Imagining Universal Salvation: Seeing Past the Uglier Confusions

A social media friend of mine, a Christian with universalist sympathies, recently posted the following:

Thought experiment:
1.) Let's say it turns out that everyone will eventually spend eternity in the blissful presence and peace of God.
2.) You are granted the knowledge of this right now.
3.) How does this make you feel? What are your thoughts on the matter?

There were numerous responses, most of them expressing feelings of joy, some expressing concerns or raising questions ("Even Hitler?"). And then there was this one:

Being as how it will not happen and cannot happen......but if it did cheated and let down!!!!!! Because that wold make God a liar, a fraud,and no better than satan himself. It wold make The Word of God a lie, and mean that satan himself and all his demonic hordes would also be in Heaven and that Heaven would actually be hell!!!!!!!!!!!!

The response makes two claims about universalism (for my purposes I will assume we're talking about Christian universalism) that are worth reflecting on, despite being somewhat lost in a haze of exclamation-point fury. They are:

A. If Christian universalism is true and all are eventually saved, then God is a liar.

B. If Christian universalism is true and all are eventually saved, this means that the devil and his demons are eventually saved as well; and a heaven filled with the devil and his demons would be no heaven at all, but would be transformed into hell.

Let me reflect on each of these

Is God a Liar if Universalism is True?

The first of these claims is presumably based on views about the nature and content of the Christian scriptures: If you assume that the Bible is the inerrant Word of God, and if you assume that the Bible clearly denies universalism, then endorsing universalism amounts to saying God is either mistaken or a liar.

But the "ifs" here are big ones.

The doctrine of inerrancy is just one theory about how the Bible is related to God and God's Word, and a universalist might have a different theory. Alternatively, the universalist might--based on passages like Lamentations 3:31-33, John 12:30-32, Romans 5:18-19, Romans 11:32, 1 Corinthians 15:22, 1 Corinthians 15:28, and Colossians 1:19-20, or maybe based on a holistic reading of the biblical narrative--reject the premise that the Bible clearly denies universalism.

So it's a mistake to say that universalism implies that God is a fraud.

Suppose someone made the following claim: "If the Bible is the inerrant Word of God, then God is a fraud." You ask them why, and they say the following: "The Bible says in some places (e.g., Romans 5:18-19) that all will be saved and in other places (e.g., 2 Thessalonians 1:8-9) that they won't. One of those claims is true and the other false. If the doctrine of inerrancy is right, then God has said something false. He's either mistaken or a liar. In either case He's a fraud."

The supporter of biblical inerrancy would likely reply in something like the following way: "That argument assumes that the relevant passages can't be reconciled. Maybe you're misreading them! It's not inerrancy that implies that God is a fraud. It's inerrancy combined with your particular understanding of the Bible that implies this. But I don't buy your understanding of the Bible!"

Yes. Exactly.

Here's the lesson: Some people, when they try to imagine universal salvation, have a negative response to it only because, when it is combined with other elements of their broader theology, the implications are ugly. But that doesn't mean universalism is ugly.

Is Heaven turned into Hell if Universalism is True?

Some universalists exclude the devil and his demonic hordes from the scope of universal salvation, limiting it to humanity: God saves all humans. But let's suppose we're dealing with the version of universalism that extends God's love even to the fallen angels. Would that brand of universalism turn heaven into hell?

An important feature of Christian universalism is this: It does not say that creatures will come to enjoy eternal blessedness without being sanctified. On the contrary, most Christian universalists I know are convinced of several things: (1) To be truly blessed requires being freed from bondage to sin, such that it is impossible to enjoy the blessedness of heaven while still being a sinner; (2) We cannot free ourselves from bondage to sin without the grace of God working in and through us; (3) Everyone will eventually receive the divine grace necessary and sufficient to free us from bondage to sin.

This third belief comes in different forms, because of different theologies. Typically, Christian universalists believe that we won't the divine grace necessary for sanctification and blessedness without repentance. So long as we have our backs to God, refusing to take in what God is pouring out to us, we will remain bound by sin.

What universalists are convinced of is that God never gives up on even the most recalcitrant of sinners, and that God is infinitely resourceful and creative in finding ways to cajole and inspire them to repent. What universalists believe is that God will ultimately succeed in transforming the heart of every sinner, redeeming every fallen creature.

In other words, universalists believe, like traditional hellist Christians do, that only the redeemed are in heaven. Where they differ is in their conviction that all of God's creatures are redeemed.

Universalists believe, like traditional hellist Christians do, that there is no sin in heaven. Where they differ is in their conviction that at the end of history there is no longer any sin at all--that God finally succeeds not merely in sequestering sin in hell but in erasing it from creation altogether.

