernard, and JP:
ReplyDeleteTime for some more distinctions. Very quickly, since I have a busy day and my son just woke up:
There's a difference between communal negotiation and communal inquiry. Someone who is committed to subjectivism would clearly still have reasons to engage in communal negotiation. My point is about inquiry--that is, investigation into rival accounts of what makes moral claims true or false. While some such accounts appeal to negotiation--either actual (Hobbes) or hypothetical (Rawls) in offering an account of what makes moral claims true or false--not all do.
I should clarify that with respect to the food analogy, I'm not saying that culinary arts arise out of negotiation (although something like the negotiation of diverse tastes may be part of it, there is also the issue of cultivation of tastes, refinement of discernment of various flavors,etc.). But the collective enterprise that generates the art of cooking and the appreciation of that art is distinct from the collective inquiry into what gastronomic judgments are about. That inquiry in relation to morality cannot ignore the hypothesis that moral judgments are exactly analogous to gastronomic ones, but the inquiry is derailed if it is assumed that morality must be just like taste because one takes it for granted (refuses to question) the presumption that morality is subjective in just the way that taste is.
"My point is about inquiry--that is, investigation into rival accounts of what makes moral claims true or false. While some such accounts appeal to negotiation--either actual (Hobbes) or hypothetical (Rawls) in offering an account of what makes moral claims true or false--not all do."
ReplyDeleteSo you seem to define inquiry as the exercise of considering morals as objective and trying to divine their objective nature, source, or foundation. Obviously, that predisposes your entire discussion. And it might better be called research. Perhaps it would be better carried out by ethical philosophers cum theologians devising moral-ometers which get put on rockets and launched into space!
I would argue that "inquiry" can take many different forms, as indicated above. Indeed, making an inquiry into the sentiments, theories, and feelings of others would seem closer to the word itself, than the frankly creative endeavor of calling rape objectively "wrong".
"...the inquiry is derailed if it is assumed that morality must be just like taste because one takes it for granted (refuses to question) the presumption that morality is subjective in just the way that taste is."
The problem is that morality is presumtively subjective, because all we have to go on initially are our feelings about moral rights and wrongs. That is their base expression, just as our gastronomic judgements are based on what tastes good and bad. Whether anyone can demonstrate some other bolt from the blue in terms of universal and objective morals is then a separate matter, one that remains, frankly, to be shown, despite the millennia of fraudulent scripture-writing, divine inspiration, tablet-finding, etc. which have put the theory of objective morals into such disrepute.
Burk,
ReplyDelete"The problem is that morality is presumtively subjective, because all we have to go on initially are our feelings about moral rights and wrongs."
You are begging the question. You are saying we can't consider what Eric is suggesting because Eric is wrong. Well...okay...but how does that help? After all, all these posts are an attempt to show why we don't have to necessarily presume that morality is subjective.
Hi, Darrell-
ReplyDeleteI was not saying the any other theory is wrong, only that we start in one place, which is the subjective place, since morals express our preferences most immediately. It is true that many people believe they start elsewhere, like from morals written down in their traditions, absolute pronouncements, tablets, etc. But if we think about it more than a second, those all reduce down to subjective sources.
The question Eric is trying to address is whether, if one thinks even more about it, it would be fair to characterize our preferences or at least the rules we eventually come up with as having more universal sources, perhaps following some pattern of reality, etc. I was not trying to prejudge that, only clarify where the discussion would necessarily begin from.
What is the simplest moral dictum? Perhaps something like .. "don't pull your sister's hair; how would you feel if someone pulled your hair?" There is a logic to it, but really, it is based on feelings that others have, which can be reflected empathically by us with a bit of cultivation and inspiration, resulting in our own happiness being enhanced, living as we do in a social system. And the parents pursue this moral instinctively & subjectively. Whether they are also perceiving something objective is open to debate.
Eric
ReplyDeleteI think I am still misunderstanding you here. Certainly I would acknowledge that the enterprise by which we examine our moral code is more likely to be successful if we are open to all possibilities, including those that have at their base a belief in moral objectivity.
