Materialist Conceptions of Mind, Part II: Emergentism and the Explanatory Gap

In my last post I explained why I found a simple identification between mental phenomena and brain processes to be untenable. But such identification of mind and brain is not the only option for the materialist—and so even if my case against identificationism is sound, it doesn’t follow that one must give up on materialism. One alternative to simple identification is emergentism—the idea that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.


This view holds (in the words of John Searle, the most prominent defender of emergentism) “that brain processes cause consciousness but that consciousness is itself a feature of the brain”—a feature that emerges because of something about the distinctive structure and organization and activity of the brain. It is this alternative I want to turn to now.

To get at the idea of what emergentism maintains, it may help to start with an example. On my desk, I have a framed picture of my kids—taken just over four years ago when my daughter was an infant. My son is leaning towards her, laughing while he looks at her. He’s wearing an armadillo t-shirt and is holding a green plastic cup. My daughter is wearing a red bodysuit and looks like she is boxing the air with her little fists.

This same picture is one I've uploaded onto my computer, and it is now part of my slideshow screensaver. When this picture appears on my computer screen, I can rightly say, “That is the same picture as the one in the frame on my desk.” And I can rightly say that because what I am referring to as the picture is something abstracted from (in one case) pixels and underlying hardware controlled by computer programming and (in the other case) ink distributed on photo paper. What I mean by "the picture" is this something that can emerge from each underlying physical substrate—something that both of these very different physical substrates have in common.

And what is it that they have in common? It has something to do with organization. In the case of the framed photo, dots of ink in different colors are arranged on paper in a pattern that produces a holistic visual effect on the viewer. The other image creates an arrangement of illuminated pixels rather than dots of ink, but the pattern into which those pixels are organized is the same. And so we have these two very different physical substrates that each succeed in generating identical images (that is, identical in kind; they are not numerically the same thing).

In each case, the picture of my children is an emergent property of the underlying physical substrate—it is a feature of the physical system that is produced by that system as a whole by virtue of what is true of the parts, but which is not a feature of any of the parts.

Arguably, the emergent property in either case doesn’t really “emerge” in the absence of an observer who has the capacity to find in the similar organizational structures of the two physical substrates a shared meaning. In other words, at least in some cases, emergence requires a subject who is capable of meaning-attributions. Without that observer, we have an arrangement of inkblots or of illuminated pixels, but we simply don’t have an image of my children. That requires someone to find meaning in the pattern—and neither a piece of photo paper with ink on it nor a computer can do that. This point, although not one I will pursue at the moment, may prove to be of great significance for thinking clearly about the emergence of consciousness.

Now, it is not necessary for emergence that there be multiple and distinct physical substrates that are somehow capable of giving rise to the same kind of property. I choose this example for two reasons. First, the fact that there are two very different physical substrates helps to isolate the emergent property and identify it as distinguishable from the substrate which produces it. Second and more importantly, this example is useful for highlighting some of the advantages of emergentism over identificationism with respect to consciousness.

The most obvious advantage, highlighted by this example, is that emergentism makes room for multiple realizations of consciousness. That is, different sorts of physical systems—human brains and, say, “positronic” ones—can both give rise to this thing we call consciousness.

Second, the example makes clear that an emergent property is not to be identified with the underlying physical system that causes it, even if it is causally explained or accounted for in each particular case by the more basic properties and structural features of that system. And because of this fact, one does not run into the sorts of problems that identificationism poses with respect to relational properties.

So, to go back to the picture of my children, I am intimately familiar with this image even though, in the case of its instantiation on my computer, I know very little about the underlying mechanisms which produce it. Since the image on the computer screen is caused by but distinct from the physical substrate that produces it, there is no problem that arises from this difference in relational properties. Put simply, one can be perfectly familiar with one property of a thing without being at all familiar with other properties. And so, if consciousness is an emergent property of brain processes, the fact that I am not familiar with any of the other properties of the underlying brain processes poses no difficulty at all. Likewise, that scientific investigation of a bat’s brain can’t tell us what it’s like to be a bat doesn’t cause the same degree of trouble, because a mode of inquiry that can describe one range of properties possessed by a thing might not be able to tell us everything there is to know about the thing. Some properties might be inaccessible to that mode of inquiry.

