Tuesday, May 7, 2013

Once More: Storytelling Animals

This past weekend I had the pleasure of participating in the annual conference of the Oklahoma Writers' Federation, Inc. Our keynote speaker was the hugely talented Patrick Rothfuss--who, in addition to writing engrossingly brilliant fantasy novels, also founded Worldbuilders, a geek-powered charity that raises money for Heifer International (an organization I have a fair bit of fondness for myself).

During his keynote, in addition to showing off his enviable beard and reading his not-for-toddlers picture book The Adventures of the Princess and Mr. Whiffle, Rothfuss made the case that what distinguishes human beings most meaningfully from other animals may be our irresistible desire to tell stories--to see the world through the lens of storytelling, to make sense of it all in narrative forms.

Hence, I thought this might be a good occasion to revisit my own exploration of this idea--from a post last year. The entire post is reprinted below. What do people think? Is "storytelling animals" a better definition of humanity than the classic "rational animals"?



STORYTELLING ANIMALS

The traditional philosophical definition of 'human' is "rational animal," and while I think this definition works, it seems to me a case could made for defining us as storytelling animals. That's what is suggested in a recent article by Maria Popova, and also in the book Popova discusses in that article, namely The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human, by Jonathan Gottschall.

There may actually be a close connection between rationality and storytelling. Perhaps defining us as storytelling animals, as opposed to merely rational ones, focuses in on a certain kind of rational thinking that is especially distinctive of who and what we are.

Reason makes connections. Some of those connections are logical ones--and certainly part of what human characteristically do is recognizing logical implications. But the most important connections people make have to do with the question "Why?" And as soon as we start saying why this or that is the case--as soon as we start making causal connections, teleological ones (roughly, connections based on purposes and aims), or what I'll call emergent ones (accounts of how some higher level property arises out of the interaction of simpler elements)--we've started to tell a story.

Scientists, in their way, are in the business of telling stories. They aim not just to be collectors of facts and observers of patterns. They want to make sense of those facts and those patterns, weave them together into a coherent picture. This is the essence of narrative, what distinguishes a timeline from a story: Fitting the pieces together in a way that makes sense. The theoretic level of science might be construed as a distinctive refinement of the storyteller's art.

Arguably, the most influential scientists are those who have a knack for how to tell their story well, in a way that resonates with and makes sense to others. Darwin, in The Origin of Species, famously told the story of evolution in a way that connected with the common experience of people of the day--by, among other things, invoking the metaphor of animal husbandry to explain the process of natural selection.

Philosophy, too, can be seen as involving a specialized kind of storytelling. Philosophy has both a negative/critical side and a constructive/speculative one. The constructive side attempts to fit disparate elements of our experience together into a coherent way of seeing the whole--and the critical side is really in the service of the constructive one, assessing attempts at speculative construction to evaluate their internal coherence and their fit with our lived experience and the facts available. Philosophy in this sense becomes a kind of storytelling and vetting of stories in an attempt to piece together our human experience into a compelling account of what it all means.

Even those who resist speculation beyond "what science tells us" have a hard time resisting their own version of such holistic storytelling, which is why "scientism" so often emerges among those who are doggedly committed not to believe in anything beyond what science tells us. Scientism is what happens, we might say, when those who consciously refuse to tell a holistic story end up telling one subconsciously: They weave together a narrative picture of the whole premised on the idea that there is nothing beyond what science gives to us, and hence postulating that the picture of "the whole" cannot include any postulates beyond the very delimited ones that arise in the scientist's specialized form of storytelling.

Naturalism, in contrast with scientism, might be seen as the conscious attempt to build a narrative worldview around such a postulate--and hence as the effort to tell this story in a self-reflective and thoughtful way, as opposed to merely falling into a muddled story by accident.

Note: The above distinction might convey the impression that agnosticism is paired with scientism rather than naturalism, but that is a mistake. Agnostics might be very deliberate, thoughtful storytellers who are simply hesitant to give too much credence to their own stories. Telling a story isn't the same as believing it.

But this point raises some interesting questions which I think I'll take up in my next post. For now, however, let me ask it of my readers: What, exactly, are the different ways in which storytelling can be (or generally is) related to belief?

7 comments:

  1. Hi Eric

    Interesting question. I think a defining characteristic of humanity is empathy, that capacity to imagine ourselves into the lives of others. Story then gives a chance, via this capacity, to try out the feel of our beliefs. What would it be like, to believe I had the right to take revenge, to believe there is,f or each, only one true love to be discovered, etc. We can then, perhaps, get a sense of the desirability of a belief, and for a certain type of pragmatist that might provide a direct line between story and belief. For others, it might provide motivation to establish a means of believing that which they desire, so a more subtle relationship between the two, and for a certain style of cynic, maybe the link is very weak.