I would also agree that the tendency of different models to converge on particular conclusions can tell us something important about those conclusions.
And, I would agree that to prejudge the existence of objective morals is unhelpful. My starting position is that I don't know whether our moral judgements refer to something beyond our own tastes, and nor can I yet see how we ever could know.
But, in none of this agreement can I see the existence of objective morality that you apparently are getting at. Through examining their convergences and divergences of the various ethical systems, and perhaps creating our own personal synthesis; we may move towards systems that are more satisfying, more effective at delivering our social goals or whatever. But as I see it, the criteria for progress here is still subjective. Our call on what constitutes a successful ethical system will still be determined by the things we subjectively value, won't it (stability or freedom? present or future? harmony or contestability? outcome or opportunity? individual or society? etc)
Bernard
John asked me to post this follow-up to his previous post:
ReplyDeleteDianelos,
I want to further explain my last post because I fear that you have misunderstood it. When I said in it that without minds there would be no truth, strictly speaking, I had in mind the Scholastic notion of ontological truth. The Scholastics thought that other things besides beliefs can be said to be “true” in some sense, e.g. “That is a true rose (not an artificial one)”, “He is a true friend (not a seeming one)”. Saying such things is a way of denominating beings according to the “transcendental (i.e. necessary) relation” they have to the intellect. It is, in fact, the way the Scholastics made the point that true beliefs require truth makers, i.e. real entities in virtue of which they are true. Being a realist I take it that no belief is true simply because some person believes it is. I think this applies to God Himself—all His beliefs are true because they correspond to what is, not because He believes them.
I agree with you that the non-existence of God (and hence of truth strictly speaking) is metaphysically impossible (though I admit that, for all I know, this isn’t the case), but composed my post the way I did in order to shed light on some things Eric was saying about morally fitting and unfitting emotions, using an analogy with truth that I thought a naturalist could understand. Burke and Bernard agree with Eric that moral judgments involve an emotional component, but this causes them to agree with Hume that moral judgments are subjective and, in some sense, arbitrary (even though they think we can explain the fact that, e.g. most people don’t find torture funny, by appealing to evolution). My point was just this –the fact that value judgments intrinsically involve an emotional component no more makes them subjective in the relevant sense than the fact that truth, strictly speaking, intrinsically involves a mental component makes truth subjective. In fact, insofar as moral subjectivists follow Hume in thinking that the emotive component of value judgments entails that such judgment are subjective, it seems to me that they make a mistake similar to one that anti-realists about truth make, i.e. they think that the intrinsically mental nature of truth entails truth is subjective and this drives them to non-cognitivist theories of truth that mirror non-cognitivist theories of value.
Thanks John
ReplyDeleteA useful clarification. If I have indeed suggested that moral judgements are necessarily subjective, then I am wrong for just the reasons you suggest. I am happy to concede that there may be things called objective moral standards out there, although I have a difficult time imagining what sort of thing they are.
There is however a second sense in which we speak of things being objective or subjective, and my failure to differentiate clearly may have caused confusion.
This sense relates to the way in which we choose between competing hypotheses when building our models of the world, be they physical, moral or whatever. The extent to which our personal narratives sway our choices might be thought of as the extent to which our decisions are subjective (and here I agree with Dianelos, we are talking difference of degree rather than difference of kind).
So, for example, I once had the great pleasure of discussing our obligations towards animals with Peter Singer over dinner. Although we disagreed, I would argue that our disagreement was in the end based upon our personal stories, how we each feel about and conceive of animals. It is possible in this case to understand another's point of view while not being compelled to embrace it.
Contrast this to a disagreement I have witnessed first hand in the physical sciences, regarding the possible historical submergence of New Zealand. In this case, the two parties, while disagreeing, are able to agree on principle as to what discoveries would defeat their position. Each view is held subject to future evidence. The views being falsifiable, the research continues in the realistic hope of resolution.
So, we might say that objective physical world, whatever it is really like, shapes our models through its impact upon the predictions they make about it. I'm not yet clear how any potential objective moral world might shape our ethical models. In this sense I'd be loathe to use the term objective to describe the method of enquiry.