Now before turning to the challenges faced by emergentism, let me say a few words about what emergentism claims—and what it doesn’t claim—about consciousness. Here, I want to specifically stress that Searle, although the philosopher most commonly associated with emergentism, rejects some very important materialist theories of mind which are emergentist (at least according to the account of emergence offered above).

To be precise, Searle is a staunch opponent of the kind of functionalist account of mind that, for decades, was almost normative in cognitive science research. Functionalism, in its broadest terms, identifies mental states with functional ones—where a functional state is one that is possessed by a physical system when that physical system responds to a certain range of inputs with a predictable range of outputs. A vending machine has a functional state insofar as, when you insert the right amount of money and push the right button, a can of coke will tumble out. It has a “functional organization” or “pattern of causal relations” (to borrow Searle’s description).

The most interesting functional states, from a cognitive science standpoint, are those that computers possess by virtue of their programming. A computer program is, basically, the imposition of a specific functional organization onto a computer’s hardware. When a particular program is running (Microsoft Word), then various inputs (keys punched on the keyboard) reliably produces certain outputs (letters appearing consecutively from left to right across the screen). Of course, different programmers can generate similar functional states in different ways, and can do so on different hardware. So the same functional state might be produced on a PC with Microsoft Word, or on a Mac with WordPerfect.

The most popular developed form of functionalism is the theory that mental states are akin to computer programs—that is, mental states just ARE the functional organization or software of the brain.

Searle calls this view “Strong AI,” and he has attacked it again and again—most famously with his “Chinese Room” thought experiment. The thought experiment asks us to imagine someone who is isolated in a room and has Chinese characters given to him from the outside. He then consults some rather complex instructions that tell him what to do when he receives such-and-such characters. Following these instructions, he puts together a set of characters and hands them out of the room. It turns out that what he is receiving are questions asked in Chinese, and what he returns are answers. The point is that no matter how sophisticated the instructions for what symbolic outputs to provide in response to which symbolic inputs, the man in the room cannot be said to understand Chinese—because the instructions (the “program”) merely indicate how to correctly manipulate the symbols. They don’t say what the symbols mean. Put another way, a program can offer syntax but not semantics. But consciousness has semantic content—in fact, that’s what qualia are. And so, any system that can’t explain such content can’t explain consciousness.

But here’s the thing: the functional state of a system IS an emergent property of that system—it’s a property that emerges out of how the whole is organized. What Searle’s Chinese Room analogy demonstrates is that it isn’t enough to say that consciousness is an emergent property of brain processes. We need to ask what kind of emergent property it is and how it emerges—and this account has to track onto what we know first-hand about consciousness.

And although Searle is convinced that consciousness IS an emergent property, he has not offered any such account. That’s not his aim, because he doesn’t think he is in a position to do so. Rather, his aim is to spark a research program. He thinks cognitive scientists have been barking up the wrong tree—that their working model for understanding what consciousness IS just doesn’t work, and that as a result their attempts to explain consciousness are really explaining something else entirely (our ability to perform complex calculations, perhaps).

So, to summarize: the emergentist thinks that something about neurological systems—their constitutive elements, their organization, the interactions of the parts—gives rise to or produces on a holistic level this thing we call consciousness. But while one emergent property—the functional organization of the brain—can explain the brain’s capacity to respond to certain inputs (a hot stove scalding a hand) with appropriate outputs (the hand jerking quickly away), or its capacity to perform complex calculations, the functional organization alone is insufficient to account for the content of consciousness.

The problem, of course, is that neuroscientists do not at present have any account of how neurological systems can do this—a fact that most are willing to admit. Sandra Menssen and Thomas Sullivan, in The Agnostic Inquirer, offer some choice quotes from current neuroscience texts that are rather striking in this regard. For example, one of the standard textbooks in the field, Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind, puts it this way: “Right from the start we can say that science has little to say about sentience. We are clueless on how the brain creates sentience.”