    Bernard

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  2. Hi Eric,

    Obviously I agree we are inherently story-tellers (my continual harping on postmodernism) and thus why we tell stories to make sense of the world. We don’t just state “facts” we weave them into comprehensive, holistic, articulations that try and answer the “big” questions. However, are you speaking of metanarratives, comprehensive world-views/faiths when you talk about “story” here? Or are you speaking of something at the level, of say, the story of supposed “American uniqueness/chosen people” sort of thing, whereas we could imagine someone telling this story in public but not quite believing it privately? Or maybe an old family story that has been handed down and while the family may tell it like they believe it for entertainment value, the also wink at one another clearly knowing how it has expanded over time and grown.

    Because if you are speaking of metanarratives/worldview/faiths, then I don’t think I agree that someone could inhabit a story at that level (telling it) but not believe it. I've always thought regarding metanarratives/worldviews/faiths, that they are not thought of as simply a “story” in a made-up sense or doubtful sense, but the very rock-bottom articulation of what a person truly believes deep down about the world and their place in that world.

    If you are speaking of that type of “story” then I don’t think I can agree with your note here:

    “Note: The above distinction might convey the impression that agnosticism is paired with scientism rather than naturalism, but that is a mistake. Agnostics might be very deliberate, thoughtful storytellers who are simply hesitant to give too much credence to their own stories. Telling a story isn't the same as believing it.”

    Because with metanarratives/worldview/faith, telling this story is most certainty the same as believing it.

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  3. Bernard,

    Perhaps Eric can shed some light here on the perennial question you bring up as to your repeated request for an “example” of a positive belief under-girding your agnosticism or your claim that your agnosticism isn't faith-based like the atheist’s or Christian’s view.

    When I read this: “Even those who resist speculation beyond ‘what science tells us’ have a hard time resisting their own version of such holistic storytelling, which is why ‘scientism’ so often emerges among those who are doggedly committed not to believe in anything beyond what science tells us. Scientism is what happens, we might say, when those who consciously refuse to tell a holistic story end up telling one subconsciously: They weave together a narrative picture of the whole premised on the idea that there is nothing beyond what science gives to us, and hence postulating that the picture of ‘the whole’ cannot include any postulates beyond the very delimited ones that arise in the scientist's specialized form of storytelling.”

    --I see those very claims or types of reasoning in some of your assertions as noted here: “I withhold belief at the point where I can't see how either reason or evidence can take me any further” and, “The link to [my] agnosticism is that the agnostic seeks to restrict their beliefs to just these cases.”—and by “these cases” you were very specific you meant “empirically” verifiable cases. So how do you square that with Eric’s quote above? How is that not closer to “scientism”?

    In his "note" he points out that one way to avoid the error of scientism is to have a deliberate and thoughtful articulation for one’s agnosticism. But how would one do that and claim at the same time they are not making any positive belief claims or metaphysical-faith claims? You seem to go out of your way to say that the decision to "withhold" belief is not really based upon a thoughtful articulation, but rather a personal preference "taste" issue. I just don't see how this squares with Eric's note/qualification.

    I don’t know if Eric wants to use this forum, post, or comment section, or even address it, but maybe he can speak to your claim better than I. And his post does definitely raise these issues. Or perhaps the two of you have resolved the issue and if so, I would definitely like to hear the result.

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  4. Hi Darrell

    I'm not entirely sure what you're asking, so apologies if I misunderstand you here.

    Eric here speaks of scientism as the tacit belief that there is nothing beyond that which science can show us. I explicitly reject that belief. I hold not only that the world is stranger than we imagine, but that it may well be stranger than we can imagine. I don't expect we are even scratching the surface of existence with our scientific understanding.

    I certainly don't suggest that I make no metaphysical faith claims. I have very many of them. Indeed they appear to be inevitable if one is to believe anything. What I do claim, in part just to test out its plausibility, is that the metaphysical faith claims I do make are of the type that are commonly held (for instance, that there is sufficient regularity in the world that the past provides a guide to the future).

    Bernard

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  5. Bernard,

    I am speaking of the very issue we’ve been discussing elsewhere. How is the regularity of the world a metaphysical claim? It is an empirical claim. Now if you were to begin surmising what you thought that such regularity meant, then you would making metaphysical claims.

    Well then if your agnosticism is based upon metaphysical claims, or as I’ve been suggesting, faith, like the rest of us, I am glad to hear it. We all stand on equal ground now. I’m not sure what all the fuss was about then. You may want to post this on my blog too for Ron and Burk.

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  6. Hi Darrell

    Because the regularity of the physical world can not be deduced from observation of the physical world, it is perhaps properly considered a metaphysical claim.

    Bernard

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  7. Bernard,

    If you are referring specifically to a question like, "how do we know the sun will rise tomorrow," then I see what you mean, but I don't see how this applies to your repeated request for an example of your holding an uncontested belief when it comes to your agnosticism.

    Regardless, the fact that you note that you do make metaphysical claims like the rest of us, whether toward belief in the trancendental or atheism, I certainly do want to stress that common ground.

    Unless Eric has something to add, I will probably take my comments back to my blog.

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