Bernard
Burk,
ReplyDelete“I was not saying the any other theory is wrong, only that we start in one place, which is the subjective place, since morals express our preferences most immediately. It is true that many people believe they start elsewhere, like from morals written down in their traditions, absolute pronouncements, tablets, etc. But if we think about it more than a second, those all reduce down to subjective sources.”
Well many people have thought about it for more than a second and disagree. You are confusing the sense in which subjective is being used. Do we all have to subjectively evaluate, reflect upon, and consider how we feel about an action, an omission, a law, a taboo, or any other moral or ethical stimulus, of course we do. Does that mean that morality cannot be objective? Of course not.
As noted by Eric’s friend, John:
“My point was just this –the fact that value judgments intrinsically involve an emotional component no more makes them subjective in the relevant sense than the fact that truth, strictly speaking, intrinsically involves a mental component makes truth subjective.”
John,
ReplyDeleteYou write: “ I think this applies to God Himself—all His beliefs are true because they correspond to what is, not because He believes them. ”
There is clearly some truth to the correspondence theory of truth, but this is clearly not the whole truth. If theism is true, then philosophy is but a stepping stone towards theology, so I’d like to share here something theological I have read and which shook my philosophical foundations. Here it goes: When Pilate asked Jesus “What is truth?”, Jesus remained quiet not because He couldn’t answer or wished not to answer, but because Pilate’s question was a false one. Had Pilate asked “Who is truth?” then Jesus would have immediately answered “I am”.
The point I think is that at its core the nature of truth is personal. It is among others the objective/subjective (objective:certain/subjective:uncertain) distinction I have been ranting against of lately which holds us from recognizing this.
Now the metaphysical distance between us and God is so great that it is always dangerous to apply human concepts to God. But in the analogous way that “to believe” applies to God, I wonder if it is not proper to hold that what makes X true is that God “believes” it. Similarly it may be proper to hold that reality exists in that God “thinks” of it.
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[2nd part, continues from above]
ReplyDelete“My point was just this –the fact that value judgments intrinsically involve an emotional component no more makes them subjective in the relevant sense than the fact that truth, strictly speaking, intrinsically involves a mental component makes truth subjective.”
I agree. I think you are saying that an ontology that has trouble making sense of moral talk will for the same reason have trouble making sense of rational talk. At a recent debate between William Lane Craig and physicist Lawrence Krauss, Krauss argued that if nature and logic conflict then logic must give way. I think that’s consistent, for if nature (i.e. reality as naturalism understands it) is the metaphysically fundamental then even our strongest intuitions must be deemed secondary. As naturalist Patricia Churchland says “Truth, whatever that is, takes the hindmost”. In comparison, on theism the metaphysically fundamental is a rational person, so truth and logic do not take the hindmost. But one will not be able to explain this unless one points out the personal nature of truth – and of value. Thus, far from making it uncertain, it is the personal nature of truth that makes it certain.
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[3rd part, continues from above]
ReplyDeleteFinally, you speak of “using an analogy with truth that I thought a naturalist could understand”. I understand that was your purpose, but I wonder whether truth is served, and whether naturalists are enlightened, if one makes an effort to use non-theistic language. For, if theism is true then the non-theistic language that naturalists can understand is ultimately misleading. That was my point. Not to mention that the value of theism does not lie in that it tracks truth better, or in that it offers a foundation for reason and for ethics, but in that it realizes a better way of life, a path to a better existential condition. And this fact cannot I think be communicated by avoiding personal/theistic language.
In these religiously charged days, my thoughts often turn to Christ’s life on Earth. And I think that Christ taught life transforming truth not by using good arguments, not even by telling wise stories, not even by giving us commands of splendid beauty, but mainly by His personal example, by living in a way that embodies truth. Embodying the truth, that’s what religion is ultimately about. And, again, that can’t be explained unless one makes clear the personal nature of truth.
The word "objective" is overused when it comes to morality. For further explication: http://edward-t-babinski.blogspot.com/2011/09/word-objective-is-overused-when-it.html
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