Neuroscientists have had considerable success in tracking correlations between neurological events and conscious states—and then in describing the correlated neurological events in growing detail. They can do this, first of all, because their subjects can communicate their conscious states to researchers. Scientists can ask their subjects what they are feeling, sensing, etc., as those subjects’ brains are being probed using MRI technology or other exploratory equipment. To a lesser extent they can also track correlations because they can reasonably posit that their subjects are undergoing certain conscious states based on their own subjective experience of consciousness (they can assume that their research subject is having a certain kind of subjective experience because they’ve just flashed a bright light in the subject’s eyes and because the researchers know what their own subjective experience is when that happens to them).

But although they have been able to track correlations between brain states and conscious states in this way, we might well ask whether they could have made any progress at all in this project in the absence of either subjective reports from their subjects or conclusions based on attributing to their subjects what they find in their own consciousness (through introspection). The answer seems to be no. And the reason is because there is nothing about the MRI images or other data that by itself gives any clue as to what the corresponding contents of consciousness should be. There is this gulf between what neuroscientists are looking at and describing (the brain processes) and the correlated conscious states with which we are all familiar.

Could this explanatory gap be one that more scientific study will eventually close? Will we, eventually, be able to understand how neurological events can generate this thing we call consciousness? Many scientists express this hope, and many naturalists rest their ontology on it. They say, in effect, “Scientists have explained many mysteries that previously had been thought to be inexplicable in scientific terms. Just give them time, and they’ll explain consciousness, too.” Searle clearly has this hope—but he thinks the hope can be realized only once scientists aren’t being misdirected by philosophical “accounts” of consciousness that really deny the existence of the data to be explained.

But others think that there is a difference in kind between the mysteries that science has unraveled in the past and the present mystery of consciousness—a difference that makes this explanatory gap more than merely contingent. In effect, the view is this: the nature of neurological systems is such that a scientific understanding of them, no matter how complete, cannot account for consciousness.

The argument for this view traces back at least to Leibniz, who offers the following brief argument in The Monadology:

One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.

In short, Leibniz thinks our physical organs which might be thought responsible for consciousness are mechanical systems—but there is nothing about mechanistic explanation which is in principle capable of accounting for our inner perceptual experience. We find a similar argument advanced in more detail by the great 19th Century German Philosopher, Hermann Lotze:

…out of all combinations of material conditions the origin of a spiritual condition of the soul never becomes analytically conceivable; or, more simply expressed, if we think of material elements in such a way as to predicate of them nothing which does not belong to the notion of matter, if we simply conceive of them as entities in space which are moveable and may call each other into motion by their power; if we, finally, imagine these motions of one or many elements as varied or combined as we please, there never comes a time when it is self-evident that the motions last produced may not longer remain motions but must be transformed into sensations. A materialism, therefore, which assumed that a spiritual life could spring out of simply physical conditions or motions of bodily atoms would be an empty assumption, and, in this form, has hardly ever been advocated in earnest.

Of course, Lotze was writing before this position was widely and persistently advocated in earnest by a range of thinkers in the 20th Century—but his argument has continued to crop up, most recently (in an implicit form) in Chalmer’s zombie thought experiment—the point of which seems to be that there is nothing about an arrangement of physical bodies “pushing on each other,” no matter how complex the system of pushes, that implies consciousness. It is for this reason, I think, that Chalmers is convinced we can always imagine such a system existing but lacking consciousness (a “zombie”). Since nothing about the physical system, if it possesses only physical properties, implies consciousness, it is possible for such a physical system to exist without consciousness.

Chalmers’ solution is one that Lotze was well aware of more than a century before Chalmers proposed it with much fanfare. In fact, here is what Lotze says immediately after his rejection of a simple mechanistic account of consciousness:

The materialistic views which have really had adherents have proceeded from the premise that what we call matter is really better than it externally appears. It contains in itself the fundamental peculiarity out of which the spiritual conditions may develop just as well as physical predicates—extension, impenetrability, etc.—are developed out of another fundamental peculiarity. From this results the new attempt, out of the reciprocal operations of these psychical elementary forces to elucidate all the elements of the spiritual life just as its bodily life is derived from the reciprocation of the physical elementary forces of its constituents.