If universalists believe that Satan and his hordes ultimately enter into Heaven, it is because they believe that Satan and his hordes are ultimately redeemed, repenting and confessing their sins, and so restored to their original state as angels of God, channeling love and mercy and grace, celebrating the peace and majesty of God in communion with all the blessed.

In other words, no one enters heaven unless hell has been removed from their hearts. Universalists believe that as much as hellists do. Where they differ is on the question of whether hello continues to enternally stain God's creation, an endless den of sin's persistence--or whether, on the contrary, heaven comes to encompass all of creation in the end.

Put simply, to think that universalism turns heaven into hell is to be caught up in some serious confusion about what universalism says.

Here's the lesson: Some people, when they try to imagine universal salvation, have a negative response to it only because they are confused about what it involves. They imagine sinners enjoying blessedness while still being sinners, even though such a thing is impossible (impossible because being a sinner is the worst conceivable affliction any creature can endure, such that its elimination is a necessary prerequisite for enjoying blessedness).

These points aren't enough to show that when universalism is properly conceived, it is a beautiful thing that should tug at our souls, filling us with the hope that it is true. These points are certainly not enough to show that universalism is, in fact, true. But they do show, I think, that some of the reasons why people don't find universalism beautiful are based on mistakes.

And I do find universalism beautiful, a source of hope and delight.

Universalism and the Argument from God's Love for the Blessed: Considering an Objection

In God’s Final Victory, John Kronen and I put forward a number of initial “prima facie” arguments for universalism as a starting point for our subsequent case that universalism has more going for it than hellism (given Christian starting points). One of those arguments, which we call “An Argument from God’s Love for the Blessed,” runs as follows:

1. Anyone in a state of eternal blessedness possesses both perfect bliss and universal love for all persons.

2. Anyone who possesses universal love for all persons and who is aware that some persons are eternally damned cannot possess perfect bliss.

3. Therefore, anyone who is aware that some persons are eternally damned cannot possess eternal blessedness (1, 2).

4. If anyone is eternally damned, anyone who possesses eternal blessedness would be aware of this.

5. Thus, if anyone is eternally damned, then none possess eternal blessedness (3, 4).

6. God, out of benevolent love for His creatures, confers blessedness at least on those who earnestly repent and seek communion with Him.

7. Therefore, God does not eternally damn anyone (5, 6).

Versions of this argument have been advanced by both Friedrich Schleiermacher and, more recently, Thomas Talbott. Thanks to the blogging efforts of Fr. Aidan Kimel, this argument has received some recent attention in the broader blogosphere.

One blogger, Brandon, raises an objection to it in a recent post on his own blog. I started to respond in a comment, but the comment quickly got so long that I decided it was better to post my reply here.

Brandon’s objection rests on the following key premise (which I will henceforth, with great creativity, refer to as Brandon’s Key Premise):

“The particular complete joy that is intrinsic to heaven itself (which is all that can be meant by perfect bliss in (1)) consists of possession of God as universal and consummate good by love and understanding, or to look at it in the opposite direction, being energized by God as universal good in both understanding and will.”

Based on this premise, Brandon argues that the sufferings of the damned cannot take the perfect bliss of the damned away. Since the bliss flows immediately and essentially from union with God, being in such union is sufficient to guarantee such bliss no matter what else might be going on. As Brandon says, “since by nature it flows directly from God in that union, it is not in the power of the blessed not to have it, regardless of anything else that may happen to them.”

The substance of John Kronen’s and my reply to this line of objection is already articulated in God’s Final Victory (see pp. 81-89). But sometimes it can help to connect the dots in connection with a particular objection. That’s what I mean to do here.

In a nutshell, Brandon’s Key Premise begs the question and relies on a parenthetical claim which is false.

Let me begin with the parenthetical claim. By “perfect bliss” John and I mean unalloyed joy that is fitting to one’s circumstances—in other words, joy that is (a) faultless, in the sense that it is appropriate to feel that level of joy given the state one finds oneself in, and (b) maximal, in the sense that it is the greatest joy of which beings of our nature are capable. Hence, what Brandon takes to be “all that can be meant” is decidedly NOT all that can be meant by “perfect bliss”—and is, in fact, not what we mean.

Now the question is whether the distinctive kind of blessedness of heaven—what the blessed have necessarily by virtue of being in the state of blessedness—includes perfect bliss in the indicated sense. Brandon’s way of putting matters does not allow for this question, which is why I say it begs the question.