Lotze goes on to challenge this “Chalmerian” view on the grounds that it cannot account for the unity of consciousness—but let me leave this aside for now. The point that Lotze wants to make—a point echoed by Chalmers more than a century later—is that there is nothing about purely mechanistic explanation that renders consciousness “analytically conceivable” in terms of it.

Menssen and Sullivan offer their own analogy for getting at this explanatory disconnect. Here is how they put the point:

Your child has a pull toy that features a little man in a box whose head pops in and out of the box as the toy is pulled along. You wonder, why does the head pop in and out? You examine the toy and see that the wheels are affixed to an axle with a rise in the middle; the little man sits on the rise, so his head goes up and down with each revolution of the wheels. Now your friend comes in and asks, ‘Why does the man’s head pop in and out?’ So you explain. And your friend says, ‘I understand all that, but why does the head pop in and out when the toy is pulled along?’ The question is bizarre: if your friend really understood everything you have said, it makes no sense to continue to ask why the head pops in and out.

This “making no sense to keep asking why once the explanation is understood” is what Lotze has in mind when he speaks of a phenomenon being “analytically conceivable” in relation to a particular kind of explanation—the explanation just shows us how the phenomenon in question is brought about. And this, Menssen and Sullivan maintain, is a feature of any genuine causal explanation. In their terms, “If a putative explanation of a phenomenon is a genuine causal explanation, then if you grasp the explanation in relation to the phenomenon, it cannot reasonably be asked: ‘But why does the phenomenon occur?’”

They follow their articulation of this principle with the following crucial claim: “No matter how much is said about the nervous system, as long as what is said is confined to statements of fundamental physics and chemistry, you will always be able to ask ‘But why does that produce consciousness?’”

The contention here is that not only do current mechanistic explanations fall short of accounting for consciousness, but that “more of the same” sort of explanation won’t close the gap—because the problem lies with the kind of explanation being offered, rather than with the amount of detail involved.

To see this point, consider an analogy my friend and colleague John Kronen likes to employ (one that dates him—and me, since I am able to appreciate it). Suppose someone comes upon Samantha Stevens wiggling her nose to miraculous effect. She wiggles, and the vacuum flies out of the closet and cleans the house all by itself. She wiggles, and her poor husband Darren materializes in the living room, blinking in surprise. Suppose someone came along and said, “Oh, I see! No mystery here. These events are explained by the wiggling of her nose.” Well, we wouldn’t be satisfied.

Now suppose that the person took to studying Samantha’s nose-wiggles and began to observe and record correlations between how she wiggles her nose and what happens. A long wiggle to the left followed by two short ones to the right precede every instance of inanimate objects moving on their own; two short left wiggles followed by two short right wiggles precede every instances of teleportation, etc. Would we now be inclined to say, “Oh, now I get it!”? Of course not. And now matter how detailed the study of the patterns of nose movements—no matter how perfect the correspondence between distinctive sorts of nose wiggles and distinctive events—we would be no closer to having an explanation of how Samantha Stevens does what she does. Nose wiggles are analytically disconnected from flying objects and teleportation, such that they have no capacity to close the explanatory gap.

The claim, in effect, is that physical brain events bear the same relation to consciousness. They are analytically disconnected in such a way that it is not possible to close the explanatory gap.

Of course, it is one thing to say this, another for it to be true. But here is the problem. If someone were to ask why Samantha’s nose-wiggles are analytically disconnected from flying objects so as to be incapable by themselves of providing an adequate explanation of the latter, I would be at pains to offer anything other than, “Well, think about her nose wiggles. Think about flying objects. They have nothing to do with each other.” The sense of disconnect here is so intuitively evident that, in the absence of some astonishingly unexpected explanation that succeeds in establishing a connection, one is justified in assuming that “more of the same” won’t narrow the explanatory gap. We need to look past her nose and introduce some further element that can make the connection.

But, of course, defenders of materialist conceptions of consciousness think brains and minds have everything to do with each other—and so it may well be the case that what we have here is (once again) a basic dichotomy of intuitions. Those who find the explanatory gap argument persuasive have an intuitive and immediate sense of the distinctness of consciousness and mechanistic processes—and this intuitive sense entails that in the absence of a causal explanation that succeeds in closing the explanatory gap, the presumptive standpoint will be that the gap can’t be closed by that kind of explanation.

This is where I am positioned. And because I am positioned as I am, no materialist account of consciousness will be convincing in the absence of an explanation that actually closes the explanatory gap. But for those with different basic intuitions, the situation may be very different.

So what does all of this mean? Do I think that scientists should stop trying to explain consciousness in terms of the brain? No. But it does mean that unless and until they succeed, those like myself—those who see a disparity between brain processes and conscious states as enormous (more enormous, actually) as that between nose-wiggles and self-propelled vaccuums—won’t believe it until we see it. For us, given where we stand intuitively, the burden of proof rests on the materialist to show that the explanatory gap can be closed by nothing other than a deeper study of the brain.

In the meantime, we’ll conduct our own inquiries—looking for something more, some additional element, that can bridge the gulf between mechanistic explanations and the phenomenon of consciousness, and so explain the correlations that scientists have shown to exist between the two.

That different people, with different basic intuitions, are pursuing different theories and attempting to find ways to substantiate them (especially to those who stand on the other side of the intuitive gap) seems to me as if it can only be a good thing--although there are, of course, plenty of people on both sides of the divide who think that what those on the other side are attempting is absurd and pointless and worthy of nothing but mockery.

Materialist Conceptions of Mind, Part 1: Identificationism

In the next few posts I want to (a) consider what I take to be the main ways that a materialist can account for consciousness, and (b) try to identify the main hurdles that these accounts must overcome in order to be generally convincing.


For my purposes here a “materialist” will refer to someone who holds that phenomena in general and mental phenomena in particular (that is, conscious states and subjective experiences such as thoughts, sensations, emotions, and desires) are (i) purely material or physical, and (ii) wholly and adequately explained by the sorts of physical mechanisms and processes that, in the sciences, are routinely posited as explanations for empirical phenomena (even if those explanations might not be accessible to us right now). By the “material” or “physical” I mean, at the most basic level, entities characterizable in spatio-temporal terms that interact and affect one another in accord with causal laws whose consistent operation can be tested through scientific means—in short, matter and energy.

So, (i) is an ontological thesis about what mental phenomena are. To say that they are purely physical is not, however, to say that they must be entities composed of matter an energy, like tomatoes and rocks. While that is one way in which something can be purely physical, there are other ways. Mental phenomena might, for example, be physical process, or a certain class of properties possessed by these processes, or the way that certain physical processes “look” from a peculiar perspective.

The related thesis, (ii), is more of an epistemological one about what methods we should employ for coming to an adequate understanding of mental phenomena. The methods are scientific. That is, we will come to adequately understand mental phenomena in just the way that we have come to understand such phenomena as illness, lightning, or the cycle of the seasons: by uncovering the physical building blocks, structures, and mechanisms that (in accord with physical laws) explain the phenomena in question.

The materialist, thus understood, has (I think) three main options for dealing with consciousness. These options are:

1) “Identificationism,” by which I mean a direct identification of mental phenomena with brain processes—what we call mental phenomena just are brain events in much the way that water is H20. (Note: while some equate this view with what is called “eliminative materialism,” I reserve “eliminative materialism” for the more radical view, seemingly embraced by Feyerabend and a few others, that mental phenomena don’t really exist at all).

2) “Emergentism,” by which I mean the view (most famously advocated by Searle) that consciousness is an emergent property of an active brain. What we know as our consciousness is a feature of the brain in something like the way that brittleness is a feature of glass—it is a property of the whole that arises by virtue of the activity of the constituent elements organized in the distinctive way that they are, and can thus be adequately explained by reference to those elements.

3) “Perspectivalism,” by which I mean the view that consciousness is the way that the complex processes of the brain “look” from a distinctive perspective—specifically, from the “internal” perspective that arises when the brain itself engages in self-monitoring/self-representing activity. This is the kind of view advocated by Douglas Hofstadter in I Am a Strange Loop.