Let me approach this another way. While I think Brandon’s Key Premise is problematic, there's a near cousin to it which I think is correct—namely, the premise that results if you swap out “the particular complete joy that is intrinsic to heaven itself” with “ the particular blessedness that is intrinsic to heaven itself,” resulting in the following:

“The particular blessedness that is intrinsic to heaven itself consists of possession of God as universal and consummate good by love and understanding, or to look at it in the opposite direction, being energized by God as universal good in both understanding and will.”

This is, if you will, the non-question-begging variant of Brandon's Key Premise. And the question that isn't begged is whether the blessing of union with God includes perfect bliss. In effect, what John and I (and Schleiermacher and Talbott) argue is that the blessing of union with God includes certain things necessarily—such as moral sanctification and an unfiltered encounter with the divine–but that it cannot contain perfect bliss necessarily unless, necessarily, all are saved.

The reason is because emotional states are about something. A state of perfect joy has a cognitive dimension to it: there is a judgment to the effect that one is in circumstances that warrant perfect joy. One could experience perfect joy that was, in fact, unwarranted only if one were either (i) ignorant of relevant facts about one’s condition, or (ii) morally imperfect (and so had a distorted value system which led one to treat imperfect conditions and perfectly wonderful). But the nature of blessedness—what is essential to union with God—precludes both (i) and (ii) with respect to perfect joy in the face of the eternal damnation of some of God’s beloved children.

Let’s step back and work through the thinking here in a more systematic and complete way. The blessing of salvation, as Brandon notes, involves being “energized by God as universal good in both understanding and will”—which includes moral sanctification. In other words, it includes loving as God loves. (Anyone who was “drugged” into a stupor of self-focused delight by the experience of being united to God, to the exclusion of caring about the fate of others, would not be in a state of blessedness because they would not be perfected in love). The blessing of salvation also involves not being blocked from knowing about what can only be of profound significance to God (since one cannot be united to God through one’s understanding if things that are of utmost significance to God are hidden from one).

The fate of the damned would be of utmost significance to God. That His plan of salvation and desire for the salvation of all were ultimately thwarted—that some of His beloved creatures were mired eternally in the worst conceivable state that a being can endure—could not be anything BUT of utmost significance to God. Thus, anyone who has the distinctive blessedness of heaven would be conscious of the fate of the damned. Anyone perfected in love would be grieved by the fate of the damned. Thus, anyone who has the distinctive blessedness of heaven would, if they knew of it, be grieved by the fate of the damned. Thus, both God and the blessed would be grieved by the fate of the damned.

To be grieved by some aspect of reality is to be in a state that falls short of perfect joy. Put another way, you are not perfectly happy if there are aspects of reality that you can only regard as a profound tragedy to be grieved, and which you actively do grieve—a profound tragedy which never comes to an end, and which you therefore never stop grieving.

Hence, the particular blessedness that is intrinsic to heaven itself—possession of God as universal and consummate good by love and understanding—will result in something substantially less than perfect bliss if reality includes elements that warrant grief as the fitting response (that is, the response exhibited by anyone who is morally sanctified).

To the extent, then, that the traditional doctrine of heaven has included perfect bliss within its conception, heaven will be experienced by anyone only if no one experiences hell.

Now one could (as we note in our book), bite the bullet here and conclude that the blessed in heaven don’t enjoy a state as wonderful as what the tradition has held them to enjoy. But one should reach that conclusion only if one is forced to it by the overwhelming weight of the arguments.

That’s why, in our book, John and I introduce this as an initial “prima facie” argument for universalism—one of four such arguments that we put forward initially as offering a presumptive case that the hellist must overcome by weightier arguments. So: are there weightier arguments for the conclusion that God’s salvific aims are finally and ultimately defeated in the souls of the damned? We think not, and make the case for that at length in God’s Final Victory.

The Landscape of Hellism and Universalism

In a comment on my last post, Dianelos made the following remark:

Perry’s argument turns on a equivocation of the meaning of the proposition P=“eternal creaturely existence of hell is compatible with God’s perfection”. Still, that equivocation apart, don’t both the hellist and hopeful universalist agree that P is true? After all they both agree that it is possible that in fact some creatures will eternally exist in hell. 

I agree. Hopeful universalists and hellists are both committed to P--and in exactly the same sense. But that then raises the question of how and where hopeful universalists differ from hellists in their beliefs. 

This, of course, generates the broader question of how best to distinguish species of hellism and universalism. In God's Final Victory (hopefully available in paperback very soon), John Kronen and I offer a strategy for doing so that I think is quite effective. But there are various ways to make the same distinctions--and it seems to me it might be helpful to use the point of agreement between hellists and hopeful universalists, noted by Dianelos, as a springboard for making some of the same basic distinctions in a fresh way (especially since John and I did not devote much attention to hopeful universalism in our book).