In this first post, I would like to look at the first of these three options to explain why materialists would do well to look elsewhere. The view gets what plausibility it has from the growing body of neuroscientific research that has succeeded in correlating specific “inner” experiences (the sensation of bright light, pain, etc.) with (partially understood/described) physical processes in the brain. The idea here is to simply identify the former with the latter—to say, in effect, that what neuroscientists are slowly describing just is the conscious experience with which it has been correlated.

There are, in effect, two substantial difficulties with making this kind of direct identification. The first has to do with the failure of brain states and mental states to meet ordinary standards of identification. The second has to do with the prospects for “multiple realization” of mental phenomena.

Let me begin with the ordinary standards of identification. In any usual understanding of identity, in order for A and B to be identical, what is true of A must be true of B and vice versa. If A has properties that B lacks (or vice versa), then the relation between A and B must be more complex than one of simple identity (perhaps A names X-as-experienced-from-perspective-1 while B names X-as-experienced-from-perspective-2).

But mental phenomena—thoughts, sensations, desires, emotions, etc.—clearly have properties that the corresponding brain processes lack, and vice versa. To see this better, it is helpful to introduce the notion of “qualia” (“quale” in the singular), by which is meant the subjective contents of experience, or, perhaps, the “way it feels” or “what it’s like” to undergo this or that mental experience (for example, what the peculiarly bitter sunflower seed I just ate tasted like as I chewed it up). This “what-it’s-like-ness” of mental phenomena isn’t some incidental feature of these phenomena, but rather their chief constitutive element. Put another way, what I mean by the conscious experience of pain just is the associated quale.

And, as Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson have both famously argued in different ways, these qualia are inaccessible to scientific study in a way that the details of brain processes are not. Nagel, in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, points out that we know a great deal about the neurophysiology of bats, and we know a great deal about how their acoustic radar works. But none of this tells us what it’s like to experience the world through such a radar in the way a bat does. The qualia of a bat’s inner life seem to be inaccessible to science in a way that the brain processes of the bat are not.

Jackson offers a different thought experiment, in terms of a hypothetical scientist who knows everything there is to know, scientifically, about the physiology of color perception, including an exhaustive understanding of the brain processes that correspond with the experience of color…but she has never herself experienced color. And then, one day, she sees a red rose for the first time. Jackson asks: has she learned something new? He thinks the answer is obviously “yes,” which means that there is something about the experience of color that is “above and beyond” the neurological processes science can study.

Here’s a way to put their point: brain processes are third-party accessible objects of study. But there is something related to these brain processes that is inaccessible to such third party study, being instead only available through first-person introspection. This something else is what has come to be called the “qualia” of consciousness. But the fact is that we might as well say that it is consciousness itself—because what we are referring to when we speak of our conscious life just ARE these qualia.

These facts make a simple identification between mental phenomena and brain states at best highly problematic. Mental phenomena are something that each of us has immediate first-person familiarity with; but these phenomena seem inaccessible to neuroscientists engaged in third-person investigation of our brains. And we can claim familiarity with what this or that conscious experience is like—and so honestly claim familiarity with mental states—even if we know absolutely nothing about the brain states with which they correspond. As such, it seems as if mental states have relational properties which brain states lack, and vice versa.

Some defenders of identificationism try to escape this conclusion by pointing to the fact that we can identify water with H2O even though, for a long time, people were entirely unfamiliar with the chemical composition of water (and many remain so). Doesn’t that show that someone’s being familiar/acquainted with A but not with B doesn’t preclude the identity of A and B?

The problem with this rejoinder is that it fails to make a crucial distinction. “Water” denotes a certain entity out there in the world—one we are acquainted with primarily through a range of properties such as liquidity, clarity, capacity to quench thirst, etc. “H2O” denotes the same entity out there in the world understood from a scientific perspective in terms of chemical composition. It turns out that the entity characterized by the former set of properties is the same one that has the given chemical composition.

That is, water and H2O are identical because they refer to the same thing. What is referenced by "water" is not a set of properties but a certain kind of thing (a "natural kind," some might say) that exists in the world but which we are acquainted with through the given set of properties. What we are referring to when we use "water" is the underlying thing which has the properties. But when we speak of pain, we are referring to the quale itself--the "what it feels like" of pain, as opposed to any underlying physical mechanism which might or might not be able to explain the emergence of this sensation.

To better see the problem here, let's consider a different example: the statement "Clark Kent is Superman." Now, consider two possible ways to look at this statement, related to two distinct ways of understanding “Clark Kent” and “Superman.” In the first case, the statement comes out true while in the second it comes out false (at least if we set aside for the moment the unique challenges associated with fictional individuals).

Consider Case 1. In this case, by “Superman” we mean “the individual who embodies a range of traits, including super strength, ability to fly, a do-gooder personality, etc.”; and by “Clark Kent” we mean “the individual who embodies a range of traits, including being mild-mannered, dorky, a reporter for the Daily Planet, etc.”. In this case the identification holds because the individual who possesses the former traits is the same individual who possesses the latter. It isn’t that Superman and Clark Kent possess different properties not possessed by the other. Rather, it is that we know the individual under one name in terms of some of that individual’s properties, and we know the individual under the other name in terms of a different set of that same individual’s properties. But given that the two names refer to the same individual, every property possessed by Clark Kent is also a property possessed by Superman, and vice versa. Hence, a simple identification is possible.

Now consider Case 2. In this case, by “Clark Kent” we mean “the identity taken on by Kryptonian Kal-El in which he masquerades as a normal Earthling”; and by “Superman” we mean “the identity taken on by Kal-El in which he exercises his unique powers in public view.” In other words, under this usage each term refers, not to an individual person, but to an “identity” or “persona” that an individual person has adopted. Well, given THOSE meanings of the respective terms, it would be a mistake to say that Clark Kent is Superman. After all, Kal-El’s “secret identity” is very different from his “superhero identity”, and so they cannot be the same identity—even if it is the same individual who adopts them both.

But given the way in which we use the language of mental states and the way that we use brain-state terms, the two are related in something more like Case 2 than Case 1. And this means that a simple identification of the kind “Clark Kent is Superman” is false, even if it might be true that there is a common underlying entity which is the bearer of both the “mental state” and “brain state” identities. This means that the materialist is better served by the materialist version of what has come to be called “property dualism”: the view that brain states have “mental properties” that are distinct from the physical properties studied by scientists. And while there are different ways to explicate this sort of property dualism, the one that strikes me as being the most plausible is emergentism—the idea (energetically defended by John Searle) that consciousness is an emergent property that supervenes on an active neurological system like the brain taken as a whole.

More quickly and briefly, let me stress one additional difficulty with identificationism. The problem lies in the fact that, by all appearances, on the assumption of materialism we should suppose consciousness admits of “multiple realizations.” The idea of multiple realizations is this: the same property or process could be produced by very different physical building blocks and arrangements. If several engineering firms are given the same task—to design a device that dispenses Starbucks-quality lattes in response to the voice command, “Overpriced coffee! Now!”—they might realize their objective in very different ways. The materials might be different. How those materials are physically arranged might be different. The internal processes of the resultant machine might be quite different in many ways—and yet, both machines might have the very same “emergent” property of dispensing Starbucks-quality lattes in response to appropriate voice commands. This property thus cannot be identical with any particular set of physical components organized and operating in a particular way, because the same property can supervene on very different physical building-blocks.

Now I suppose it is possible that only organic materials exactly like those in terrestrial brains, organized in only the ways that more highly developed terrestrial brains are organized, and operating only in terms of those brains’ distinctive “programming parameters,” can give rise to what we know as consciousness. But this seems implausible to me. Maybe that’s just because I watched one too many episodes of Star Trek--but I think it's more than that. Among other things, rejecting multiple realizations makes the emergence of consciousness through natural selection seem to be an even bigger miracle than it already is (something I doubt a materialist would find congenial).

So, I’m inclined to think that if consciousness is the kind of thing that can emerge from physical systems at all, it will be the kind of thing that will admit of multiple realizations. If so, then one kind of mental phenomenon (say, the experience of pain) cannot be identified with the kind of neurological activity it happens to be correlated with in human brains. And so, if you are a materialist, you will need a different account than identificationism. And since the contender which seems to arise most naturally out of the ashes of identificationism is emergentism, this is what I will take up in my next post.